28,538 research outputs found
Network Markets and Consumer Coordination
This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium. A monopolist might operate multiple ex ante identical networks to price differentiate. In Bertrand competition different firms might target high reservation value consumers on different sides of the market. Firms can obtain positive profits in price competition. Product differentiation in equilibrium is endogenized by consumers' network choices. Enough heterogeneity in reservation values is necessary for existence of these asymmetric equilibria.two-sided markets, network externalities, platform competition, coordination
Price Competition on Network
We present a model of imperfect price competition where not all firms can sell to all consumers. A network structure models the local interaction of firms and consumers. We find that aggregate surplus is maximized with a fully connected network, which corresponds to perfect competition, and decreases monotonically as the network becomes less connected until firms become local monopolists. When we study which networks are likely to form in equilibrium, we find that stable networks are not fully connected but are connected enough to rule out local monopolists. Our results extend to oligopolistic competition when consumers can either buy from a single firm or from all firms.Network markets, price competition, oligopoly competition, Bertrand competition.
Competition with Congestible Networks
We analyse competition between two network providers when the quality of each network depends negatively on the number of customers connected to that network. With respect to price competition we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Comparative statics show that as the congestion effect gets stronger quantities will decrease and prices increase, under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. In an example with endogenous capacities it turns out that capacities are strategic substitutes for both modes of ensuing competition. Welfare comparisons between Bertrand and Cournot competition are unambiguous for fixed capacities, but may turn around for endogenous capacities.Congestion; Networks; Bertrand and Cournot competition
Payment Card Network Pricing - A Theoretical Approach Analyzing the Relationship between Downstream Market Characteristics and the Merchant Usage Fee
In this thesis the model of a payment card network is constructed to explore the impact of downstream market characteristics (i.e., the market where merchants and consumers interact) on the merchant and the interchange fee, thereby extending the literature’s observations of payment systems. To accomplish this, three scenarios are analyzed: firstly, a unitary payment card network with merchants under Cournot quantity competition and, secondly, under Bertrand price competition respectively, as well as, thirdly, a multi-party payment card network with merchants under Cournot quantity competition. This study yields two significant results. Firstly, the merchant and the interchange fee are found decreasing in the consumer price elasticity, the level of product substitutability and the relative frequency of card usage. Secondly, regulating the interchange fee and the merchant fee respectively is found particularly useful since, in markets with less competition where consumers already face inefficiently high prices, the payment card fees will also tend to be higher. --Two-sided markets,Payment card networks,Platform pricing,Bertrand competition,Industrial Organization,Cournot competition
Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency
When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise because workers typically do not know where other workers apply to and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider. The first coordination friction affects network formation, while the second coordination friction affects network clearing. We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. The wage mechanism determines both the distribution of networks that can arise and the number of matches on a given network. Equilibria that exhibit wage dispersion are inefficient in terms of network formation. Under complete recall (firms can go back and forth between all their candidates) only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post Bertrand competition generate the maximum matching on a realized network.random bipartite network formation, network clearing, efficiency, simultaneous search
The effect of competition among brokers on the quality and price of differentiated internet services
Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level compete in a Bertrand game while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers' level. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.This work has been partly supported by National Science Foundation awards: CNS-0963974, CNS-1346688, CNS-1536090 and CNS-1647084
The effect of (non-)competing brokers on the quality and price of differentiated internet services
Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in (virtualized) service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players, i.e. providers and brokers, at each level compete in a Bertrand game while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers’ level. We also study cooperation among a subset of brokers. Numerical simulations demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.Accepted manuscrip
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Network-constrained models of liberalized electricity markets: the devil is in the details
Numerical models for electricity markets are frequently used to inform and support decisions. How robust are the results? Three research groups used the same, realistic data set for generators, demand and transmission network as input for their numerical models. The results coincide when predicting competitive market results. In the strategic case in which large generators can exercise market power, the predicted prices differed significantly. The results are highly sensitive to assumptions about market design, timing of the market and assumptions about constraints on the rationality of generators. Given the same assumptions the results coincide. We provide a checklist for users to understand the implications of different modelling assumptions
Competition between highway operators: can we expect toll differentiation?
Where there are alternative roads to the same destination, competition between profit maximizing road operators is possible. Tolls on such roads could perform two welfare enhancing functions; discouraging excessive driving and allocating drivers between roads. The second of these functions will typically require some roads to be more expensive to drive on, and to be less congested, than others. Bertrand equilibrium will not always peform this second function. It may fail to allocate the most impatient drivers to less congested roads, as it does not always deliver toll differentiation. The performance of this second function is dependent on the first. That is, whether or not competing roads will be differentiated by tolls and congestion, will depend in part on the importance of discouraging marginal drivers. The equilibrium will not generally be fully efficient, but will often provide efficiency gains over other decentralized options.congestion, road pricing, networks, market structure
Pricing differentiated brokered internet services
Price war, as an important factor in undercutting competitors and attracting customers, has spurred considerable work that analyzes such conflict situation. However, in most of these studies, quality of service (QoS), as an important decision-making criterion, has been neglected. Furthermore, with the rise of service-oriented architectures, where players may offer different levels of QoS for different prices, more studies are needed to examine the interaction among players within the service hierarchy. In this paper, we present a new approach to modeling price competition in service-oriented architectures, where there are multiple service levels. In our model, brokers, as the intermediaries between end-users and service providers, offer different QoS by adapting the service that they obtain from lower-level providers so as to match the demands of their clients to the services of providers. To maximize profit, players at each level, compete in a Bertrand game, while they offer different QoS. To maintain an oligopoly market, we then describe underlying dynamics which lead to a Bertrand game with price constraints at the providers' level. Numerical examples demonstrate the behavior of brokers and providers and the effect of price competition on their market shares.http://www.cs.bu.edu/fac/matta/Papers/sdp2016.pdfAccepted manuscrip
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