Approximately Counting Triangles in Sublinear Time

We consider the problem of estimating the number of triangles in a graph. This problem has been extensively studied in both theory and practice, but all existing algorithms read the entire graph. In this work we design a {\em sublinear-time\/} algorithm for approximating the number of triangles in a graph, where the algorithm is given query access to the graph. The allowed queries are degree queries, vertex-pair queries and neighbor queries. We show that for any given approximation parameter $0<\epsilon<1$, the algorithm provides an estimate $\widehat{t}$ such that with high constant probability, $(1-\epsilon)\cdot t< \widehat{t}<(1+\epsilon)\cdot t$, where $t$ is the number of triangles in the graph $G$. The expected query complexity of the algorithm is $\!\left(\frac{n}{t^{1/3}} + \min\left\{m, \frac{m^{3/2}}{t}\right\}\right)\cdot {\rm poly}(\log n, 1/\epsilon)$, where $n$ is the number of vertices in the graph and $m$ is the number of edges, and the expected running time is $\!\left(\frac{n}{t^{1/3}} + \frac{m^{3/2}}{t}\right)\cdot {\rm poly}(\log n, 1/\epsilon)$. We also prove that $\Omega\!\left(\frac{n}{t^{1/3}} + \min\left\{m, \frac{m^{3/2}}{t}\right\}\right)$ queries are necessary, thus establishing that the query complexity of this algorithm is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors in $n$ (and the dependence on $1/\epsilon$).Comment: To appear in the 56th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2015

Approximation Algorithms for Multi-Criteria Traveling Salesman Problems

In multi-criteria optimization problems, several objective functions have to be optimized. Since the different objective functions are usually in conflict with each other, one cannot consider only one particular solution as the optimal solution. Instead, the aim is to compute a so-called Pareto curve of solutions. Since Pareto curves cannot be computed efficiently in general, we have to be content with approximations to them. We design a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for multi-criteria g-metric STSP that computes (min{1 +g, 2g^2/(2g^2 -2g +1)} + eps)-approximate Pareto curves for all 1/2<=g<=1. In particular, we obtain a (2+eps)-approximation for multi-criteria metric STSP. We also present two randomized approximation algorithms for multi-criteria g-metric STSP that achieve approximation ratios of (2g^3 +2g^2)/(3g^2 -2g +1) + eps and (1 +g)/(1 +3g -4g^2) + eps, respectively. Moreover, we present randomized approximation algorithms for multi-criteria g-metric ATSP (ratio 1/2 + g^3/(1 -3g^2) + eps) for g < 1/sqrt(3)), STSP with weights 1 and 2 (ratio 4/3) and ATSP with weights 1 and 2 (ratio 3/2). To do this, we design randomized approximation schemes for multi-criteria cycle cover and graph factor problems.Comment: To appear in Algorithmica. A preliminary version has been presented at the 4th Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA 2006

Streaming Verification of Graph Properties

Streaming interactive proofs (SIPs) are a framework for outsourced computation. A computationally limited streaming client (the verifier) hands over a large data set to an untrusted server (the prover) in the cloud and the two parties run a protocol to confirm the correctness of result with high probability. SIPs are particularly interesting for problems that are hard to solve (or even approximate) well in a streaming setting. The most notable of these problems is finding maximum matchings, which has received intense interest in recent years but has strong lower bounds even for constant factor approximations. In this paper, we present efficient streaming interactive proofs that can verify maximum matchings exactly. Our results cover all flavors of matchings (bipartite/non-bipartite and weighted). In addition, we also present streaming verifiers for approximate metric TSP. In particular, these are the first efficient results for weighted matchings and for metric TSP in any streaming verification model.Comment: 26 pages, 2 figure, 1 tabl

An ETH-Tight Exact Algorithm for Euclidean TSP

We study exact algorithms for {\sc Euclidean TSP} in $\mathbb{R}^d$. In the early 1990s algorithms with $n^{O(\sqrt{n})}$ running time were presented for the planar case, and some years later an algorithm with $n^{O(n^{1-1/d})}$ running time was presented for any $d\geq 2$. Despite significant interest in subexponential exact algorithms over the past decade, there has been no progress on {\sc Euclidean TSP}, except for a lower bound stating that the problem admits no $2^{O(n^{1-1/d-\epsilon})}$ algorithm unless ETH fails. Up to constant factors in the exponent, we settle the complexity of {\sc Euclidean TSP} by giving a $2^{O(n^{1-1/d})}$ algorithm and by showing that a $2^{o(n^{1-1/d})}$ algorithm does not exist unless ETH fails.Comment: To appear in FOCS 201

Improved Metric Distortion for Deterministic Social Choice Rules

In this paper, we study the metric distortion of deterministic social choice rules that choose a winning candidate from a set of candidates based on voter preferences. Voters and candidates are located in an underlying metric space. A voter has cost equal to her distance to the winning candidate. Ordinal social choice rules only have access to the ordinal preferences of the voters that are assumed to be consistent with the metric distances. Our goal is to design an ordinal social choice rule with minimum distortion, which is the worst-case ratio, over all consistent metrics, between the social cost of the rule and that of the optimal omniscient rule with knowledge of the underlying metric space. The distortion of the best deterministic social choice rule was known to be between $3$ and $5$. It had been conjectured that any rule that only looks at the weighted tournament graph on the candidates cannot have distortion better than $5$. In our paper, we disprove it by presenting a weighted tournament rule with distortion of $4.236$. We design this rule by generalizing the classic notion of uncovered sets, and further show that this class of rules cannot have distortion better than $4.236$. We then propose a new voting rule, via an alternative generalization of uncovered sets. We show that if a candidate satisfying the criterion of this voting rule exists, then choosing such a candidate yields a distortion bound of $3$, matching the lower bound. We present a combinatorial conjecture that implies distortion of $3$, and verify it for small numbers of candidates and voters by computer experiments. Using our framework, we also show that selecting any candidate guarantees distortion of at most $3$ when the weighted tournament graph is cyclically symmetric.Comment: EC 201