Modeling Evolutionary Dynamics of Lurking in Social Networks

Lurking is a complex user-behavioral phenomenon that occurs in all large-scale online communities and social networks. It generally refers to the behavior characterizing users that benefit from the information produced by others in the community without actively contributing back to the production of social content. The amount and evolution of lurkers may strongly affect an online social environment, therefore understanding the lurking dynamics and identifying strategies to curb this trend are relevant problems. In this regard, we introduce the Lurker Game, i.e., a model for analyzing the transitions from a lurking to a non-lurking (i.e., active) user role, and vice versa, in terms of evolutionary game theory. We evaluate the proposed Lurker Game by arranging agents on complex networks and analyzing the system evolution, seeking relations between the network topology and the final equilibrium of the game. Results suggest that the Lurker Game is suitable to model the lurking dynamics, showing how the adoption of rewarding mechanisms combined with the modeling of hypothetical heterogeneity of users' interests may lead users in an online community towards a cooperative behavior.Comment: 13 pages, 5 figures. Accepted at CompleNet 201

Decentralized Protection Strategies against SIS Epidemics in Networks

Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a SIS epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a game theoretic framework and find pure, mixed equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. Further, we propose both a decentralized algorithm and an iterative procedure to compute a pure equilibrium in the general case of a multiple communities network. Finally, we evaluate the algorithms and give numerical illustrations of all our results.Comment: accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network System

Opinion Polarization by Learning from Social Feedback

We explore a new mechanism to explain polarization phenomena in opinion dynamics in which agents evaluate alternative views on the basis of the social feedback obtained on expressing them. High support of the favored opinion in the social environment, is treated as a positive feedback which reinforces the value associated to this opinion. In connected networks of sufficiently high modularity, different groups of agents can form strong convictions of competing opinions. Linking the social feedback process to standard equilibrium concepts we analytically characterize sufficient conditions for the stability of bi-polarization. While previous models have emphasized the polarization effects of deliberative argument-based communication, our model highlights an affective experience-based route to polarization, without assumptions about negative influence or bounded confidence.Comment: Presented at the Social Simulation Conference (Dublin 2017

Community at the Courts: Social and Community Interactions at Public Basketball Courts

Based on over 60 informal interviews conducted at two public basketball courts, this study utilizes grounded theory to trace class- and race-based differences in the social interactions occurring at both parks. By comparing social interactions between a white, middle class basketball court, and a black, lower class basketball court, I argue that social engagement is not be declining for all segments of society as some theorists suggest. Moreover, I argue that the relationships forged at the basketball court in a predominantly black, working-class neighborhood prove to be more meaningful and have deeper benefits than those forged at a basketball court in a white, middle-class neighborhood. I show that public places serve as a source of social status for participants of pick-up basketball and that social status stemming from pick-up basketball varies in importance based on the socioeconomic status of the participants. Further, I contend that public places in low-income neighborhoods can serve as a vehicle for establishing social networks in the surrounding community, affirming and maintaining status, and realizing personal fulfillment

The Naming Game in Social Networks: Community Formation and Consensus Engineering

We study the dynamics of the Naming Game [Baronchelli et al., (2006) J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. P06014] in empirical social networks. This stylized agent-based model captures essential features of agreement dynamics in a network of autonomous agents, corresponding to the development of shared classification schemes in a network of artificial agents or opinion spreading and social dynamics in social networks. Our study focuses on the impact that communities in the underlying social graphs have on the outcome of the agreement process. We find that networks with strong community structure hinder the system from reaching global agreement; the evolution of the Naming Game in these networks maintains clusters of coexisting opinions indefinitely. Further, we investigate agent-based network strategies to facilitate convergence to global consensus.Comment: The original publication is available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/70370l311m1u0ng3