Analysis of WIMAX/BWA Licensing in India: A real option approach

Indian Internet and broadband market has experienced very slow growth and limited penetration till now. The introduction of Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) is expected to aid in increasing the penetration of internet and broadband in India. The report sheds light on the guidelines and procedure used in 4G/BWA spectrum auction and presents comparative analysis of the competing technologies, providing the information about suitability of each technology available. Recently held 4G/ BWA spectrum auction saw enthusiastic participation by the industry and even saw some new entrants in Indian broadband market. Government benefited by Rs, 385bn that it earned as revenue from the auction of the spectrum and projected it as successful auction. However, the question remains if the auctions were efficient and whether they led to creation of value or will it prove to be burden to the telecom operators and will depress their balance sheet for years to come. The report uses both traditional valuation methods such as Discounted Cash Flow as well as Real Option approach to answer such questions. Using DCF analysis, the broadband subscribers have been forecasted to grow from present 13.77mn to 544mn by the end of 2025. The wireless subscribers are forecasted to be 70% of the total broadband subscribers after 5 years of roll out as it will be difficult to replace all wireline subscribers with wireless subscribers in India due to the high cost of wireless broadband and new technology. WiMAX is expected to increase its presence with time and reach 90mn subscribers from meager 0.35mn subscribers by 2025. Using industry wide cost of capital as 12.05%, the Net Present Value has been found Rs 221bn aggregate with an IRR of 17.1%. Using Real option approach, the value of license has been calculated as Rs 437bn which is 13.5% more than the spectrum fees paid by the operators. This mismatch, between the auction value and the correct value that should have been discovered by supply-demand dynamics, can be due to limited participants in BWA spectrum auctions and companies such as TATA and Reliance opting out of the auction process midway as well as uncertainty about acceptance of new technology with Indian subscribers.WiMAX, broadband, 3G spectrum, 4G,broadband wireless access, valuation, licensing, real option

Valuation of 3G spectrum license in India: A real option approach

India is about to enter a new technological phase as far as mobile technology is concerned. After almost a decade of existence, Third Generation (3G) mobile technology will be rolled out in India. The licenses for the same were auctioned in April – May 2010 and 3G licenses were allocated to the winners in September 2010. Nine private telecom operators entered the bidding for the license and eventually seven won the licenses. The bidding was intense and eventually the aggregate fees of the license as received by the government were almost twice the expected amount. In the backdrop of experience of 3G auction winners in UK and Germany who paid huge sums to acquire the 3G licenses and later lost their market capitalization as the markets perceived that the price paid for the license was more than the actual value of the license, analysts in India were concerned if the operators had paid too much for the licenses. In this report aggregate value of the 3G licenses is calculated using both traditional discounted cash flow approach and real options approach. We find that the rollout of 3G services gives an internal rate of return of 14.2%over the life of the license. If we assume an internal rate of return of 15% for the telecom operators then the aggregate license value comes out to be INR 594 Billion which is 12% lower than what the operators have paid to acquire the license. We also found out that the value of the license as calculated from the real options methodology is INR 798 Billion which is 17.8% higher than the aggregate value paid by the operators. Hence we see that DCF valuation suggests that the licenses were overvalued while Real Options methodology suggests that the licenses were undervalued. The report discusses the reasons for differences between real option valuation and DCF valuation of the license, the possible challenges that the 3Goperators might face in the short to long term and what are the key enablers for the growth of3G services if they want to extract the maximum mileage out of the 3G technology. The report recommends that in future while allocating telecom licenses or licenses in sectors where high and irreversible investment is required and there is a scope for the licensees to invest in phases or in modules, the government should consider real options methodology for setting the price of the license., or the base price of the licenses in case the government decides to follow an auction methodology3G spectrum, mobile technology, valuation, real options, DCF

Analysis of WIMAX/BWA Licensing in India: A real option approach

Indian Internet and broadband market has experienced very slow growth and limited penetration till now. The introduction of Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) is expected to aid in increasing the penetration of internet and broadband in India. The report sheds light on the guidelines and procedure used in 4G/BWA spectrum auction and presents comparative analysis of the competing technologies, providing the information about suitability of each technology available. Recently held 4G/ BWA spectrum auction saw enthusiastic participation by the industry and even saw some new entrants in Indian broadband market. Government benefited by Rs, 385bn that it earned as revenue from the auction of the spectrum and projected it as successful auction. However, the question remains if the auctions were efficient and whether they led to creation of value or will it prove to be burden to the telecom operators and will depress their balance sheet for years to come. The report uses both traditional valuation methods such as Discounted Cash Flow as well as Real Option approach to answer such questions. Using DCF analysis, the broadband subscribers have been forecasted to grow from present 13.77mn to 544mn by the end of 2025. The wireless subscribers are forecasted to be 70% of the total broadband subscribers after 5 years of roll out as it will be difficult to replace all wireline subscribers with wireless subscribers in India due to the high cost of wireless broadband and new technology. WiMAX is expected to increase its presence with time and reach 90mn subscribers from meager 0.35mn subscribers by 2025. Using industry wide cost of capital as 12.05%, the Net Present Value has been found Rs 221bn aggregate with an IRR of 17.1%. Using Real option approach, the value of license has been calculated as Rs 437bn which is 13.5% more than the spectrum fees paid by the operators. This mismatch, between the auction value and the correct value that should have been discovered by supply-demand dynamics, can be due to limited participants in BWA spectrum auctions and companies such as TATA and Reliance opting out of the auction process midway as well as uncertainty about acceptance of new technology with Indian subscribers

Valuation of 3G spectrum license in India: A real option approach

India is about to enter a new technological phase as far as mobile technology is concerned. After almost a decade of existence, Third Generation (3G) mobile technology will be rolled out in India. The licenses for the same were auctioned in April – May 2010 and 3G licenses were allocated to the winners in September 2010. Nine private telecom operators entered the bidding for the license and eventually seven won the licenses. The bidding was intense and eventually the aggregate fees of the license as received by the government were almost twice the expected amount. In the backdrop of experience of 3G auction winners in UK and Germany who paid huge sums to acquire the 3G licenses and later lost their market capitalization as the markets perceived that the price paid for the license was more than the actual value of the license, analysts in India were concerned if the operators had paid too much for the licenses. In this report aggregate value of the 3G licenses is calculated using both traditional discounted cash flow approach and real options approach. We find that the rollout of 3G services gives an internal rate of return of 14.2%over the life of the license. If we assume an internal rate of return of 15% for the telecom operators then the aggregate license value comes out to be INR 594 Billion which is 12% lower than what the operators have paid to acquire the license. We also found out that the value of the license as calculated from the real options methodology is INR 798 Billion which is 17.8% higher than the aggregate value paid by the operators. Hence we see that DCF valuation suggests that the licenses were overvalued while Real Options methodology suggests that the licenses were undervalued. The report discusses the reasons for differences between real option valuation and DCF valuation of the license, the possible challenges that the 3Goperators might face in the short to long term and what are the key enablers for the growth of3G services if they want to extract the maximum mileage out of the 3G technology. The report recommends that in future while allocating telecom licenses or licenses in sectors where high and irreversible investment is required and there is a scope for the licensees to invest in phases or in modules, the government should consider real options methodology for setting the price of the license., or the base price of the licenses in case the government decides to follow an auction methodolog

Análise de decisão de investimento através da aplicação de opções reais na avaliação de startups

Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (graduação)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Tecnologia, Departamento de Engenharia de Produção, 2018.O investimento em startups vem crescendo significativamente nos últimos anos. Do ponto de vista do investidor, as startups se mostram bastante atrativas devido ao elevado potencial de valorização, no entanto, por se tratarem de empresas de alta inovação e ainda em sua fase inicial, a baixa disponibilidade de dados dificulta as diversas análises necessárias para a tomada de decisão acerca do valor do investimento. Tais características tornam métodos tradicionais de avaliação de empresas, como o Fluxo de Caixa Descontado, pouco eficientes. Nesse contexto, a Teoria das Opções Reais surge como um importante método para avaliação, especialmente, o Método Integrado de Avaliação por Opções, pois este trata a avaliação separada em dois tipos de riscos (públicos e privados) amenizando as incertezas e subjetividades envolvidas no processo. Portanto, o presente trabalho busca aplicar este método em uma situação prática para que assim seja possível definir qual a melhor alternativa de investimento do ponto de vista financeiro dado o perfil de tolerância ao risco do investidor.Investment in startups has been growing significantly in recent years. From the investor's point of view, startups are very attractive due to the high valuation potential; however, because they are high innovation companies and they are still in their initial phase, the low availability of data hampers the various analyzes necessary for the decision-making about the value of the investment. Such characteristics make traditional methods of evaluating companies, such as Discounted Cash Flow, inefficient. In this context, the Real Options Theory emerges as an important method for evaluation, especially the Integrated Valuation, since it treats the separate valuation in two types of risks (public and private) mitigating the uncertainties and subjectivities involved in the process. Therefore, the present work seeks to apply this method in a practical to be possible to define the best investment alternative from the financial point of view, given the risk tolerance profile of the investor

IFRS accounting trends and techniques

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_att/1082/thumbnail.jp

Risk Management

Every business and decision involves a certain amount of risk. Risk might cause a loss to a company. This does not mean, however, that businesses cannot take risks. As disengagement and risk aversion may result in missed business opportunities, which will lead to slower growth and reduced prosperity of a company. In today's increasingly complex and diverse environment, it is crucial to find the right balance between risk aversion and risk taking. To do this it is essential to understand the complex, out of the whole range of economic, technical, operational, environmental and social risks associated with the company's activities. However, risk management is about much more than merely avoiding or successfully deriving benefit from opportunities. Risk management is the identification, assessment, and prioritization of risks. Lastly, risk management helps a company to handle the risks associated with a rapidly changing business environment

Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2008, nr 4

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