Automated competitive analysis of real time scheduling with graph games

This paper is devoted to automatic competitive analysis of real-time scheduling algorithms for firm-deadline tasksets, where only completed tasks con- tribute some utility to the system. Given such a taskset T , the competitive ratio of an on-line scheduling algorithm A for T is the worst-case utility ratio of A over the utility achieved by a clairvoyant algorithm. We leverage the theory of quantitative graph games to address the competitive analysis and competitive synthesis problems. For the competitive analysis case, given any taskset T and any finite-memory on- line scheduling algorithm A , we show that the competitive ratio of A in T can be computed in polynomial time in the size of the state space of A . Our approach is flexible as it also provides ways to model meaningful constraints on the released task sequences that determine the competitive ratio. We provide an experimental study of many well-known on-line scheduling algorithms, which demonstrates the feasibility of our competitive analysis approach that effectively replaces human ingenuity (required Preliminary versions of this paper have appeared in Chatterjee et al. ( 2013 , 2014 ). B Andreas Pavlogiannis [email protected] Krishnendu Chatterjee [email protected] Alexander Kößler [email protected] Ulrich Schmid [email protected] 1 IST Austria (Institute of Science and Technology Austria), Am Campus 1, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria 2 Embedded Computing Systems Group, Vienna University of Technology, Treitlstrasse 3, 1040 Vienna, Austria 123 Real-Time Syst for finding worst-case scenarios) by computing power. For the competitive synthesis case, we are just given a taskset T , and the goal is to automatically synthesize an opti- mal on-line scheduling algorithm A , i.e., one that guarantees the largest competitive ratio possible for T . We show how the competitive synthesis problem can be reduced to a two-player graph game with partial information, and establish that the compu- tational complexity of solving this game is Np -complete. The competitive synthesis problem is hence in Np in the size of the state space of the non-deterministic labeled transition system encoding the taskset. Overall, the proposed framework assists in the selection of suitable scheduling algorithms for a given taskset, which is in fact the most common situation in real-time systems design

Dagstuhl Reports : Volume 1, Issue 2, February 2011

Online Privacy: Towards Informational Self-Determination on the Internet (Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop 11061) : Simone Fischer-Hübner, Chris Hoofnagle, Kai Rannenberg, Michael Waidner, Ioannis Krontiris and Michael Marhöfer Self-Repairing Programs (Dagstuhl Seminar 11062) : Mauro Pezzé, Martin C. Rinard, Westley Weimer and Andreas Zeller Theory and Applications of Graph Searching Problems (Dagstuhl Seminar 11071) : Fedor V. Fomin, Pierre Fraigniaud, Stephan Kreutzer and Dimitrios M. Thilikos Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Sequence Processing (Dagstuhl Seminar 11081) : Maxime Crochemore, Lila Kari, Mehryar Mohri and Dirk Nowotka Packing and Scheduling Algorithms for Information and Communication Services (Dagstuhl Seminar 11091) Klaus Jansen, Claire Mathieu, Hadas Shachnai and Neal E. Youn

IST Austria Technical Report

We present a flexible framework for the automated competitive analysis of on-line scheduling algorithms for firm- deadline real-time tasks based on multi-objective graphs: Given a taskset and an on-line scheduling algorithm specified as a labeled transition system, along with some optional safety, liveness, and/or limit-average constraints for the adversary, we automatically compute the competitive ratio of the algorithm w.r.t. a clairvoyant scheduler. We demonstrate the flexibility and power of our approach by comparing the competitive ratio of several on-line algorithms, including D(over), that have been proposed in the past, for various tasksets. Our experimental results reveal that none of these algorithms is universally optimal, in the sense that there are tasksets where other schedulers provide better performance. Our framework is hence a very useful design tool for selecting optimal algorithms for a given application

Q-Strategy: A Bidding Strategy for Market-Based Allocation of Grid Services

The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational services is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic service provisioning and usage of Grid services, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a bidding agent framework for implementing artificial bidding agents, supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation as well as automated bid generation by the requesting and provisioning of Grid services. Secondly, we introduce a novel consumer-side bidding strategy, which enables a goal-oriented and strategic behavior by the generation and submission of consumer service requests and selection of provider offers. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare the Q-strategy, implemented within the presented framework, against the Truth-Telling bidding strategy in three mechanisms – a centralized CDA, a decentralized on-line machine scheduling and a FIFO-scheduling mechanisms

Rational bidding using reinforcement learning: an application in automated resource allocation

The application of autonomous agents by the provisioning and usage of computational resources is an attractive research field. Various methods and technologies in the area of artificial intelligence, statistics and economics are playing together to achieve i) autonomic resource provisioning and usage of computational resources, to invent ii) competitive bidding strategies for widely used market mechanisms and to iii) incentivize consumers and providers to use such market-based systems. The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we present a framework for supporting consumers and providers in technical and economic preference elicitation and the generation of bids. Secondly, we introduce a consumer-side reinforcement learning bidding strategy which enables rational behavior by the generation and selection of bids. Thirdly, we evaluate and compare this bidding strategy against a truth-telling bidding strategy for two kinds of market mechanisms – one centralized and one decentralized

Self-Evaluation Applied Mathematics 2003-2008 University of Twente

This report contains the self-study for the research assessment of the Department of Applied Mathematics (AM) of the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science (EEMCS) at the University of Twente (UT). The report provides the information for the Research Assessment Committee for Applied Mathematics, dealing with mathematical sciences at the three universities of technology in the Netherlands. It describes the state of affairs pertaining to the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008

Delivering services by building and running virtual organisations

Non peer reviewedPostprin