Agents for educational games and simulations

This book consists mainly of revised papers that were presented at the Agents for Educational Games and Simulation (AEGS) workshop held on May 2, 2011, as part of the Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS) conference in Taipei, Taiwan. The 12 full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from various submissions. The papers are organized topical sections on middleware applications, dialogues and learning, adaption and convergence, and agent applications

Levels of interaction: a user-guided experience in large-scale virtual environments

This paper investigates a range of challenges faced in the design of a serious game, teaching history to a player immersed in an 'open' virtual environment. In the context of this paper, such an environment is described as an exploratory, expansive virtual world within which a user may interact in a non-linear, situated fashion with both the environment and virtual characters. The main contribution of this paper consists in the introduction of the levels of interaction (LoI), a novel framework designed to assist in the creation of interactions between the player and characters. The LoI approach also addresses the necessity for balancing computational efficiency with the need to provide believable and interactive virtual characters, by allowing varying degrees of animation, display and, ultimately, interaction detail. This paper demonstrates the challenges faced when implementing such a technique, as well as the potential benefits it brings

A COEVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL PRESSURES VERSUS ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ACROSS THE WORLD'S FOOD CHAINS

Institutional and Behavioral Economics,

Principles for Consciousness in Integrated Cognitive Control

In this article we will argue that given certain conditions for the evolution of bi- \ud ological controllers, these will necessarily evolve in the direction of incorporating \ud consciousness capabilities. We will also see what are the necessary mechanics for \ud the provision of these capabilities and extrapolate this vision to the world of artifi- \ud cial systems postulating seven design principles for conscious systems. This article \ud was published in the journal Neural Networks special issue on brain and conscious- \ud ness

Knowledge Representation with Ontologies: The Present and Future

Recently, we have seen an explosion of interest in ontologies as artifacts to represent human knowledge and as critical components in knowledge management, the semantic Web, business-to-business applications, and several other application areas. Various research communities commonly assume that ontologies are the appropriate modeling structure for representing knowledge. However, little discussion has occurred regarding the actual range of knowledge an ontology can successfully represent

Artificial Societies, Virtual Worlds, and Their Meaningful Integration

Artificial societies and virtual worlds are two areas of interest to modern social scientists that are distinctly separate in modern academic study, and are yet undeniably related. Artificial societies are multi-agent systems comprised of autonomous social agents, programmed with their own set of rules and behavior. While virtual worlds are occupied in large part by human controlled agents participating in a collective virtual experience and space. Within both types of virtual environments there can be found a scarcity of resources and intricate cross-entity interaction. This often results in the development and evolution of complex economic and cultural structures. In addition, by examining the modern research and common history shared by each field, it is possible to compile a set of shared attributes. This work attempts to capitalize on these shared features and promote a new type of integrated analysis that holds potential for future development in both fields. The concrete implementation of these ideas takes form as a simple economic model containing meaningful computer and human interaction as well as a framework designed for future extensibility

Future school services, 'Global Solutions' : ESRC Seminar 4 Proceedings

Publisher PD

Solving Frege's Puzzle

So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response to it. I grant that psychological explanation must invoke non-intentional features of mental states, but it is of crucial importance which such features must be referenced. -/- It emerges from a careful reading of Frege's own view that we need only invoke what I call 'formal' relations between mental states. I then claim that referencing such 'formal' relations within psychological explanation does not undermine its intentionality in the way that invoking, say, neurological features would. The central worry about this view is that either (a) 'formal' relations bring narrow content in through back door or (b) 'formal' relations end up doing all the explanatory work. Various forms of each worry are discussed. The crucial point, ultimately, is that the present strategy for responding to Frege cases is not available either to the 'psycho-Fregean', who would identify the content of a belief with its truth-value, nor even to someone who would identify the content of a belief with a set of possible worlds. It requires the sort of rich semantic structure that is distinctive of Russellian propositions. There is therefore no reason to suppose that the invocation of 'formal' relations threatens to deprive content of any work to do