Bargaining Power and Equilibrium Consumption

We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same.household behavior, bargaining power, local and global changes, price effects, general equilibrium

Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption

We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic, the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit, if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the sam

The Poverty of Growth with Interdependent Utility Functions

We argue that with interdependent utility functions growth can lead to a decline in total welfare of a society if the gains from growth are sufficiently unequally distributed in the presence of negative externalities, i.e., envy.interdependent utility functions, growth, inequality

(Why) Do we need Corporate Taxation?

Tax rates on corporate income have considerably come down in the process of tax competition and further pressures are evident. Against this background, the paper discusses possible benefits of corporate income taxation that may be at risk. In particular, the paper surveys the empirical evidence for a backstop function of the corporate income tax that allows preserving individual taxes.tax competition, corporate taxation

On the Long-Run Evolution of Technological Knowledge

This paper revisits the debate about the appropriate differential equation that governs the evolution of knowledge in models of endogenous growth. We argue that the assessment of the appropriateness of an equation of motion should not only be based on its implications for the future, but that it should also include its implications for the past. We maintain that the evolution of knowledge is plausible if it satisfies two asymptotic conditions: Looking forwards, infinite knowledge in finite time should be excluded, and looking backwards, knowledge should vanish towards the beginning of time (but not before). Our key results show that, generically, the behavior of the processes under scrutiny is either plausible in the future and implausible in the past or vice versa, or implausible at both ends of the time line.endogenous technological change, Malthus, long-run growth

S-Based Taxation under Default Risk

This article studies the characteristics of a S-based tax system under default risk. In particular we show that its neutrality properties depend on whether debt is protected or unprotected. In the former case, this system is neutral. In the latter case, where default timing is optimally chosen by shareholders, the S-based system is neutral with respect to real decisions only if the firm’s and the lender’s tax rate are equal. However, the shareholders’ decision to default is always distorted.capital structure, corporate taxation, neutrality, option pricing

Necessary and Sufficient Restrictions for Existence of a Unique Fourth Moment of a Univariate GARCH(p,q) Process

A univariate GARCH(p,q) process is quickly transformed to a univariate autoregressive moving-average process in squares of an underlying variable. For positive integer m, eigenvalue restrictions have been proposed as necessary and sufficient restrictions for existence of a unique mth moment of the output of a univariate GARCH process or, equivalently, the 2mth moment of the underlying variable. However, proofs in the literature that an eigenvalue restriction is necessary and sufficient for existence of unique 4th or higher even moments of the underlying variable, are either incorrect, incomplete, or unecessarily long. Thus, the paper contains a short and general proof that an eigenvalue restriction is necessary and sufficient for existence of a unique 4th moment of the underlying variable of a univariate GARCH process. The paper also derives an expression for computing the 4th moment in terms of the GARCH parameters, which immediately implies a necessary and sufficient inequality restriction for existence of the 4th moment. Because the inequality restriction is easily computed in a finite number of basic arithmetic operations on the GARCH parameters and does not require computing eigenvalues, it provides an easy means for computing "by hand" the 4th moment and for checking its existence for low-dimensional GARCH processes. Finally, the paper illustrates the computations with some GARCH(1,1) processes reported in the literature.state-space form, Lyapunov equations, nonnegative and irreducible matrices

Skilled Emigration, Business Networks and Foreign Direct Investment

In a global context foreign direct investment (FDI) and migration substitute one another in the matching process between workers and firms. However, as labor flows can lead to the formation of business networks, migration can actually facilitate FDI in the long-run. We first present a stylized model for a small open economy illustrating these offsetting effects. We then use U.S. data on bilateral labor inflows and capital outflows to measure the extent of contemporaneous substitutability and dynamic complementarity between migration and FDI. We find that brain drain and FDI inflows are negatively correlated contemporaneously but that skilled migration is associated with future increases in FDI inflows. We also find suggestive evidence of substitutability between current migration and FDI for migrants with secondary education, and of complementarity between past migration and FDI for unskilled migrants.brain drain, foreign direct investment inflows, migrant ties and business networks

Pitfalls in the Use of Ad valorem Equivalent Representations of the Trade Impacts of Domestic Policies

Numerical simulation exercises to analyze the impacts of potential changes in non-tariff policies commonly use ad valorem equivalent tariff treatment even though estimated impacts using explicit model representation and ad valorem equivalent treatments will differ. The difficulty for modellers is that the detail and subtlety embodied in a wide array of policy interventions means that some simplification is appealing, but no meaningful general propositions exist in the theoretical literature as to the sign or size of the differences in predicted effects. All that can seemingly be done is to investigate the differences case by case, but even here the findings are sensitive both to the particular form of model used as well as the model parameterization employed. As a result, there is relatively little in the literature that provides guidance as to how serious the pitfalls may be, and how misleading ad valorem tariff equivalent treatment is. Here I draw on three examples of numerical modelling where explicit representation of policy interventions are used. The picture that emerges is one of large quantitative and even qualitative differences in predicted impacts. These examples suggest that where interventions differ from a tariff, ad valorem representation should be undertaken in numerical trade modelling only with substantial caveats.

A Simple Model of Brain Circulation

This paper considers the allocation of two types of individuals differentiated by levels of talent within and between two countries when they choose to be workers or entrepreneurs. The equilibrium with international migrations requires both countries to be sufficiently different in talent endowments and is consistent with individuals moving in one or in both directions whether they are entrepreneurs or workers. Average welfare per capita falls in the country losing highly talented individuals and rises in the country attracting them. However, in both countries, the liberalization of migrations for immigrants, emigrants or both is always supported by majority voting.