Visiting Bruegel Scholar, Xavier Debrun, discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline.

Xavier Debrun

English

Research Papers in Economics

A Model of Central Bank’s Accountability,”

Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence,”

Deficit Limits, Budget Rules, and Fiscal Policy,” IMF Working Paper, No 05/120,

Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in a Second-Best World”,

Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S.

Enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact: How Fiscal Policy Did and Did Not Change Under Europe’s Fiscal Framework,” IMF Working Paper,

Fiscal Policy Behavior in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union:

Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules,”

Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union:

Interaction of commitment and Discretion in

Monetary Union in West Africa: Who Might Gain, Who Might Lose, and Why?”,

Primary Surplus Behavior and Risks to Public Debt Sustainability: A Fan Chart Approach,” IMF Working Paper No 06/67. Forthcoming in IMF Staff Papers.

Strategic Signals and Multilateral Fiscal Surveillance,” unpublished,

The Design of Fiscal Rules and Forms of Fiscal Governance in European Union Countries,” ECB Working Paper, No 419, European Central Bank.

The New Stability and Growth Pact:

Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank

What Remains of the Stability Pact and What Next?,

Tying hands is not commitment: can fiscal rules and institutions really enhance fiscal discipline?

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Tying hands is not commitment: can fiscal rules and institutions really enhance fiscal discipline?

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Research Papers in Economics