National Party Politics and Supranational Politics in the European Union: New Evidence from the European Parliament

Political parties play an important role in structuring political competition at different levels of governance in the European Union (EU). The political parties that contest national elections also participate in the EU legislative institutions, with the governing parties at the national level participating in the Council of Ministers and a broad range of national parties represented in the European Parliament (EP). Recent research indicates that national parties in the EP have formed ideological coalitions -- party groups -- that represent transnational political interests. These party groups appear to manage legislative behavior such that national interests -- which dominate the Council of Ministers -- are subjugated to ideological conflict. In this paper, we demonstrate that the roll-call vote evidence for the impact of party groups in the EP is misleading. Because party groups have incentives to select votes for roll call so as to hide or feature particular voting patterns, the true character of political conflict is never revealed in roll calls.

Post-Chicago Law and Economics

This is not another law-and-econ bashing symposium. Nor is the symposium\u27s title intended to denigrate Chicago School law and economics any more than the term Post-Keynesian economics was intended to denigrate the work of John Maynard Keynes. Instead, this symposium marks the fact that many practitioners of law and economics have moved well beyond the stereotypes familiar to most legal academics. Rather than designating an entirely new school of thought, the term Post-Chicago law and economics refers to a new era in which a variety of new questions about law and lawmaking is being asked and a variety of promising economic techniques is being used to answer them. Yet most legal academics who, like me, are not part of the law and economics movement are generally unaware of these changes. The purpose of this Symposium on Post-Chicago Law and Economics is to bring some of these new methods and questions to the attention of mainstream legal academics and others. The hope is that those who have shunned the economic analysis of law in the past may wish to reconsider their stance in light of what Post-Chicago law and economics has to offer. To facilitate this, the author uses this Foreword to summarize the new directions suggested by each of the symposium contributors, most of whom are practitioners of law and economics

Reliable dual-redundant sensor failure detection and identification for the NASA F-8 DFBW aircraft

A technique was developed which provides reliable failure detection and identification (FDI) for a dual redundant subset of the flight control sensors onboard the NASA F-8 digital fly by wire (DFBW) aircraft. The technique was successfully applied to simulated sensor failures on the real time F-8 digital simulator and to sensor failures injected on telemetry data from a test flight of the F-8 DFBW aircraft. For failure identification the technique utilized the analytic redundancy which exists as functional and kinematic relationships among the various quantities being measured by the different control sensor types. The technique can be used not only in a dual redundant sensor system, but also in a more highly redundant system after FDI by conventional voting techniques reduced to two the number of unfailed sensors of a particular type. In addition the technique can be easily extended to the case in which only one sensor of a particular type is available

Policy Influence and Reelection in the European Parliament

Introduction: In this paper, we undertake two challenges: measuring political influence and using influence to explain reelection. First, we develop a new measure of policy leadership in the European Parliament (EP), by which we mean leadership by lawmakers in particular policy domains. Second, we investigate the predictive power of this new indicator by considering its ability to explain individual MEPs’ reelection. In other words, we ask if policy leaders are more likely to be reelected, controlling for relevant confounding factors, such as formal party and legislative leadership, seniority, and the electoral performance of MEPs’ national parties