23 research outputs found
Analysis of an attenuator artifact in an experimental attack by Gunn-Allison-Abbott against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system
A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L.J. Gunn et al., Scientific
Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN)
secure key exchange system could experience a severe information leak. Here we
refute their results and demonstrate that GAA's arguments ensue from a serious
design flaw in their system. Specifically, an attenuator broke the single
Kirchhoff-loop into two coupled loops, which is an incorrect operation since
the single loop is essential for the security in the KLJN system, and hence
GAA's asserted information leak is trivial. Another consequence is that a fully
defended KLJN system would not be able to function due to its built-in
current-comparison defense against active (invasive) attacks. In this paper we
crack GAA's scheme via an elementary current comparison attack which yields
negligible error probability for Eve even without averaging over the
correlation time of the noise.Comment: Accepted for publication in Fluctuation and Noise Letters, on
November 3, 201
Analysis of an Attenuator Artifact in an Experimental Attack by Gunn–Allison–Abbott Against the Kirchhoff-Law–Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System
A recent paper by Gunn-Allison-Abbott (GAA) [L.J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a severe information leak. Here we refute their results and demonstrate that GAA's arguments ensue from a serious design flaw in their system. Specifically, an attenuator broke the single Kirchhoff-loop into two coupled loops, which is an incorrect operation since the single loop is essential for the security in the KLJN system, and hence GAA's asserted information leak is trivial. Another consequence is that a fully defended KLJN system would not be able to function due to its built-in current-comparison defense against active (invasive) attacks. In this paper we crack GAA's scheme via an elementary current comparison attack which yields negligible error probability for Eve even without averaging over the correlation time of the noise
Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange
The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical
secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics
to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and
circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the
current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system,
respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the
instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy
amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information
leak and successfully preserve the system's unconditional security
Comments On "A New Transient Attack On The Kish Key Distribution System"
A recent IEEE Access Paper by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) proposed a new
transient attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key
exchange system. The attack is valid, but it is easy to build a defense for the
KLJN system. Here we note that GAA's paper contains several invalid statements
regarding security measures and the continuity of functions in classical
physics. These deficiencies are clarified in our present paper, wherein we also
emphasize that a new version of the KLJN system is immune against all existing
attacks, including the one by GAA.Comment: Accepted for publication in the journal Metrology and Measurement
Systems (May 2016
Transient Attacks against the VMG-KLJN Secure Key Exchanger
The security vulnerability of the Vadai, Mingesz, and Gingl (VMG)
Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key exchanger, as presented in the
publication "Nature, Science Report 5 (2015) 13653," has been exposed to
transient attacks. Recently an effective defense protocol was introduced (Appl.
Phys. Lett. 122 (2023) 143503) to counteract mean-square voltage-based (or
mean-square current-based) transient attacks targeted at the ideal KLJN
framework.
In the present study, this same mitigation methodology has been employed to
fortify the security of the VMG-KLJN key exchanger. It is worth noting that the
protective measures need to be separately implemented for the HL and LH
scenarios. This conceptual framework is corroborated through computer
simulations, demonstrating that the application of this defensive technique
substantially mitigates information leakage to a point of insignificance