Cognitive architecture of perceptual organization: from neurons to gnosons

What, if anything, is cognitive architecture and how is it implemented in neural architecture? Focusing on perceptual organization, this question is addressed by way of a pluralist approach which, supported by metatheoretical considerations, combines complementary insights from representational, connectionist, and dynamic systems approaches to cognition. This pluralist approach starts from a representationally inspired model which implements the intertwined but functionally distinguishable subprocesses of feedforward feature encoding, horizontal feature binding, and recurrent feature selection. As sustained by a review of neuroscientific evidence, these are the subprocesses that are believed to take place in the visual hierarchy in the brain. Furthermore, the model employs a special form of processing, called transparallel processing, whose neural signature is proposed to be gamma-band synchronization in transient horizontal neural assemblies. In neuroscience, such assemblies are believed to mediate binding of similar features. Their formal counterparts in the model are special input-dependent distributed representations, called hyperstrings, which allow many similar features to be processed in a transparallel fashion, that is, simultaneously as if only one feature were concerned. This form of processing does justice to both the high combinatorial capacity and the high speed of the perceptual organization process. A naturally following proposal is that those temporarily synchronized neural assemblies are “gnosons”, that is, constituents of flexible self-organizing cognitive architecture in between the relatively rigid level of neurons and the still elusive level of consciousness

Is the brain a quantum computer

Abstract We argue that computation via quantum mechanical processes is irrelevant to explaining how brains produce thought, contrary to the ongoing speculations of many theorists. First, quantum effects do not have the temporal properties required for neural information processing. Second, there are substantial physical obstacles to any organic instantiation of quantum computation. Third, there is no psychological evidence that such mental phenomena as consciousness and mathematical thinking require explanation via quantum theory. We conclude that understanding brain function is unlikely to require quantum computation or similar mechanisms

The retreat from alienation in cognitive science

This thesis examines the relevance of Hegelian-Marxian theory to modern day philosophy of cognitive science. It is suggested that certain key Hegelian-Marxian ideas and themes, such as ‘externalization’, ‘praxis’ and ‘dialectics’, have parallels in modern day cognitive science and that, in some instances a direct connection can be traced from Marxian theory to recent cognitive science, via intermediaries such as Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty and Levins & Lewontin. It is also suggested that the overarching trajectory of cognitive science is one that can be usefully understood in Marxian terms as a ‘retreat from alienation.’ Taking this as one’s starting point enables one to unify otherwise disparate perspectives under a single banner. In addition it provides one with a means of evaluating individual accounts, such as Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s ‘Embodied Mind’ and Clark and Chalmers’ ‘Extended Mind’. Conversely, some recent cognitive scientific accounts, such as Kirsh & Maglio’s work on ‘epistemic action’, offer further illumination of ideas that are ambiguously expressed in Marxian theory

The Free Self: What Separates Us From Machines

Could a machine ever achieve consciousness? Will it ever make sense to hold a machine morally responsible? In this thesis, I argue that the architecture of SPAUN - the largest WIP functioning brain model currently in existence - makes it the most plausible contender for strong AI status, but that a hypothetically completed, future iteration of SPAUN is not guaranteed to possess qualitative experiences, consciousness, free will, or selfhood despite its biological plausibility; it therefore cannot be held morally responsible the way we are. To justify this position, I offer critiques of determinism, compatibilism, micro-functionalism, physicalism, and naturalistic accounts of the evolution of consciousness, as well as experiments in neuroscience that appear at first glance to disprove free will. In opposition to these views, I develop a novel form of dualism which posits the self as the free, non-physical, uncaused cause of its own actions, and provide arguments to justify this position. In essence, I propose - counter to Daniel Dennett - that selves are free to do otherwise (in the classical sense), that this is their purpose, and that naturalistic accounts of the existence of selfhood, consciousness, and qualitative experiences are inadequate because they lack a view to this purpose. I conclude that because SPAUN is a physically determined system, and its underlying substrate is distinct from our own, we should be wary of ascribing cognition and moral responsibility to it, since function alone does not guarantee cognition in this novel dualistic framework