136 research outputs found

    Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

    Full text link
    Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

    Implementation and Evaluation of Steganography based Online Voting

    Get PDF
    Though there are online voting systems available, the authors propose a new and secure steganography based E2E (end-to-end) verifiable online voting system, to tackle the problems in voting process. This research implements a novel approach to online voting by combining visual cryptography with image steganography to enhance system security without degrading system usability and performance. The voting system will also include password hashed-based scheme and threshold decryption scheme. The software is developed on web-based Java EE with the integration of MySQL database server and Glassfish as its application server. The authors assume that the election server used and the election authorities are trustworthy. A questionnaire survey of 30 representative participants was done to collect data to measure the user acceptance of the software developed through usability testing and user acceptance testing

    Distributed, end-to-end verifiable, and privacy-preserving internet voting systems

    Get PDF
    We present the D-DEMOS suite of distributed, privacy-preserving, and end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems; one completely asynchronous and one with minimal timing assumptions but better performance. Their distributed voting operation is human verifiable; a voter can vote over the web, using an unsafe web client stack, without sacrificing her privacy, and get recorded-as-cast assurance. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. We provide a model and security analysis of the systems, implement prototypes of the complete systems, measure their performance experimentally, demonstrate their ability to handle large-scale elections, and demonstrate the performance trade-offs between the two versions

    The New South Wales iVote System: Security Failures and Verification Flaws in a Live Online Election

    Full text link
    In the world's largest-ever deployment of online voting, the iVote Internet voting system was trusted for the return of 280,000 ballots in the 2015 state election in New South Wales, Australia. During the election, we performed an independent security analysis of parts of the live iVote system and uncovered severe vulnerabilities that could be leveraged to manipulate votes, violate ballot privacy, and subvert the verification mechanism. These vulnerabilities do not seem to have been detected by the election authorities before we disclosed them, despite a pre-election security review and despite the system having run in a live state election for five days. One vulnerability, the result of including analytics software from an insecure external server, exposed some votes to complete compromise of privacy and integrity. At least one parliamentary seat was decided by a margin much smaller than the number of votes taken while the system was vulnerable. We also found protocol flaws, including vote verification that was itself susceptible to manipulation. This incident underscores the difficulty of conducting secure elections online and carries lessons for voters, election officials, and the e-voting research community

    Theoretical Attacks on E2E Voting Systems

    Get PDF
    We give a survey of existing attacks against end-to-end verifiable voting systems in the academic literature. We discuss attacks on the integrity of the election, attacks on the privacy of voters, and attacks aiming at coercion of voters. For each attack, we give a brief overview of the voting system and a short description of the attack and its consequences

    Practical Attacks on Cryptographically End-to-end Verifiable Internet Voting Systems

    Get PDF
    Cryptographic end-to-end verifiable voting technologies concern themselves with the provision of a more trustworthy, transparent, and robust elections. To provide voting systems with more transparency and accountability throughout the process while preserving privacy which allows voters to express their true intent. Helios Voting is one of these systems---an online platform where anyone can easily host their own cryptographically end-to-end verifiable election, aiming to bring verifiable voting to the masses. Helios does this by providing explicit cryptographic checks that an election was counted correctly, checks that any member of the public can independently verify. All of this while still protecting one of the essential properties of open democracy, voter privacy. In spite of these cryptographic checks and the strong mathematical assertions of correctness they provide, this thesis discusses the discovery and exploit of three vulnerabilities. The first is the insufficient validation of cryptographic elements in Helios ballots uploaded by users. This allows a disgruntled voter to cast a carefully crafted ballot which will prevent an election from being tallied. The second vulnerability is the insufficient validation of cryptographic parameters used in ElGamal by an election official. This leads to an attack where the election official can upload weak parameters allowing the official to cast arbitrary votes in a single ballot. The final attack is a cross-site scripting attack that would allow anyone to steal or re-cast ballots on behalf of victims. We coordinated disclosure with the Helios developers and provided fixes for all the vulnerabilities outlined in the thesis. Additionally, this thesis adds to the body of work highlighting the fragility of internet voting applications and discusses the unique challenges faced by internet voting applications

    Apollo - End-to-end Verifiable Internet Voting with Recovery from Vote Manipulation

    Get PDF
    We present security vulnerabilities in the remote voting system Helios. We propose Apollo, a modified version of Helios, which addresses these vulnerabilities and could improve the feasibility of internet voting. In particular, we note that Apollo does not possess Helios\u27 major known vulnerability, where a dishonest voting terminal can change the vote after it obtains the voter\u27s credential. With Apollo-lite, votes not authorized by the voter are detected by the public and prevented from being included in the tally. The full version of Apollo enables a voter to prove that her vote was changed. We also describe a very simple protocol for the voter to interact with any devices she employs to check on the voting system, to enable frequent and easy auditing of encryptions and checking of the bulletin board
    corecore