Constraint through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control over Immigration Policy

This Article proposes recalibrating the separation of powers between the political branches in the context of their regulation of immigration law\u27s core questions: how many and what types of immigrants to admit to the United States. Whereas Congress holds a virtual monopoly over formal decisionmaking, the executive branch makes de facto admissions decisions using its discretionary enforcement power. As a result of this structure, stasis and excessive prosecutorial discretion characterize the regime, particularly with respect to labor migration. Both of these features exacerbate pathologies associated with illegal immigration and call for a structural response. This Article contends that Congress should create an executive branch agency, marked by indicia of independence, to set visa policy-an avenue increasingly contemplated by reformers. Though it may seem counterintuitive, delegation of greater authority can help constrain executive power by substituting a transparent process, subject to monitoring, for decisionmaking that occurs hidden from view. Delegation can also help overcome limitations in the legislative process that contribute to the current regime\u27s dysfunction, making immigration policy more efficient and effective. The Refugee Act of 1980 provides a parallel that is helpful in thinking through what it would mean to delegate ex ante admissions power to the executive

International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement,Standards and Monitoring:Corporate Governance and Internal Controls

This paper is structured in accordance with identified components which are considered to be essential to the successful implementation of the (two fold) topics of discussion of this paper, namely, monitoring and liquidity risk measurements. The importance of successfully communicating results obtained from monitoring and measuring such risks, and the role of corporate governance in ensuring such effective communication, constitutes a recurring theme throughout this paper. The identified components are as follows: i) Corporate governance (ii) Internal controls (iii) Disclosure (iv) Management of risk (v) Substance over form (vi) Transparency As well as highlighting the interdependence of these components, the paper also aims to accentuate the importance of individual components. Whilst no hierarchy of importance is assigned to these components, corporate governance and internal controls are two components which are analysed in greater depth (than other components). Furthermore, corporate governance could be accorded a status of greater importance than internal controls having regard to the fact that whilst internal controls relate to a very vital control aspect of an organisation, corporate governance relates to all processes – be it decision making, control, production, performance, within a company/bank. The paper will also attempt to demonstrate that it is possible to implement a system of regulation which combines increased formalised procedures and/or detailed rules - whilst giving due consideration to the substance of transaction

On Using Encryption Techniques to Enhance Sticky Policies Enforcement

How to enforce privacy policies to protect sensitive personal data has become an urgent research topic for security researchers, as very little has been done in this field apart from some ad hoc research efforts. The sticky policy paradigm, proposed by Karjoth, Schunter, and Waidner, provides very useful inspiration on how we can protect sensitive personal data, but the enforcement is very weak. In this paper we provide an overview of the state of the art in enforcing sticky policies, especially the concept of sticky policy enforcement using encryption techniques including Public-Key Encryption (PKE), Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), and Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE). We provide detailed comparison results on the (dis)advantages of these enforcement mechanisms. As a result of the analysis, we provide a general framework for enhancing sticky policy enforcement using Type-based PRE (TPRE), which is an extension of general PRE

The Stability Pact - Rationales, Problems, Alternatives

We analyze economic rationales for, and possible alternatives to, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). We identify various cross-country spillover effects and domestic policy failures as potential rationales. The two sets of problems suggest different corrective measures, and different measures than those applied in the context of SGP. We contrast the “legalistic” perspective adopted in the Pact with a more incentive-based approach and discuss how the legalistic perspective gives rise to enforcement problems in connection with the implementation of the SGP’s sanctions.

Tying hands is not commitment: can fiscal rules and institutions really enhance fiscal discipline?

Visiting Bruegel Scholar, Xavier Debrun, discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline.

When, What, and Why do States Choose to Delegate?

Koremenos demonstrates that international delegation is an important and nontrivial empirical phenomenon. Using an extensive data set created from the United Nations Treaty Series, she finds that almost half of all international agreements involve delegation of some kind. By exploring the institutional design choices of international delegation, she finds that dispute resolution is the most commonly delegated function and often involves externally delegating authority to an existing arbitration tribunal or an international court. Furthermore, she finds that external delegation in particular increases with the existence of complex cooperation problems such as enforcement and uncertainty and with the heterogeneity and number of parties