Adjoint exactness

Plato's ideas and Aristotle's real types from the classical age, Nominalism and Realism of the mediaeval period and Whitehead's modern view of the world as pro- cess all come together in the formal representation by category theory of exactness in adjointness (a). Concepts of exactness and co-exactness arise naturally from ad- jointness and are needed in current global problems of science. If a right co-exact valued left-adjoint functor ( ) in a cartesian closed category has a right-adjoint left- exact functor ( ), then physical stability is satis ed if itself is also a right co-exact left-adjoint functor for the right-adjoint left exact functor ( ): a a . These concepts are discussed here with examples in nuclear fusion, in database interroga- tion and in the cosmological ne structure constant by the Frederick construction

Abstraction as a basis for the computational interpretation of creative cross-modal metaphor

Various approaches to computational metaphor interpretation are based on pre-existing similarities between source and target domains and/or are based on metaphors already observed to be prevalent in the language. This paper addresses similarity-creating cross-modal metaphoric expressions. It is shown how the “abstract concept as object” (or reification) metaphor plays a central role in a large class of metaphoric extensions. The described approach depends on the imposition of abstract ontological components, which represent source concepts, onto target concepts. The challenge of such a system is to represent both denotative and connotative components which are extensible, together with a framework of general domains between which such extensions can conceivably occur. An existing ontology of this kind, consistent with some mathematic concepts and widely held linguistic notions, is outlined. It is suggested that the use of such an abstract representation system is well adapted to the interpretation of both conventional and unconventional metaphor that is similarity-creating

Categorization through Sensory Codes

The central premise of concept empiricism is the denial of unique cognitive mental representations. The negative thesis applies as well to classic empiricists as it does to current ones. John Locke’s (1690) refusal to accept ‘abstract ideas’ is one way of denying unique and distinct cognitive representations. Jesse J. Prinz’s (2002) multi-modality hypothesis, according to which cognition functions on a multi-sensory code instead of a central ‘amodal’ one, is another. Both empiricist models have a common foil in a theory that posits one unique kind of ‘intellectualist’ mental representation to account for human cognitive achievements. For Locke, it was Descartes’ abstract mental medium for clear and distinct ideas and for Prinz it is Jerry Fodor’s Language of Thought. In this paper, I explore the empiricists’ denial of unique cognitive representations and argue that both Locke’s and Prinz’s theories privilege a unique representational medium – a spatial ‘code.’ As such, this tacit assumption does not entail that cognition runs on a unique medium. It does not lead to a ‘common code rationalism,’ to use Prinz’s terms, or support computational theories of the mind that privilege innate linguistic structures over sensory ones. To incorporate the idea of a spatial code more smoothly within empiricist intellectual resources, I interpret it through Lakoff’s experientialist account of categorical cognition. Through Lakoff’s embodied experientialist account – embodied neo-empiricism – the spatiality of cognition becomes founded in a broader and more plausible sensory matrix. I further suggest that Lakoff’s ideas on and use of spatial codes can be given a largely externalist reading. Lakoff’s space is not a unique cognitive one. This way, current neo-empiricism can be saved from assuming any unique internal posits including a language of thought

Recent Conceptual Consequences of Loop Quantum Gravity. Part I: Foundational Aspects

Conceptual consequences of recent results in loop quantum gravity are collected and discussed here in view of their implications for a modern philosophy of science which is mainly understood as one that totalizes scientific insight so as to eventually achieve a consistent model of what may be called fundamental heuristics on an onto-epistemic background which is part of recently proposed transcendental materialism. This enterprise is being understood as a serious attempt of answering recent appeals to philosophy so as to provide a conceptual foundation for what is going on in modern physics, and of bridging the obvious gap between physics and philosophy. This present first part of the paper deals with foundational aspects of this enterprise, a second part will deal with its holistic aspects.Comment: 25 page

An introduction to the perplex number system

AbstractThe perplex number system is a generalization of the abstract logical relationships among electrical particles. The inferential logic of the new number system is homologous to the inferential logic of the progression of the atomic numbers. An electrical progression is defined categorically as a sequence of objects with teridentities. Each identity infers corresponding values of an integer, units and a correspondence relation between each unit and its integer. Thus, in this logical system, each perplex numeral contains an exact internal representational structure; it carries an internal message. This structure is a labeled bipartite graph that is homologous to the internal electrical structure of a chemical atom. The formal logical operations are conjunctions and disjunctions. Combinations of conjunctions and disjunctions compose the spatiality of objects. Conjunctions may include the middle term of pairs of propositions with a common term, thereby creating new information. The perplex numerals are used as a universal source of diagrams.The perplex number system, as an abstract generalization of concrete objects and processes, constitutes a new exact notation for chemistry without invoking alchemical symbols. Practical applications of the number system to concrete objects (chemical elements, simple ions and molecules, and the perplex isomers, ethanol and dimethyl ether) are given. In conjunction with the real number system, the relationships between the perplex number system and scientific theories of concrete systems (thermodynamics, intra-molecular dynamics, molecular biology and individual medicine) are described

Apperceptive patterning: Artefaction, extensional beliefs and cognitive scaffolding

In “Psychopower and Ordinary Madness” my ambition, as it relates to Bernard Stiegler’s recent literature, was twofold: 1) critiquing Stiegler’s work on exosomatization and artefactual posthumanism—or, more specifically, nonhumanism—to problematize approaches to media archaeology that rely upon technical exteriorization; 2) challenging how Stiegler engages with Giuseppe Longo and Francis Bailly’s conception of negative entropy. These efforts were directed by a prevalent techno-cultural qualifier: the rise of Synthetic Intelligence (including neural nets, deep learning, predictive processing and Bayesian models of cognition). This paper continues this project but first directs a critical analytic lens at the Derridean practice of the ontologization of grammatization from which Stiegler emerges while also distinguishing how metalanguages operate in relation to object-oriented environmental interaction by way of inferentialism. Stalking continental (Kapp, Simondon, Leroi-Gourhan, etc.) and analytic traditions (e.g., Carnap, Chalmers, Clark, Sutton, Novaes, etc.), we move from artefacts to AI and Predictive Processing so as to link theories related to technicity with philosophy of mind. Simultaneously drawing forth Robert Brandom’s conceptualization of the roles that commitments play in retrospectively reconstructing the social experiences that lead to our endorsement(s) of norms, we compliment this account with Reza Negarestani’s deprivatized account of intelligence while analyzing the equipollent role between language and media (both digital and analog)

Human Uniqueness, Cognition by Description, and Procedural Memory

Evidence will be reviewed suggesting a fairly direct link between the human ability to think about entities which one has never perceived — here called “cognition by description” — and procedural memory. Cognition by description is a uniquely hominid trait which makes religion, science, and history possible. It is hypothesized that cognition by description (in the manner of Bertrand Russell’s “knowledge by description”) requires variable binding, which in turn utilizes quantifier raising. Quantifier raising plausibly depends upon the computational core of language, specifically the element of it which Noam Chomsky calls “internal Merge”. Internal Merge produces hierarchical structures by means of a memory of derivational steps, a process plausibly involving procedural memory. The hypothesis is testable, predicting that procedural memory deficits will be accompanied by impairments in cognition by description. We also discuss neural mechanisms plausibly underlying procedural memory and also, by our hypothesis, cognition by description

From Domains Towards a Logic of Universals: A Small Calculus for the Continuous Determination of Worlds

At the end of the 19th century, 'logic' moved from the discipline of philosophy to that of mathematics. One hundred years later, we have a plethora of formal logics. Looking at the situation form informatics, the mathematical discipline proved only a temporary shelter for `logic'. For there is Domain Theory, a constructive mathematical theory which extends the notion of computability into the continuum and spans the field of all possible deductive systems. Domain Theory describes the space of data-types which computers can ideally compute -- and computation in terms of these types. Domain Theory is constructive but only potentially operational. Here one particular operational model is derived from Domain Theory which consists of `universals', that is, model independent operands and operators. With these universals, Domains (logical models) can be approximated and continuously determined. The universal data-types and rules derived from Domain Theory relate strongly to the first formal logic conceived on philosophical grounds, Aristotelian (categorical) logic. This is no accident. For Aristotle, deduction was type-dependent and he too thought in term of type independent universal `essences'. This paper initiates the next `logical' step `beyond' Domain Theory by reconnecting `formal logic' with its origin