Introduction

What is critical thinking, especially in the context of higher education? How have research and scholarship on the matter developed over recent past decades? What is the current state of the art here? How might the potential of critical thinking be enhanced? What kinds of teaching are necessary in order to realize that potential? And just why is this topic important now? These are the key questions motivating this volume. We hesitate to use terms such as “comprehensive” or “complete” or “definitive,” but we believe that, taken in the round, the chapters in this volume together offer a fair insight into the contemporary understandings of higher education worldwide. We also believe that this volume is much needed, and we shall try to justify that claim in this introduction

Stacking the Deck? An Empirical Analysis of Agreement Rates Between Pro Tempore Justices and Chief Justices of California, 1977-2003

The chief justice of California is empowered to select a pro tempore justice when one or more of the court\u27s regular justices are absent. Chief Justice Rose Bird was accused of using this power to manipulate case outcomes. Contemporary scholarly investigations came to mixed conclusions. Bird\u27s successors have adopted the nondiscretionary method of alphabetical selection. The present study compares the agreement rates of temporary justices with Bird and with her two immediate successors, Malcolm Lucas and Ronald George. It finds evidence of vote bias for Bird, particularly in close cases and cases before April 1981. It does not find evidence of vote bias for Chief Justices Lucas or George, suggesting that a non-discretionary selection procedure should be formally required

A restatement of the case for Scottish fiscal autonomy : or: the Barnett Formula - a formula for a Rake’s Progress

In this paper, we rebut the case that Ashcroft, Christie and Swales [ACS] (2006) make in favour of the status quo fiscal settlement in Scotland that stems from the Scotland Act 1998. This Act in creating the Scottish Parliament and Executive effectively separated public spending by the Scottish government from the need to raise taxes to finance it; rather, financing comes from Westminster through the Barnett formula. We do not think that these arrangements provide a stable political solution in the UK, as is evidenced by the so-called West Lothian question - a matter that may be becoming of greater concern in England than hitherto. Scotland, therefore, should be forewarned that even if it does not move from the status quo, movement might anyway be forced on it

A Restatement of the Case for Fiscal Autonomy (or: The Barnett Formula - a formula for Rake's Progress)

In this paper, we rebut the case that Ashcroft, Christie and Swales (2006) make in favour of the status quo fiscal settlement in Scotland that stems from the Scotland Act 1998. This Act in creating the Scottish Parliament and Executive effectively separated public spending by the Scottish government from the need to raise taxes to finance it; rather, financing comes from Westminster through the Barnett formula. We do not think that these arrangements provide a stable political solution in the UK, as is evidenced by the so-called West Lothian question - a matter that may be becoming of greater concern in England than hitherto. Scotland, therefore, should be forewarned that even if it does not move from the status quo, movement might anyway be forced on it.

Why We Need Legal Philosophy

Do we need legal philosophy? Legal philosophy or jurisprudence, like many other areas of philosophy, is of intrinsic interest to many people. But this does not tell us whether or why we need it. The answer suggested by Lon Fuller is that legal philosophy has - or should have - implications for lawyers, judges, legislators and law professors. And yet in 1952 Fuller concluded that: Judged by this standard I don\u27t think we can claim that the last quarter of a century has been a fruitful one for legal philosophy in this country - certainly not in terms of immediate yield. Fuller\u27s dour observation, if it was true when made and remained true, leads to two further questions: First, in what manner does legal philosophy affect the practice of law? Second, how is it that some philosophies are useful to legal institutions and others are not? In this essay I shall briefly describe the present state of legal philosophy and, then, sketch the answers to these questions that are suggested by one particular strain of recent jurisprudential thought

Is the Constitution Libertarian?

Ever since Justice Holmes famously asserted that “the Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,” academics have denied that the Constitution is libertarian. In this essay, I explain that the Constitution is libertarian to the extent that its original meaning respects and protects the five fundamental rights that are at the core of both classical liberalism and modern libertarianism. These rights can be protected both directly by judicial decisions and indirectly by structural constraints. While the original Constitution and Bill of Rights provided both forms of constraints, primarily on federal power, it left states free to violate the liberties of the people—and even enslave their own people—subject only to their own constitutions. The constitutional protection of individual liberty was substantially enhanced by adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, which abolished slavery and extended the power of the federal courts and Congress to protect the rights if individuals from violation by state governments. Libertarianism has much less to say about either the conduct of foreign policy or the proper institutional allocation of foreign policy powers (though some libertarians mistakenly accord to foreign states a sovereignty that properly belongs only to individuals). Perhaps not coincidentally, the Constitution provides few constraints on the foreign policy decisions of the political branches, or on the allocation of power between them

Originalism: A Critical Introduction

The theory of originalism is now well into its second wave. Originalism first came to prominence in the 1970s and 1980s as conservative critics reacted to the decisions of the Warren Court, and the Reagan Administration embraced originalism as a check on judicial activism. A second wave of originalism has emerged since the late 1990s, responding to earlier criticisms and reconsidering earlier assumptions and conclusions. This Article assesses where originalist theory currently stands. It outlines the points of agreement and disagreement within the recent originalist literature and highlights the primary areas of continuing separation between originalists and their critics

Tax Constitutional Questions in “Obamacare”: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius in Light of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and Speiser v. Randall: Conditioning a Tax Benefit on the Nonexercise of a Constitutional Right

[Excerpt] “The phrase “Tax Constitutional Questions” may seem to be an oxymoron or at least an interesting juxtaposition somewhat akin to the phrase “passive activity” derived from Section 469 of the Internal Revenue Code, which is familiar to tax practitioners, professors, and perhaps others. It has been noted elsewhere that it is seemingly normal that tax professors (and tax practitioners) are somewhat isolated from such weighty issues as constitutional questions. … Despite what may be the tax bar’s seeming reluctance to engage in constitutional questions, those questions are nevertheless thrust upon tax practitioners and professors. Perhaps nowhere has the intersection of taxation and constitutional law been clearer than in the recent United States Supreme Court case on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

Introduction to \u3ci\u3ePhilosophical Foundations of Contract Law\u3c/i\u3e

This Introduction to Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., Oxford University Press, forthcoming) describes the field of contract theory and locates the essays in the volume within that field. The volume includes chapters from Aditi Bagchi, Randy Barnett, Lisa Bernstein, Mindy Chen-Wishart, Charles Fried, Avery Katz, Dori Kimel, Gregory Klass, George Letsas and Prince Saprai, Daniel Markovits, Liam Murphy, David Owens, J.E. Penner, Margaret Jane Radin, Joseph Raz, Stephen Smith, and Charlie Webb

Nonlinear and Complex Dynamics in Economics

This paper is an up-to-date survey of the state-of-the-art in dynamical systems theory relevant to high levels of dynamical complexity, characterizing chaos and near chaos, as commonly found in the physical sciences. The paper also surveys applications in economics and �finance. This survey does not include bifurcation analyses at lower levels of dynamical complexity, such as Hopf and transcritical bifurcations, which arise closer to the stable region of the parameter space. We discuss the geometric approach (based on the theory of differential/difference equations) to dynamical systems and make the basic notions of complexity, chaos, and other related concepts precise, having in mind their (actual or potential) applications to economically motivated questions. We also introduce specifi�c applications in microeconomics, macroeconomics, and �finance, and discuss the policy relevancy of chaos