Critical Realism and Statistical Methods: A Response to Nash

This article offers a defence of critical realism in the face of objections Nash (2005) makes to it in a recent edition of this journal. It is argued that critical and scientific realisms are closely related and that both are opposed to statistical positivism. However, the suggestion is made that scientific realism retains (from statistical positivism) a number of elements that result in misleading accounts of social processes and events: indicators are used which do not reflect the close relationship between structure and agency; indicators refer to reified and not real properties of both structures and agents; and indicators do not refer to causal properties of objects and entities. In order to develop a narrative of causal processes, as Nash argues researchers should, then some adjustments need to be made to the principles that underpin scientific realism

Understanding Opportunities in Social Entrepreneurship: A Critical Realist Abstraction

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.This paper extends social entrepreneurship (SE) research by drawing upon a critical realist perspective to analyse dynamic structure/agency relations in SE opportunity emergence, illustrated by empirical evidence. Our findings demonstrate an agential aspect (opportunity actualisation following a path-dependent seeding-growing-shaping process) and a structural aspect (institutional, cognitive and embedded structures necessary for SE opportunity emergence) related to SE opportunities. These structures provide three boundary conditions for SE agency: institutional discrimination, an SE belief system and social feasibility. Within this paper, we develop a novel theoretical framework to analyse SE opportunities plus, an applicable tool to advance related empirical research

History, Crucial Choices and Equilibrium

This paper discusses alternative conceptions of time and scrutinises the ideas of crucial choice, determinism and equilibrium. The relevant notion is that of historical time, where time is seen as irreversible, flowing from the irrevocable past to an unknown future, like an arrow. This notion is consistent with the concept of fundamental uncertainty and is at odds with deterministic explanations of reality. The economy is an open, evolving process in which free will, Shacklean genuine choices, Schumpeterian innovative behaviours, and unpredictable, unintended consequences of human actions have an important role to play. Human imagination and crucial decisions preclude the full operation of rigid laws of necessity. In the light of these ideas, the paper also approaches a few suggestions of reconceptualisations of the notion of equilibrium which purport to render the concept more palatableHistorical Time, Crucial Choices, Shackle, Determinism, Equilibrium.

A comprehensive theory of induction and abstraction, part I

I present a solution to the epistemological or characterisation problem of induction. In part I, Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT) is discussed as a good contender for such a solution but with a fundamental explanatory gap (along with other well discussed problems); useful assigned probabilities like priors require substantive degrees of belief about the world. I assert that one does not have such substantive information about the world. Consequently, an explanation is needed for how one can be licensed to act as if one has substantive information about the world when one does not. I sketch the outlines of a solution in part I, showing how it differs from others, with full details to follow in subsequent parts. The solution is pragmatic in sentiment (though differs in specifics to arguments from, for example, William James); the conceptions we use to guide our actions are and should be at least partly determined by preferences. This is cashed out in a reformulation of decision theory motivated by a non-reductive formulation of hypotheses and logic. A distinction emerges between initial assumptions--that can be non-dogmatic--and effective assumptions that can simultaneously be substantive. An explanation is provided for the plausibility arguments used to explain assigned probabilities in BCT. In subsequent parts, logic is constructed from principles independent of language and mind. In particular, propositions are defined to not have form. Probabilities are logical and uniquely determined by assumptions. The problems considered fatal to logical probabilities--Goodman's `grue' problem and the uniqueness of priors problem are dissolved due to the particular formulation of logic used. Other problems such as the zero-prior problem are also solved. A universal theory of (non-linguistic) meaning is developed. Problems with counterfactual conditionals are solved by developing concepts of abstractions and corresponding pictures that make up hypotheses. Spaces of hypotheses and the version of Bayes' theorem that utilises them emerge from first principles. Theoretical virtues for hypotheses emerge from the theory. Explanatory force is explicated. The significance of effective assumptions is partly determined by combinatoric factors relating to the structure of hypotheses. I conjecture that this is the origin of simplicity

Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law

Could it be right to convict and punish defendants using only statistical evidence? In this paper, I argue that it is not and explain why it would be wrong. This is difficult to do because there is a powerful argument for thinking that we should convict and punish defendants using statistical evidence. It looks as if the relevant cases are cases of decision under risk and it seems we know what we should do in such cases (i.e., maximize expected value). Given some standard assumptions about the values at stake, the case for convicting and punishing using statistical evidence seems solid. In trying to show where this argument goes wrong, I shall argue (against Lockeans, reliabilists, and others) that beliefs supported only by statistical evidence are epistemically defective and (against Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre) that these epistemic considerations should matter to the law. To solve the puzzle about the role of statistical evidence in the law, we need to revise some commonly held assumptions about epistemic value and defend the relevance of epistemology to this practical question

"Ideas" in Development from George Soros: Power and Influence through Philanthropy?

This paper mainly examines the economic ideas and models brought forward by the always controversial global financier George Soros. The aim is to first explore whether in fact Soros has developed over time a well- articulated model for development based on a coherent system of beliefs and (economic, social, political, and philosophical) ideas, and second examine the notion that the world's wealthiest (including Soros) wield enough power and influence (through philanthropy and other means) to shape the economic landscape of countries. The latter point poses a more problematic question: if indeed the world's wealthiest wield unlimited powers in shaping the global development landscape, it could then be assumed that the quality of their "ideas" does not matter much. How do the resources they control ultimately facilitate the transformation of their beliefs and practices into valid economic "ideas"? Do wealth, power and influence validate ideas? The flip side to this coin is that time (hopefully) eventually weeds out the bad ideas, and only the good ones prevail and propagate in the world, and that the Soros's of the world do not matter much in the long run. A lot has been said and written about Soros's controversial financial dealings but very few attempted to systematically explore his system of ideas and evalua te their cohesiveness. He is too often dismissed as a philosophe manqué. The paper will briefly review the written works of Soros and his publicly stated positions on some of the more significant issues in development and economics today, and at times offer a light critique or praise) where due. A parallel with Keynes on some of the issues is also drawn. The paper will also offer insight on the question of whether philanthropy is conducive to the germination (and, most importantly, diffusion) of ideas.economic development; philanthropy; Soros

God and the demon in Cartesian and Akan philosophies: a comparative analysis

The 16th century French philosopher, René Descartes, is one of the most important Christian thinkers in modern philosophy. His ideas on dualism and metaphysics (in general) have been of great interest to both philosophers and religionists. In this piece, I do not discuss Christianity or its influence on Descartes as such. I analyse presentations of God and the demon in Cartesian philosophy (as specifically found in his Meditations) and how they compare with the conceptions of God and the demon in indigenous Akan philosophy. Using the qualitative method, I also examine some implications of both the Cartesian and Akan notions of God and the demon in relation to moral responsibility. While acknowledging that both philosophies contain the ideas of God and the demon, I seek to show that there are significant differences which make it difficult to equate Akan conceptions of these beings to those of Descartes. I establish in this research that the Akan conception of the demon, unlike the Cartesian, is two-sided. Consequently, I caution against the uncritical adoption of non-African concepts in the interpretation of African beliefs, values and practices.Keywords: Akan philosophy, Cartesian philosophy, demon, God, reaso

The two social philosophies of Ostroms' institutionalism

The article argues that Ostroms’ institutionalism has a dimension that is complex and profound enough to deserve to be considered a “social theory” or a “social philosophy”. The paper pivots around the thesis that the “social philosophy” behind the Bloomington School’s research agenda has in fact two facets that may or may not be consistent with each other. The article describes the main features of the two facets, offers a brief overview of the development of these ideas, and clarifies their relationship to Public Choice theory and alternative visions of public goods analysis, public administration, and governance. The argument goes further to raise the provocative question whether the two “social philosophies” involved in the approach undertaken by Elinor Ostrom and Vincent Ostrom are necessarily and inseparably connected with the rest of their research program.Institutional Theory; Polycentricity; Governance; Public choice; Institutional Design; Social Theory