Boris Hessen and Newton's God

A significant thread in Boris Hessen‟s iconic essay, The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia (1931), is his critique of Newton‟s involving God in his physics. Contra Newton, Hessen believes that nature does not need God in order to function properly. Hessen gives two, quite distinct, „internal‟ explanations of Newton‟s failure to see this. The first explanation is that Newton‟s failure is caused by his believing that motion is a mode instead of an attribute or essence of matter. The second explanation is that Newton‟s failure is owed to his considering mechanical motion as the sole form of the motion of matter: Newton, in Hessen‟s view, did not realize that matter has many forms of motion which constantly transform into one another while conserving energy. In the present paper, I defend the thesis that none of these explanations can account for Newton‟s failure. Hessen‟s first explanation is problematic because even if Newton believed that motion is an attribute or essence of matter, he would still be obliged to involve God in physics. His second explanation fails too because he does not show exactly how the multiplicity and inter-transformation of forms of motion can account for nature‟s organizational structure

Agency and actions

Among philosophical questions about human agency, one can distinguish in a rough and ready way between those that arise in philosophy of mind and those that arise in ethics. In philosophy of mind, one central aim has been to account for the place of agents in a world whose operations are supposedly ‘physical’. In ethics, one central aim has been to account for the connexion between ethical species of normativity and the distinctive deliberative and practical capacities of human beings. Ethics then is involved with questions of moral psychology whose answers admit a kind of richness in the life of human beings from which the philosophy of mind may ordinarily prescind. Philosophy of mind, insofar as it treats the phenomenon of agency as one facet of the phenomenon of mentality, has been more concerned with how there can be ‘mental causation’ than with any details of a story of human motivation or of the place of evaluative commitments within such a story. This little account of the different agenda of two philosophical approaches to human agency is intended only to speak to the state of play as we have it, and it is certainly somewhat artificial. I offer it here as a way to make sense of attitudes to what has come to be known as the standard story of action. The standard story is assumed to be the orthodoxy on which philosophers of mind, who deal with the broad metaphysical questions, have converged, but it is held to be deficient when it comes to specifically ethical questions. Michael Smith, for instance, asks: ‘How do we turn the standard story of action into the story of ‘orthonomous action?’, where orthonomous action is action ‘under the rule of the right as opposed to the wrong’. Smith is not alone in thinking that the standard story is correct as far as it goes but lacks resources needed to accommodate genuinely ethical beings. Michael Bratman is another philosopher who has this thought; and I shall pick on Bratman’s treatment of human agency in due course

Recklessness and Uncertainty: Jackson Cases and Merely Apparent Asymmetry

Is normative uncertainty like factual uncertainty? Should it have the same effects on our actions? Some have thought not. Those who defend an asymmetry between normative and factual uncertainty typically do so as part of the claim that our moral beliefs in general are irrelevant to both the moral value and the moral worth of our actions. Here I use the consideration of Jackson cases to challenge this view, arguing that we can explain away the apparent asymmetries between normative and factual uncertainty by considering the particular features of the cases in greater detail. Such consideration shows that, in fact, normative and factual uncertainty are equally relevant to moral assessment

Affect: knowledge, communication, creativity and emotion

Concerns about emotional well-being have recently become the focus of social policy, particularly in education settings. This is a sudden and unique development in placing new ideas about emotion and creativity and communication in curriculum content, pedagogy and assessment, but also in redefining fundamentally what it is to ‘know’. Our report charts the creation of what we call an ‘emotional epistemology’ that may undermine all previous ideas about epistemology, draws out implications for educational aspirations and purposes and evaluates potential implications for these aspirations and purposes if trends we identify here continue into the future.This document has been commissioned as part of the UK Department for Children, Schools and Families’ Beyond Current Horizons project, led by Futurelab. The views expressed do not represent the policy of any Government or organisation

What do networks do to work: the agential role of network

The article draws on an ongoing study of interorganisational learning in project based organisations and how organisations learn through network settings. The article aimed at drawing theoretical explanations of network learning especially after learning moved from interorganisational learning to inter-networked learning. The article employs the structure agency relationship by Dave Elder-Vass as theoretical lens to draw conclusions that provides fresh explanations of how network are helpful in fostering learning activities. The research method included interviews, observation and archives. Data were analysed using thematic analysis which generated codes and then conclusion were drawn. The main contributions of this article are (1) to portray agency as another face of structure, (2) stress the agential role of networks, and (3) looking at networks as agents provides fresh understanding of benefits of networks

The path-dependent problem of exporting the rule of law

This article examines three indicators of a functioning rule of law state. First, that the executive operates through legally constituted channels: that administrative and political actions are constrained and channelled through legal authority. Second, that trial processes are robust: being genuine attempts to decide according to proof and law, rather than returning decisions that it is hoped will placate the powerful. Third, that no individual entities, be they corporations or individuals, be they economically or politically or militarily powerful, are able to act outside the reach of legal remedy. The work of D. C. North helps in understanding how the failure to implement or reform law successfully is predictable if the relevant features of the society that receives legal transplant or legal reform efforts are ignored. Ultimately, reform must involve domestic agents in its design and implementation because their knowledge of the subjunctive worlds of their own societies is a vital component in the reform process

Back to the Future – the Marginal Utility of History in Economics

Economics and economic history share many fundamental research problems and have a rich shared intellectual history. Still, works by economic historians are rarely read or referenced in economics. In this essay we attempt to identify the cost of this negligence. In particular, we argue that a restrictive understanding of the economic research programme excludes available evidence and precludes analysis of complex situational constraints on economic decision-making.

Costless Discrimination and Unequal Achievements in a Labour Market Experiment

We investigate the emergence of discrimination in an experiment where individuals affiliated to different groups compete for a monetary prize, submitting independent bids to an auctioneer. The auctioneer receives perfect information about the bids (i.e. there is no statistical discrimination), and she has no monetary incentive to favour the members of her own group (the bidders are symmetric). We observe nonetheless some discrimination by auctioneers, who tend to assign the prize more frequently to a member of their own group when two or more players put forward the highest bid. Out-group bidders react to this bias and reduce significantly their bids, causing an average decay of their earnings throughout the game, with cumulative effects that generate strongly unequal outcomes. Because the initial bias is costless, such mechanism can survive even in competitive market, providing a rationale for a well-known puzzle in the literature, i.e. the long-run persistence of discrimination.discrimination, tournament, groups, experiment