A simultaneous equations analysis of analysts’ forecast bias and institutional ownership

In this paper we use a simultaneous equations model to examine the relationship between analysts' forecasting decisions and institutions' investment decisions. Neglecting their interaction results in model misspecification. We find that analysts' optimism concerning a firm's earnings responds positively to changes in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock. At the same time, institutional demand responds positively to increases in analysts' optimism. We also investigate several firm characteristics as determinants of analysts' and institutions' decisions. We conclude that agency-driven behavioral considerations are significant.Financial institutions ; Forecasting ; Financial markets

Differential Informativeness of Accrual Measures to Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy

This paper evaluates whether analysts incorporate formal measures of earnings quality into their earnings forecasts. It examines whether the accrual ratio and abnormal accruals, measured with the Modified Jones (1991) Model of discretionary accruals, differentially inform analysts’ earnings forecasts. It uses the accuracy of analysts’ forecast as a context in which to evaluate how well analysts incorporate effects of the information contained in accrual ratio and abnormal accruals. The results indicate that the accrual ratio is negatively related to the absolute value of analysts’ forecast errors while the Modified Jones (1991) Model of discretionary accruals have virtually no economic effect on analysts’ forecast error. The insignificant effect of discretionary accruals on analysts’ forecast may be attributed to analysts having already incorporated the information therein in their earnings forecasts, effect of the accrual anomaly having been largely arbitraged away by market participants or both. This paper contributes to the research on analysts’ earnings forecast and earnings quality and helps bridge the gap between practice and theory by demonstrating the differential impact of discretionary accruals (favored by academics) and the accrual ratio (favored by analysts) on analysts’ forecast accuracy. This study informs researchers and policy makers interested in better understanding how analysts affects the financial markets including how they may have learned from previously documented market anomalies such as the accrual anomaly. This is important as ultimately, efficient economy-wide capital allocation decisions are based partly on outputs of analysts’ forecasting processes

Terrorist attacks, analyst sentiment, and earnings forecasts

We examine whether exogenous and extremely negative events, such as terrorist attacks and mass shootings, influence the sentiment and forecasts of sell-side equity analysts. We find that analysts who are local to these attacks issue forecasts that are relatively more pessimistic than the consensus forecast. This effect is stronger when the analyst is closer to the event and located in a low-crime region. Impacted analysts are also relatively more pessimistic around the one- and two-year anniversaries of the attacks. Collectively, these findings indicate that exposure to extreme negative events affects the behavior of information intermediaries and the information dissemination process in financial markets

The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial Institutions

A conflict of interest exists when a party to a transaction could potentially make a gain from taking actions that are detrimental to the other party in the transaction. This paper examines the economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions and reviews the growing empirical literature (mostly focused on analysts) on the economic implications of these conflicts. Economic analysis shows that, although conflicts of interest are omnipresent when contracting is costly and parties are imperfectly informed, there are important factors that mitigate their impact and, strikingly, it is possible for customers of financial institutions to benefit from the existence of such conflicts. The empirical literature reaches conclusions that differ across types of conflicts of interest, but overall these conclusions are more ambivalent and certainly more benign than the conclusions drawn by journalists and politicians from mostly anecdotal evidence. Though much has been made of conflicts of interest arising from investment banking activities, there is no consensus in the empirical literature supporting the view that conflicts resulting from these activities had a systematic adverse impact on customers of financial institutions.

How markets react to earnings announcements in the absence of analysts and institutions evidence from the Saudi market

How stock markets react to news is an established area of research. We examine the behaviour of the Saudi Stock market in response to earnings announcements where there are no analysts’ forecasts, with the aim of examining the efficiency of the market. The SSM seems to underreact to positive news for the first five days and then reactions tend to strengthen in the following weeks, indicating the presence of a post–earnings announcement drift, or PEAD. At the same time, the SSM overreacts to negative news in the first five days and then reverses its direction and reports an upward post-earnings announcement drift. The individually dominated market combined with the absence of analysts’ forecasts is the main explanation for this underreaction to positive news and overreaction to negative news

Institutional investors, analyst following, and the January anomaly

Studies have documented that average stock returns for small, low-stock-price firms are higher in January than for the rest of the year. Two explanations have received a great deal of attention: the tax-loss selling hypothesis and the gamesmanship hypothesis. This paper documents that seasonality in returns is not a phenomenon observed only for small firms' stock or those with low prices. Strong seasonality in excess returns is reported for a sample of widely followed firms. Sample firms have unusually low excess returns in January, and returns adjust upward over the remainder of the year. These results are consistent with the gamesmanship hypothesis but not the tax-loss-selling hypothesis. As financial institutions rebalance their portfolios in January to sell the stock of highly visible and low-risk firms, there is downward price pressure in January. In addition, the results suggest that firm visibility explains why seasonality in returns is related to firm size and stock price. Once we control for visibility, market value and uncertainty do not appear to be important determinants of seasonality.Financial markets ; Seasonal variations (Economics)

Investment banks, scope, and unavoidable conflicts of interest

In recent years investment banks have drawn particular criticism for the lack of objectivity and independence in their research reports and analyst recommendations. This article argues that this conflict of interest is but one of many potential conflicts that arise as banks take advantage of the scope economies inherent in providing the customary business lines of investment banking under one roof. ; The author considers academic evidence on investment bank analysts’ jobs, which entail both an acknowledged sales function and an unacknowledged information brokerage function. In these two roles, analysts are often serving two or more parties whose interests are not aligned. Though some research shows that analyst buy-sell recommendations are biased, the market appears to understand and correct for this bias, the author finds. Evidence on research quality also indicates that analysts at large banks make less biased and more precise earnings forecasts than do analysts at independent research firms. ; The author also examines conflicts of interest between banks’ research and corporate finance functions and between internal proprietary trading and the customer-driven sales-and-trading function. These conflicts center around how and when research and proprietary trading information are disseminated to investors. Even more subtle conflicts may arise between investment banks and their customers when either party tries to further its own ends at the expense of a third party. ; Ultimately, the author believes there is little evidence that the mandated regulatory changes that physically and economically separate banking from research or that require banks to make independent research available to retail clients will improve investor welfare.Investment banking

Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital Markets

Prevailing models of capital markets capture a limited form of social influence and information transmission, in which the beliefs and behavior of an investor affects others only through market price, information transmission and processing is simple (without thoughts and feelings), and there is no localization in the influence of an investor on others. In reality, individuals often process verbal arguments obtained in conversation or from media presentations, and observe the behavior of others. We review here evidence concerning how these activities cause beliefs and behaviors to spread, affect financial decisions, and affect market prices; and theoretical models of social influence and its effects on capital markets. Social influence is central to how information and investor sentiment are transmitted, so thought and behavior contagion should be incorporated into the theory of capital markets.capital markets; thought contagion; behavioral contagion; herd behavior; information cascades; social learning; investor psychology; accounting regulation; disclosure policy; behavioral finance; market efficiency; popular models; memes

Investor Skepticism v. Investor Confidence: Why the New Research Analyst Reforms Will Harm Investors

Part I of this Article provides an overview of research analysts and their basic functions, including a discussion of sell-side analysts\u27 role in the market\u27s recent boom and bust. Part II examines the conflicts of interest that have plagued sell-side research, and Part III reviews the Regulatory Actions that are meant to address these conflicts. In Part IV, the author will make the case for encouraging, rather than lessening, investor skepticism in sell-side research and will explain why the Regulatory Actions are not likely to improve the performance of sell-side analysts. Finally, Part V will offer a simpler proposal to address the sell-side analyst issue. While there may not be a solution to the maybe not problem, the information gap between institutional investors and retail investors regarding the weaknesses of sell-side research can be eliminated, which would allow retail investors to benefit from the value of sell-side research while also granting them the opportunity to properly protect themselves from its weaknesses. Akin to the Surgeon General\u27s warning for cigarette manufacturers, this Article proposes that sell-side analysts and their firms be required to prominently include, with all research, a short and clear warning from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ), regarding the historical weaknesses of sell-side research

Coexistence and dynamics of overconfidence and strategic incentives.

We present a two-stage model for the decision making process of financial analysts when issuing earnings forecasts. In the first stage, financial analysts perform a fundamental earnings analysis in which they are, potentially, subject to a behavioral bias. In the second stage analysts can adjust their earnings forecast in line with their strategic incentives. The paper analyzes this decision process throughout the forecasting period and explains the underlying drivers. Using quarterly earnings forecasts, we document that throughout the entire forecasting period financial analysts overweight their private information. At the same time, financial analysts behave strategically. They issue initial optimistic forecasts by strategically inflating their forecast. In their last revision, they become pessimistic and strategically deflate their earnings forecast, which creates the possibility of a positive earnings surprise. This analysis of the dynamics of the decision process pro- vides empirical evidence on the coexistence of overconfidence and strategic incentives.financial analysts; earnings forecasts; overconfidence; conflicts of interest;