Job evaluation and organized labor.

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston Universit

Endogenous price leadership

duopoly;game theory;pricing;price leadership

Gender strategy: CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems

WLE’s Gender Strategy sets out a path for the program to engage in pioneering research that generates findings and catalyzes action to address the gender-based challenges facing women and men, who are dependent on water, land and ecosystems for their livelihoods, food, nutrition and water security, and incomes. The strategy starts out and tests the hypothesis that gender equity promotes sustainable agriculture in vibrant ecosystems. It then builds on work undertaken within the CGIAR system and elsewhere, by applying cutting-edge gender equality and women’s empowerment frameworks, and innovative research approaches and methods. Knowledge generated will improve WLE interventions at the policy, programming and community implementation levels. Grounded within this strategy, we hypothesize that women, in general, are better custodians and natural resource stewards than their counterparts. Addressing this null hypothesis will form part of the research effort of the strategy, and will bring greater insights into the future role of women in shaping vibrant ecosystems, and food- and water-secure communities. The strategy should be viewed as a ‘living’ document, which will require adjustments as new evidence emerges of the role of women in resource management. WLE is committed to ensuring that the gender component, which falls under the Gender, Poverty and Institutions crosscutting theme, is well resourced with financial targets to be achieved along with appropriate human skills. We believe that by elevating the role and status of women in the management and planning of sustainable food production systems through a natural resource lens, we will be in a position to ensure a food-secure world within vibrant landscapes

CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems (WLE) Gender Strategy

WLE Gender StrategyWLE’s Gender Strategy sets out a path for the program to engage in pioneering research that generates findings and catalyzes action to address the gender-based challenges facing women and men, who are dependent on water, land and ecosystems for their livelihoods, food, nutrition and water security, and incomes. The strategy starts out and tests the hypothesis that gender equity promotes sustainable agriculture in vibrant ecosystems. It then builds on work undertaken within the CGIAR system and elsewhere, by applying cutting-edge gender equality and women’s empowerment frameworks, and innovative research approaches and methods. Knowledge generated will improve WLE interventions at the policy, programming and community implementation levels

Fairness at Work: Federal Labour Standards for the 21st Century

On October 30, 2006 Commissioner Harry Arthurs delivered his report Fairness at Work: Federal Labour Standards for the 21st Century to the Minister of Labour, the Hon. Jean-Pierre Blackburn

Bazaar Transnational Drafting: An Analysis of the GNU Public License Version 3 Revision Process

This Article will step through the drafting process and compare bazaar and cathedral modes of drafting to determine if a bazaar mode can efficiently produce a legal instrument that crosses legal regimes. As the title suggests, the bazaar process analysis case will be the GNU General Public License version 3 (the GPLv3) Revision Process. A comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the bazaar mode of drafting to the cathedral mode of drafting will hopefully demonstrate the overall value of a transnational bazaar process like the GPLv3 Revision Process

Dynamic equilibrium : game theory, contracts, and search

This thesis comprises three chapters centered on two common themes. The first theme is the application of non-cooperative game theory to economic questions; the second is the study of the kind of arrangements that can arise in the labour market as a response to asymmetric information. The first chapter surveys recent developments in non-cooperative game theory, and then attempts an extension of the recent results characterising perfect equilibrium payoffs in repeated games without discounting to more general games. We choose the dynamic game framework for the generalisation, and shows that there are two jointly, but not indi vidually sufficient condi tions for the generalisation to go through. We then turn to an application of these ideas to the theory of longterm contracts. The main motivation for this is that the view that wages and employment are determined by risk-sharing implicit contracts is now a well established alternative to fixed-price and marketclearing theories. In general, long-term arrangements may mitigate inefficiencies in the short-term contract that arise from various sorts of asymmetric information which are likely to be prevalent in worker-firm relationships. In this chapter two things are attempted; first, we try to integrate the game-theoretic approach to contractinq of Radner with the work of Townshend, Rogerson, Roberts and Manning among others, and second, we characterise the optimal contract, and obtain some new results. The labour market is also the topic of the third chapter. Here, we attempt to extend a well-known model of "frictional" labour market equilibrium to the case where onr or both sides of the market differ in inherent characteristics (e.g. skills) which may be observable or unobservable. We show first that the equilibrium may be inefficient even in the absence of externalities which work through the matching technology. Also, the model with unobservable characteristics provides a framework for a theoretical anal;Tsis of the practice of firms of screening workers by unemployment duration. We show that in our model, there are screening equilibria, and also investigate in some detail the impact of exogenous variables on the equilibrium