‘I feel like we’re really behind the game’: perspectives of the United Kingdom’s intimate partner violence support sector on the rise of technology-facilitated abuse

Technology-facilitated abuse or ‘tech abuse’ in intimate partner violence (IPV) contexts describes the breadth of harms that can be enacted using digital systems and online tools. While the misappropriation of technologies in the context of IPV has been subject to prior research, a dedicated study on the United Kingdom’s IPV support sector has so far been missing. The present analysis summarises insights derived from semi-structured interviews with 34 UK voluntary and statutory sector representatives that were conducted over the course of two years (2018–2020). The analysis identifies four overarching themes that point out support services’ practices, concerns and challenges in relation to tech abuse, and specifically the Internet of Things (IoT). These themes include (a) technology-facilitated abuse, where interviewees outline their experiences and understanding of the concept of tech abuse; (b) IoT-enabled tech abuse, focusing on the changing dynamics of tech abuse due to the continuing rise of smart consumer products; (c) data, documentation and assessment, that directs our attention to the shortcomings of existing risk assessment and recording practices; and (d) training, support and assistance, in which participants point to the need for specialist support capabilities to be developed within and beyond existing services.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Key messages&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;UK statutory and voluntary support services do not feel well equipped to respond to tech abuse.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;Shortcomings in documentation and assessment practices make it difficult to estimate the full scale and nature of tech abuse.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;Tech abuse training and other support mechanisms are needed to amplify the UK sector’s ability to assist IPV victims/survivors.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt; </jats:p

Technology-Facilitated Domestic Abuse in Political Economy: A new theoretical framework

This paper presents a new theoretical framework around technology-facilitated domestic abuse (TFDA) in identifying four distinct types of omnipresent behaviour. Perpetrators are increasingly drawing upon networked technologies likes smartphones, social media and GPS trackers in monitoring, controlling and abusing survivors. There is considerable academic literature developing in response to this. Whilst this scholarship is valuable, this paper argues that TFDA must be understood as a neoliberal manifestation of patriarchal legacies of misogyny and sexism. A failure to recognise this will serve to prioritise abusers’ freedom to do harm over rights of survivors to be protected from harm

The digital harms of smart home devices:a systematic literature review

The connection of home electronic devices to the internet allows remote control of physical devices and involves the collection of large volumes of data. With the increase in the uptake of Internet-of-Things home devices, it becomes critical to understand the digital harms of smart homes. We present a systematic literature review on the security and privacy harms of smart homes. PRISMA methodology is used to systematically review 63 studies published between January 2011 and October 2021; and a review of known cases is undertaken to illustrate the literature review findings with real-world scenarios. Published literature identifies that smart homes may pose threats to confidentiality (unwanted release of information), authentication (sensing information being falsified) and unauthorised access to system controls. Most existing studies focus on privacy intrusions as a prevalent form of harm against smart homes. Other types of harms that are less common in the literature include hacking, malware and DoS attacks. Digital harms, and data associated with these harms, may vary extensively across smart devices. Most studies propose technical measures to mitigate digital harms, while fewer consider social prevention mechanisms. We also identify salient gaps in research, and argue that these should be addressed in future crossdisciplinary research initiatives

“I thought you were okay”: Participatory Design with Young Adults to Fight Multiparty Privacy Conflicts in Online Social Networks

International audienceWhile sharing multimedia content on Online Social Networks (OSNs) has many benefits, exposing other people without obtaining permission could cause Multiparty Privacy Conflicts (MPCs). Earlier studies developed technical solutions and dissuasive approaches to address MPCs. However, none of these studies involved OSN users who have experienced MPCs, in the design process, possibly overlooking the valuable experiences these individuals might have accrued. To fill this gap, we recruited participants specifically from this population of users, and involved them in participatory design sessions aiming at ideating solutions to reduce the incidence of MPCs. To frame the activities of our participants, we borrowed terminology and concepts from a well known framework used in the justice systems. Over the course of several design sessions, our participants designed 10 solutions to mitigate MPCs. The designed solutions leverage different mechanisms, including preventing MPCs from happening, dissuading users from sharing, mending the harm, and educating users about the community standards. We discuss the open design and research opportunities suggested by the designed solutions and we contribute an ideal workflow that synthesizes the best of each solution. This study contributes to the innovation of privacy-enhancing technologies to limit the incidences of MPCs in OSNs

The UK code of practice for consumer IoT cybersecurity: where we are and what next

This report has been produced by the Geopolitics of Industrial Internet of Things Standards (GISt) research project led by Professors Madeline Carr and Stephen Hailes, and the Building Evidence for CoP Legislation (BECL) research project led by Dr Saheli Datta Burton and commisioned by the Secure-by-Design team of the United Kingdom Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). Both GISt and BECL projects are held at the Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy (STEaPP), University College London and funded by The PETRAS National Centre of Excellence for IoT Systems Cybersecurity, a consortium of leading UK universities dedicated to understanding critical issues in the privacy, ethics, trust, reliability, acceptability, and security of the Internet of Things. Funding for PETRAS is provided by the UKRI’s Strategic Priorities Fund as part of the Security of Digital Technologies at the Periphery (SDTaP) programme

Trust and Abusability Toolkit: Centering Safety in Human-Data Interactions

If you care about security, you care about safety. So you need to care about abusability and trust. This toolkit will provide information about why centering peoples’ safety in our digital technologies is important. We present the concepts of abusability and trust as two important tenets of building such safer technologies, followed by resources that can help us build safer technologies

Technology-Facilitated Intimate Partner Violence: A multidisciplinary examination of prevalence, methods used by perpetrators and the impact of COVID-19.

A multidisciplinary team of academics from the University of Kent’s Institute for Cyber Security in Society (iCSS) received funding from the Home Office Domestic Abuse Perpetrators Fund to conduct research into the perpetration of Technology Facilitated Intimate Partner Violence (TFIPV). The project comprised of 4 workstreams: 1) A Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) of the evidence base around TFIVP, 2) A thorough analysis of a representative sample of cases of TFIPV as reported to The Cyber Helpline, 3) interviews and surveys with Helpline Responders around their experiences responding to TFIPV and 4) a synthesis of the findings and a visual presentation

Technology-Facilitated Intimate Partner Violence: A multidisciplinary examination of prevalence, methods used by perpetrators and the impact of COVID-19

A multidisciplinary team of academics from the University of Kent’s Institute for Cyber Security in Society (iCSS) received funding from the Home Office Domestic Abuse Perpetrators Fund to conduct research into the perpetration of Technology Facilitated Intimate Partner Violence (TFIPV). The project comprised of 4 workstreams: 1) A Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) of the evidence base around TFIVP, 2) A thorough analysis of a representative sample of cases of TFIPV as reported to The Cyber Helpline, 3) interviews and surveys with Helpline Responders around their experiences responding to TFIPV and 4) a synthesis of the findings and a visual presentation

Geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt in Zeiten der Digitalisierung: Formen und Interventionsstrategien

Digitale Gewalt kommt nicht nur im öffentlichen Raum vor, sondern auch in privaten Beziehungen - und hat in Kombination mit häuslicher und sexualisierter Gewalt eine deutlich geschlechtsspezifische Komponente. Durch Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien haben Gewaltformen wie Doxing, Stalking, Hate Speech und Online-Belästigung und -Bedrohung stark zugenommen und durch die Nutzung des Internets ihre Wirkmächtigkeit verstärkt. Die Beiträger*innen des Bandes liefern für den Umgang mit diesen Gewaltformen grundlegende interdisziplinäre Analysen und diskutieren sowohl juristische, technische und aktivistische Interventionen als auch Erfahrungen aus der Beratungspraxis. Dabei werden zentrale politische Änderungsbedarfe ausgemacht und entsprechende Handlungsoptionen aufgezeigt.Digital violence is not only directed against public persons, but also against private individuals and in its domestic and sexualized manifestations, it has a distinctly gender-specific component. Various forms of violence, such as doxing, stalking, hate speech, and cyber harassment, have developed and have been made possible by information and communication technologies or have become increasingly effective through the use of the Internet. The contributors to this volume provide fundamental interdisciplinary analyses for dealing with these forms of violence and discuss both legal, technical and activist interventions as well as experiences from counseling practice. In doing so, they identify central political needs for change and point out appropriate options for action