Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power

The purpose of the current study was to develop and validate an automatic algorithm for classification of cross-country (XC) ski-skating gears (G) using Smartphone accelerometer data. Eleven XC skiers (seven men, four women) with regional-to-international levels of performance carried out roller skiing trials on a treadmill using fixed gears (G2left, G2right, G3, G4left, G4right) and a 950-m trial using different speeds and inclines, applying gears and sides as they normally would. Gear classification by the Smartphone (on the chest) and based on video recordings were compared. Formachine-learning, a collective database was compared to individual data. The Smartphone application identified the trials with fixed gears correctly in all cases. In the 950-m trial, participants executed 140 ± 22 cycles as assessed by video analysis, with the automatic Smartphone application giving a similar value. Based on collective data, gears were identified correctly 86.0% ± 8.9% of the time, a value that rose to 90.3% ± 4.1% (P < 0.01) with machine learning from individual data. Classification was most often incorrect during transition between gears, especially to or from G3. Identification was most often correct for skiers who made relatively few transitions between gears. The accuracy of the automatic procedure for identifying G2left, G2right, G3, G4left and G4right was 96%, 90%, 81%, 88% and 94%, respectively. The algorithm identified gears correctly 100% of the time when a single gear was used and 90% of the time when different gears were employed during a variable protocol. This algorithm could be improved with respect to identification of transitions between gears or the side employed within a given gear

Franchising: A literature review on management and control issues.

Franchising; Literature review; Management control;

Privatisation and Franchising of British Train Operations: the decline and derailment of the Great North Eastern Railway

As a result of the 1993 Railways Act, the British railways industry was privatised which resulted in the separation of ownership and control of the railway infrastructure (track, signals and stations) from that of passenger train operations. The Great North Eastern Railway (GNER), a major train operator, was unable to meet its contractual obligations shortly after successfully re-tendering for its second franchise. Within the context of incomplete contract theory, this paper discusses the main problems inherent in the franchising process and which specifically contributed to the collapse of GNER. In particular, the paper argues that the fragmented structure of asset ownership, the lack of coordination and investment incentives and flaws in the franchise method itself explain the demise of GNER and have undermined the general objectives of railway privatisation

Vertical Integration and Market Structure

Contractual theories of vertical integration derive firm boundaries as an efficient response to market transaction costs. These theories predict a relationship between underlying features of transactions and observed integration decisions. There has been some progress in testing these predictions, but less progress in quantifying their importance. One difficulty is that empirical applications often must consider firm structure together with industry structure. Research in industrial organization frequently has adopted this perspective, emphasizing how scale and scope economies, and strategic considerations, influence patterns of industry integration. But this research has paid less attention to contractual or organizational details, so that these two major lines of research on vertical integration have proceeded in parallel with only rare intersection. We discuss the value of combining different viewpoints from organizational economics and industrial organization.

PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSES TO INCREASED VERTICAL LINKAGES IN AGRI-FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS

vertical coordination, vertical linkage, public policy, agri-food supply chains, supply chain management, Agribusiness, Q1, L1,

Hybrid Modes of Organization. Alliances, Joint Ventures, Networks, and Other 'Strange' Animals

The central message conveyed in this chapter is that there is a whole class of economic organizations that contribute substantially to what Coase (1992) called "the institutional structure of production". These arrangements fall neither under pure market relationships nor within 'firm boundaries'. They have multiplied because they are viewed as efficient in dealing with knowledge-based activities, solving hold-up problems, and reducing contractual hazards. They have properties of their own that deserve theoretical attention and empirical investigation.Hybrids, Alliances, Joint Ventures, organization theory, transaction costs, incomplete contracts

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights and incentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufacturer opportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.Franchising, contracts, self-enforcement, incentives, complementarities, automobiles