Why not proportional?

This paper reviews the arguments that justify the principles of proportional and degressively proportional representation.Proportional representation, Degressive proportionality

Inequality aversion among gypsies: a field investigation

This paper presents a first attempt to measure inequality aversion among gypsies. We conducted an experiment among adult gypsies living at slums outside Vallecas (Madrid). To analyze this variable we use the mechanism provided by Kroll & Davidovitz (2003) among 38 voluntary participants. Results indicate that: i) 52.6% of the individuals are inequality averse; ii) there is a positive relationship between inequality aversion and some features of the population such as individual religious practise, marital status, family size, position in the hierarchy of the family or club association and, iii) neither wealth, nor participation in voluntary activities affect inequality aversion.inequality aversion, gypsies, field experiment.

Modifying the Hoede-Bakker index to the Shapley-Shubik and Holler-Packel indices

In the paper, we present some modifications of the Hoede-Bakker index defined in a social network in which players may influence each other. Due to influences of the other actors, the final decision of a player may be different from his original inclination. These modifications are defined for an arbitrary probability distribution over all inclination vectors. In particular, they concern a situation in which the inclination vectors may be not equally probable. Furthermore, byassuming special probability distributions over all inclination vectors, we construct modificationsof the Hoede-Bakker index that coincide with the Shapley-Shubik index and with the Holler-Packelindex, respectively.Hoede-Bakker index ; inclination vector ; probability distribution ; Shapley-Shubik index ; Holler-Packel index

BARGAINING IN COMMITTEES OF REPRESENTATIVES: THE OPTIMAL VOTING RULE

Committees are often made up of representatives of different-sized groups of individuals, and make decisions by means of a voting rule which specifies what vote configurations can pass a decision. This raises the question of the choice of the optimal voting rule, given the different sizes of the groups that members represent. In this paper we take a new departure to address this problem, assuming that the committee is a bargaining scenario in which negotiations take place 'in the shadow of the voting rule' in search of unanimous consensus. That is, a general agreement is looked for, but any winning coalition can enforce an agreement.Voting rule, Bargaining, Nash solution.

An axiomatization of success

In this paper we give an axiomatic characterization of three families of measures of success defined by Laruelle and Valenciano (2005) for voting rules.power indices, voting power, collective decision-making, axiomatization

On the not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index

The paper concerns a certain modification of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index - a notion defined for a social network of players. In the original Hoede-Bakker set up, preferences of players are involved. It is assumed that a player has an inclination either to accept or to reject a proposal, but due to the influence of others, his final decision may be different from his original inclination. In this paper, we propose the not-preference-based (NPB) generalized Hoede-Bakker index, where feasible strategies instead of players' inclinations are considered. We show that if all feasible strategy profiles are equally probable, then the NPB generalized Hoede-Bakker index is a 'net' Success, i.e., 'Success - Failure', where Success and Failure of a player is defined as the probability that the player is successful and fails, respectively. Moreover, under the assumption of equal probabilities of all feasible strategy profiles, we show that the probability that a player is lucky (Luck) equals the probability that he fails (Failure). Since Success - Luck = Decisiveness, it follows that, under the same assumption, the NPB generalized Hoede-Bakker index is equal to the probability that a player is decisive.Hoede-Bakker index ; feasible strategy ; success ; failure ; decisiveness

SUCCESS VERSUS DECISIVENESS: CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION AND CASE STUDY

In this paper, we vindicate the relevance of the notion of success or satisfaction for the normative assessment of voting rules. We provide arguments in support of this view and emphasize the conceptual and analytical differences between this notion and that of decisiveness. The conclusions are illustrated in the case study provided by three different voting rules that have been proposed for the Council of Ministers of the European Union.Voting, European Union, Power indices