Bargaining with an Agenda

We propose a new framework for bargaining in which the process follows an agenda. The agenda is represented by a family, parameterized by time, of increasing sets of joint utilities for possible agreements. This is in contrast to the single set used in the standard framework. The set at each time involves all possible agreements on the issues discussed up to that time. A \emph{bargaining solution} for an agenda specifies a path of agreements, one for each time. We characterize axiomatically a solution that is ordinal, meaning that it is covariant with order- preserving transformations of the utility representations. It can be viewed as the limit of a step-by-step bargaining process in which the agreement point of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others, and the ordinal solution will still emerge as the steps tend to zero. Shapley showed that ordinal solutions exist for the standard framework for three players but not for two; the present framework generates an ordinal solution for any number of bargainers, in particular for two.bargaining, ordinal utility

External Intervention and the Duration of Civil Wars

This paper examines the effect of external intervention on civil war duration from the years 1946-2002. Based on the logic that intervention causes a distortion of the bargaining process in civil wars, it is hypothesized that intervention leads to increased civil war duration. This hypothesis is tested using linear regression analysis, which finds a positive, significant relationship between intervention and civil war duration. Considered in the context of previous literature, it is concluded that in addition to the distorting effect intervention appears to have on the bargaining process, this result may have been informed by the presence of competitive intervention, rival intervention, and interventions by states with an independent agenda. This research provides further evidence of the conflict lengthening effect of intervention, while tracing a common explanation based in the bargaining model of war throughout the various perspectives in the literature

On-the-Job Search, Minimum Wages, and Labor Market Outcomes in an Equilibrium Bargaining Framework

We look at the impact of a binding minimum wage on labor market outcomes and welfare distributions in a partial equilibrium model of matching and bargaining in the presence of on-the-job search. We use two different specifications of the Nash bargaining problem. In one, firms engage in a Bertrand competition for the services of an individual, as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). In the other, firms do not engage in such competitions, and the outside option used in bargaining is always the value of unemployed search. We estimate both bargaining specifications using a Method of Simulated Moments estimator applied to data from a recent wave of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Even though individuals will be paid the minimum wage for a small proportion of their labor market careers, we find significant effects of the minimum wage on the ex ante value of labor market careers, particularly in the case of Bertrand competition between firms. An important futures goal of this research agenda is to develop tests capable of determining which bargaining framework is more consistent with observed patterns of turnover and wage change at the individual level.Minimum wage, On-the-job search, Renegotiation, Matching functions

Agenda Setting Power in Organizations With Overlapping Generations of Players

This paper presents an analysis of the allocation of agenda-setting (or bargaining) power in organizations with overlapping generations of players. Such powers are typically institutionalized within an organization�s structure, and, given the focus of this paper, we identify the former with the latter. Our analysis concerns organizations (such as the US Senate) in which the number of periods each player participates is endogenously determined by his or her past performance. We derive several results and insights concerning (i) optimal organizational structure and (ii) conditions under which the unique, dynamically optimal outcome can be sustained (in equilibrium) in organizations with suboptimal structures. For example, we show that under a broad set of conditions, the optimal organizational structure should involve a seniority system, in which most of the agenda-setting power is allocated to the oldest generation of players.

Automated Negotiations Under Uncertain Preferences

Automated Negotiation is an emerging field of electronic markets and multi-agent system research. Market engineers are faced in this connection with computational as well as economic issues, such as individual rationality and incentive compatibility. Most literature is focused on autonomous agents and negotiation protocols regarding these issues. However, common protocols show two deficiencies: (1) neglected consideration of agents’ incentives to strive for social welfare, (2) underemphasised acknowledgement that agents build their decision upon preference information delivered by human principals. Since human beings make use of heuristics for preference elicitation, their preferences are subject to informational uncertainty. The contribution of this paper is the proposition of a research agenda that aims at overcoming these research deficiencies. Our research agenda draws theoretically and methodologically on auctions, iterative bargaining, and fuzzy set theory. We complement our agenda with simulation-based preliminary results regarding differences in the application of auctions and iterative bargaining

His Dollar ? Her Dollar ? Their Dollar: The Effects of Couples' Money Management Systems on Union Dissolution and Women's Labor Force Participation

Most analyses of time and resource allocation in couple households ignore what couples do with their money, assuming that money is “absolutely fungible, qualitatively neutral, infinitely divisible, [and] entirely homogeneous” (Zelizer 1994). If, instead, couples’ money management sets the agenda for household bargaining and serves as a mechanism by which couples “do gender”, we should expect that what couples do with money at an earlier period will have an independent effect on subsequent allocative outcomes. Using three waves of data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing, I find that the money management system a couple uses at the 12-month survey is a significant predictor of both union dissolution and women’s labor force participation at the 30-month survey, net of other predictors of these outcomes.

PLEA BARGAINING: A PANACEA TOWARDS PRISON DECONGESTION IN NIGERIA

Against the panoramic view of the criminal justice reform agenda in Nigeria, the plea bargaining procedure is yet to be fully recognized as a major intervention strategy to deal with the problems in the Nigerian criminal justice administration. This paper therefore conceptualized the concept of plea bargaining. The legal basis for plea, the justifications for plea as well as the merits and demerits of the plea are discussed. The paper also highlights the major problems afflicting criminal justice administration and examines the steps being taken to deal with the problems. The emphasis is on strengthening arguments for a mutual acceptance of plea bargaining as a credible exist strategy by both the state and an alleged offender. The way forward in form of recommendations for the expansion and institutionalization of the practice is also discussed.

Multilateral bargaining for resource division

We address the problem of how a group of agents can decide to share a resource, represented as a unit-sized pie. We investigate a finite horizon non-cooperative bargaining game, in which the players take it in turns to make proposals on how the resource should be allocated, and the other players vote on whether or not to accept the allocation. Voting is modelled as a Bayesian weighted voting game with uncertainty about the players’ weights. The agenda, (i.e., the order in which the players are called to make offers), is defined exogenously. We focus on impatient players with heterogeneous discount factors. In the case of a conflict, (i.e., no agreement by the deadline), all the players get nothing. We provide a Bayesian subgame perfect equilibrium for the bargaining game and conduct an ex-ante analysis of the resulting outcome. We show that, the equilibrium is unique, computable in polynomial time, results in an instant Pareto optimal agreement, and, under certain conditions provides a foundation for the core of the Bayesian voting game. Our analysis also leads to insights on how an individual’s bargained share is in- fluenced by his position on the agenda. Finally, we show that, if the conflict point of the bargaining game changes, then the problem of determining a non-cooperative equilibrium becomes NP-hard even under the perfect information assumption

Agenda for Canadian Labour Law Reform: A Little Liberal Law, Much More Democratic Socialist Politics

Statutory collective bargaining has been the linchpin of Canadian industrial relations since World War I. It yielded benefits to large segments of workers, although its reach and impact were always exaggerated. As the economic entente which underpinned the scheme is unravelling, workers fight desperately to hang onto a system which, in retrospect, looks even better than it did before. But the narrow, male-centred, economic premises of collective bargaining make statutory collective bargaining reform a poor vehicle with which to offset employer attacks on the working classes. An agenda which seeks to link the economic and the political, men and women, must be developed. This can be done, in part, by exploiting some of the claims (contrast realities) of the existing industrial relations system. But, more is needed; some suggestions are offered

Bargaining agenda in a unionised monopoly with network effects: when corporate social responsibility may be welfare-reducing

This paper investigates the bargaining agenda selection in a socially concerned unionised monopoly producing a network good. We show that the recently established result that under network effects the firm prefers sequential efficient bargaining may be reversed when there are social concerns. Thus, firm's social responsibility restores also in network industries the conventional result of the trade-union economics that the firm prefers right-to-manage (RTM). However, this may result rather paradoxical because RTM is always welfare-inferior and thus the higher the social responsibility is, the lower the social welfare outcome due to the agenda selection. As a consequence an increase of the firms' social concerns in network industries may reduce, through the channel of the unionised labour market, social welfare, in contrast with the common sense. This sheds some light on so far unexplored effects of the promotion of social responsibility activities by policy makers when also labour markets are taken into account