If You Believe You Believe, You Believe. A Constitutive Account of Knowledge of One’s Own Beliefs

Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that p without believing that one believes that p

The silence of self-knowledge

Gareth Evans famously affirmed an explanatory connection between answering the question whether p and knowing whether one believes that p. This is commonly interpreted in terms of the idea that judging that p constitutes an adequate basis for the belief that one believes that p. This paper formulates and defends an alternative, more modest interpretation, which develops from the suggestion that one can know that one believes that p in judging that p

Louise Cowan Believes

Louise Cowan believes 1. There is a body of “classic texts” that constitute a necessary knowledge for members of Western civilization. 2. These texts interact with--and welcome--sufficiently qualified new texts. 3. Underlying these texts is an oral tradition that sustains the unconscious life of a people. 4. A culture is formed by all the public virtues—both written and oral--cohering to form a cosmos and a code. 5. Poetry is the foundation of this conscious and unconscious cosmos in which people live. 6. Two kinds of learning exist: the first with the purpose of transmitting a sense of this unconstitute cosmos in which one’s world exists; the purpose of the second is to constitute a self. The two make up a liberal education. 7. All young people should be given a liberal education

Honors Banquet Awardees

Raymond G. LaPlaca \u2783, a partner at Knight, Manzi, Nussbaum & LaPlaca believes in giving back to the communities that have nurtured him along the way. A partner with Brown, Goldstein & Levy, Andrew D. Levy \u2781 believes that having a license to practice law carries with it the responsibility of giving something back. (article continued on page 66 of JD. See link to Continuation of Honors Banquet Awardees.

An Epistemic Characterisation of Extensive Form Rationalisability

We use an extensive form, universal type space to provide the following epistemic characterisation of extensive form rationalisability. Say that player i strongly believes event E if i is certain of E conditional on each of her information sets consistent with E. Our main contribution is to show that a strategy profile s is extensive form rationalisable if and only if there is a state in which s is played and (0) everybody is rational, (1) everybody strongly believes (0), (2) everybody strongly believes (0) & (1), (3) everybody strongly believes (0) & (1) & (2), .... This result also allows us to provide sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome and to relate extensive form rationalisability and conditional common certainty of rationality.Rationalisability, Extensive Form Games