118 research outputs found
Knowledge is Closed Under Analytic Content
I am concerned with epistemic closureāthe phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true, then S knows that all analytic parts of p are true as well. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox. I close by arguing that contextualists who maintain that knowledge attributions are closed withinābut not betweenālinguistic contexts are tacitly committed to this principleās trut
A Semantic Framework for the Impure Logic of Ground
There is a curious bifurcation in the literature on ground and its logic. On the one hand, there has been a great deal of work that presumes that logical complexity invariably yields grounding. So, for instance, it is widely presumed that any fact stated by a true conjunction is grounded in those stated by its conjuncts, that any fact stated by a true disjunction is grounded in that stated by any of its true disjuncts, and that any fact stated by a true double negation is grounded in that stated by the doubly-negated formula. This commitment is encapsulated in the system GG axiomatized and semantically characterized in [deRosset and Fine, 2023] (following [Fine, 2012]). On the other hand, there has been a great deal of important formal work on āflatterā theories of ground, yielding logics very different from GG [Correia, 2010] [Fine, 2016, 2017b]. For instance, these theories identify the fact stated by a self-conjunction (Ļ ā§ Ļ) with that stated by its conjunct Ļ. Since, in these systems, no fact grounds itself, the āflatterā theories are inconsistent with the principles of GG. This bifurcation raises the question of whether there is a single notion of ground suited to fulfill the philosophical ambitions of grounding enthusiasts. There is, at present, no unified semantic framework employing a single conception of ground for simultaneously characterizing both GG and the āflatterā approaches. This paper fills this gap by specifying such a framework and demonstrating its adequacy
A hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance
On one important notion of irrelevance, evidence that is irrelevant in an inquiry may rationally be discarded, and attempts to obtain evidence amount to a waste of resources if they are directed at irrelevant evidence. The familiar Bayesian criterion of irrelevance, whatever its merits, is not adequate with respect to this notion. I show that a modification of the criterion due to Ken Gemes, though a significant improvement, still has highly implausible consequences. To make progress, I argue, we need to adopt a hyperintensional conception of content. I go on to formulate a better, hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance, drawing heavily on the framework of the truthmaker conception of propositions as recently developed by Kit Fine
Aboutness in Imagination
I present a formal theory of the logic and aboutness of imagination. Aboutness is understood as the relation between meaningful items and what they concern, as per Yablo and Fineās works on the notion. Imagination is understood as per Chalmersā positive conceivability: the intentional state of a subject who conceives that p by imagining a situationāa configuration of objects and propertiesāverifying p. So far aboutness theory has been developed mainly for linguistic representation, but it is natural to extend it to intentional states. The proposed framework combines a modal semantics with a mereology of contents: imagination operators are understood as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a content-preservation constraint
Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions
Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness
Cognitive synonymy : a dead parrot?
Funding: This research is published within the project āThe Logic of Conceivabilityā, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.Sentences Ļ and Ļ are cognitive synonyms for one when they play the same role in oneās cognitive life. The notion is pervasive (Sect. 1), but elusive: it is bound to be hyperintensional (Sect. 2), but excessive fine-graining would trivialize it and there are reasons for some coarse-graining (Sect. 2.1). Conceptual limitations stand in the way of a natural algebra (Sect. 2.2), and it should be sensitive to subject matters (Sect. 2.3). A cognitively adequate individuation of content may be intransitive (Sect. 3) due to ādead parrotā series: sequences of sentences Ļ1,ā¦,Ļn where adjacent Ļi and Ļi+1 are cognitive synonyms while Ļ1 and Ļn are not (Sect. 3.1). Finding an intransitive account is hard: Fregean equipollence wonāt do (Sect. 3.2) and a result by Leitgeb shows that it wouldnāt satisfy a minimal compositionality principle (Sect. 3.3). Sed contra, there are reasons for transitivity, too (Sect. 3.4). In Sect. 4, we come up with a formal semantics capturing this jumble of desiderata, thereby showing that the notion is coherent. In Sect. 5, we re-assess the desiderata in its light.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe
Towards a theory of ground-theoretic content
A lot of research has recently been done on the topic of ground, and in particular on the logic of ground. According to a broad consensus in that debate, ground is hyperintensional in the sense that even logically equivalent truths may differ with respect to what grounds them, and what they ground. This renders pressing the question of what we may take to be the ground-theoretic content of a true statement, i.e. that aspect of the statement's overall content to which ground is sensitive. I propose a novel answer to this question, namely that ground tracks how, rather than just by what, a statement is made true. I develop that answer in the form of a formal theory of ground-theoretic content and show how the resulting framework may be used to articulate plausible theories of ground, including in particular a popular account of the grounds of truth-functionally complex truths that has proved difficult to accommodate on alternative views of content
The Semantic Foundations of Philosophical Analysis
I provide an analysis of sentences of the form āTo be F is to be Gā in terms of exact truth-maker semanticsāan approach that identifies the meanings of sentences with the states of the world directly responsible for their truth-values. Roughly, I argue that these sentences hold just in case that which makes something F is that which makes it G. This approach is hyperintensional, and possesses desirable logical and modal features. These sentences are reflexive, transitive and symmetric, and, if they are true, then they are necessarily true, and it is necessary that all and only Fs are Gs. I close by defining an asymmetric and irreflexive notion of analysis in terms of the reflexive and symmetric one
The Levels of the Empirical Sciences
It is the aim of this paper to develop and defend an interpretation of level of scientific discipline within the truth-maker framework. In particular, I exploit the mereological relation of proper parthood, which is integral to truth-maker semantics, in order to provide an account of scientific level
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