11 research outputs found
Streaming Algorithms for Submodular Function Maximization
We consider the problem of maximizing a nonnegative submodular set function
subject to a -matchoid
constraint in the single-pass streaming setting. Previous work in this context
has considered streaming algorithms for modular functions and monotone
submodular functions. The main result is for submodular functions that are {\em
non-monotone}. We describe deterministic and randomized algorithms that obtain
a -approximation using -space, where is
an upper bound on the cardinality of the desired set. The model assumes value
oracle access to and membership oracles for the matroids defining the
-matchoid constraint.Comment: 29 pages, 7 figures, extended abstract to appear in ICALP 201
Multiwinner Elections with Diversity Constraints
We develop a model of multiwinner elections that combines performance-based
measures of the quality of the committee (such as, e.g., Borda scores of the
committee members) with diversity constraints. Specifically, we assume that the
candidates have certain attributes (such as being a male or a female, being
junior or senior, etc.) and the goal is to elect a committee that, on the one
hand, has as high a score regarding a given performance measure, but that, on
the other hand, meets certain requirements (e.g., of the form "at least
of the committee members are junior candidates and at least are
females"). We analyze the computational complexity of computing winning
committees in this model, obtaining polynomial-time algorithms (exact and
approximate) and NP-hardness results. We focus on several natural classes of
voting rules and diversity constraints.Comment: A short version of this paper appears in the proceedings of AAAI-1
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement
auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function
subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful
mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the
participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of
general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first
truthful, budget-feasible and -approximate mechanisms that run in
polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions.
Prior to our work, the only -approximation mechanism known for
non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value
queries.
At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone
submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two
candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet
ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly
enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem
where---crucially---the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal
value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online
setting as well.
To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the
case where additional feasibility constraints are present. We obtain
-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular
objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a -system.
With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known
for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting
that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guarantees in polynomial
time, our results are asymptotically best possible.Comment: Accepted to EC 201
Budget-feasible mechanism design for non-monotone submodular objectives: Offline and online
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first truthful, budget-feasible and O(1)-approximation mechanisms that run in polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions. Since the introduction of the problem by Singer [40], obtaining efficient mechanisms for objectives that go beyond the class of monotone submodular functions has been elusive. Prior to our work, the only O(1)-approximation mechanism known for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries. At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem where-crucially-the agents are not ordered according to their marginal value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online setting as well. To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the case where additional feasibility constraints are present, e.g., at most k agents can be selected. We obtain O(p)-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a p-system. With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guaran