The Problem of the Kantian Line

In this paper I discuss the problem of the Kantian line. The problem arises because the locus of value in Kantian ethics is rationality, which (counterintuitively) seems to entail that there are no duties to groups of beings like children. I argue that recent attempts to solve this problem by Wood and O’Neill overlook an important aspect of it before posing my own solution

State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Daniel Bagley Rogers Defendant/Appellant : Brief of Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF UTAH, Plaintiff/Appellant, DANIEL BAGLEY ROGERS Case No. 20030953-CA Defendant/Appellant BRIEF OF APPELLANT Appeal from the Third District Court\u27s Order denying Defendant\u27s Motion to Quash the Bindover Order for trial on Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999). Appellant is not incarcerated

Fraud on Any Market

Claims of securities fraud had historically failed because investors seldom rely on false or misleading statements when transacting securities. To bolster confidence in securities markets, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a doctrine called “fraud-on-the-market” so that duped investors can show detrimental reliance without ever encountering the fraudulent statements. The doctrine assumes that a stock’s price reflects all material information, meaning that an investor who bought tainted stock has constructively relied on the fraud. Fraud-on-the-market is not only unavailable in other markets but is also embattled within securities law. The doctrine has endured volleys of criticisms about whether markets actually absorb information, leading critics to believe that the Supreme Court would eliminate it in 2014. The Court did not. In light of persistent questions about whether the doctrine reflects reality or has outlived its purpose, our empirical research tests fraud-on-the-market’s viability by investigating sports gambling: we find that the doctrine provides a sound remedy for investors in any market. The sports wagering market operates like others in which defrauded individuals have historically failed to support their fraud claims due to a lack of reliance. We show that securities and gambling markets suffer from many of the same frailties. Chief among them is that both investors and bettors place money in markets where they lack information about deception, cheating, and fraud. And like investors rely on prices affected by fraud, gamblers reference wagering information based on the playing field: if deception enables a team to fare better or worse, this skews the betting lines on which gamblers rely. The difference between these markets, though, is that investors enjoy a body of securities law to condemn fraud. We first argue that fraud-on-the-market would benefit most types of investable markets like sports gambling and support the doctrine in the securities context. Despite criticisms of the doctrine, our analysis shows that fraud creates the presumption of distorted prices. Second, the money wagered via sports betting and daily fantasy sports (DFS) would generate damages such that leagues would better maintain a competitive environment, boosting sports integrity akin to how securities regulations provide market protections. Also, our argument recognizes the inequity of denying sports bettors and DFS users a remedy. Whereas the leagues had traditionally benefited from gambling indirectly, today, the NFL, NHL, MLB, and NBA have partnered with DFS and other gambling industry companies. Since the leagues now benefit directly from gambling, and lucratively so, they should owe their fans a truly competitive landscape

The Kentucky High School Athlete, March 1952

https://encompass.eku.edu/athlete/1532/thumbnail.jp

A Decade of the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act

Corporations intent upon expanding via the acquisition route have had three statutory hurdles placed in their way by the Congress of the United States. As hurdles, the first two, the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914, were failures. A judiciary which refused to give effect either to the language or intent of the acts nullified completely their usefulness as anti-merger weapons. The third hurdle, the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton Act, was enacted in 1950. Relatively few judicial opinions have interpreted this act, new section 7, as it is called. It is clear, however, that it has little to fear in the way of a hostile judiciary or Federal Trade Commission. So far at least, delays which can be characterized only as incredible have been the sole serious problem for new section 7. Shortly before the turn of the century, a great merger movement began in the United States. Although the Sherman Act was the law of the land, effective action under it could be taken only after a monopoly had been achieved, if then. By 1914, it was clear to a majority of the Congress that, if the growing merger movement was to be checked, new legislation was needed. As enacted into law in 1914, section 7 of the Clayton Act contained a civil prohibition against the acquisition of stock of one corporation by another where the effect of the acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce