38,944 research outputs found
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Long-term Framework for Electricity Distribution Access Charges
In order to achieve overall economic efficiency, incentive regulation of electricity distribution utilities must address two important and inter-related issues. First, the utilitiesâ allowed revenues need to be set at correct levels. Second, the access charging mechanism by which the utilities recover the allowed revenues must give the correct economic signals to generation and load connected to the network. This paper is concerned with the latter aspect of regulation. The paper discusses the main economic principles that should form the basis on which a distribution access charging model is developed. The charging model should have a number of attributes: be calibrated to each existing network; contain an asset register; be able to determine assets needed to meet new demand; find least-cost system expansion; compute network losses and handle ancillary services; estimate incremental operating and maintenance costs; be available to users; and be simple enough for external users to understand
Tariffs for European Gas Transmission Networks. Report on workshop proceedings
The mainline of the workshop was the transmission tariffs on gas network from a European perspective. Transmission is a key issue for the European gas system for two reasons. First, transmission tariff should incentivize the efficient use of infrastructure and so facilitate the development of competition. Second, transmission tariff should also give enough return to network investors so that they upgrade the network efficently compared to their current and future uses not only for national infrastructures but also for cross-border pipelines. Three issues were especially treated in the different sessions during the workshop namely: 1° competition and efficient use of the network, 2° investment in national infrastructures, and 3° investment in cross-border infrastructures. Key conclusions and open questions from the debate among regulators, TSOs, stakeholders and academic delegates are reported here.
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Electricity Network Investment and Regulation for a Low Carbon Future
The requirement for significantly higher electricity network investment in the UK seems certain as the capacity of distributed generation and large scale renewables increases on the system. In this paper, which forms a chapter in the forthcoming Book âDelivering a Low Carbon Electricity System: Technologies, Economics and Policyâ, the authors make a number of significant suggestions for improvement to the current system of network regulation. First, they suggest that the RPI-X system needs to be overhauled in favour of a simpler yardstick based system and which allows for more merchant transmission investments. Second, future regulation should involve more negotiated regulation involving agreements between network owners and purchasers of network services. This would be particularly advantageous for decisions on new network investments. Third, more extensive use needs to be made of locational pricing within the transmission and distribution system in order to facilitate the least cost expansion of low carbon generation, including micropower. Fourth, consideration needs to be given to ownership unbundling of distribution networks from retail supply. This would better facilitate the entry of distributed generation and the development of appropriate competition between grid and off-grid generation supply and demand side management. Finally, there needs to be a significant increase in R&D expenditure in electricity networks supported by customer levies
Monetary policy and risk taking : [draft january 2013]
We assess the effects of monetary policy on bank risk to verify the existence of a risk-taking channel - monetary expansions inducing banks to assume more risk. We first present VAR evidence confirming that this channel exists and tends to concentrate on the bank funding side. Then, to rationalize this evidence we build a macro model where banks subject to runs endogenously choose their funding structure (deposits vs. capital) and risk level. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage and risk. In turn, higher bank risk in steady state increases asset price volatility and reduces equilibrium output
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Electricity transmission: an overview of the current debate
Electricity transmission has emerged as critical for successfully liberalising powermarkets. This paper surveys the issues currently under discussion and provides a framework for the remaining papers in this issue. We conclude that signalling the efficient location of generation investment might require even a competitive LMP system to be complemented with deep connection charges. Although a Europe-wide LMP system is desirable, it appears politically problematic, so an integrated system of market coupling, possibly evolving by voluntary participation, should have high priority. Merchant investors may be able to increase interconnector capacity, although this is not unproblematic and raises new regulatory issues. A key issue that needs further research is how to better incentivize TSOs, especially with respect to cross-border issues
Financial Stability and Monetary Policy - A Framework
The paper presents a stylised framework to analyse conditions under which monetary policy contributes to amplified movements in the housing market. Extending work by Hyun Shin (2005), the paper analyses self enforcing feedback mechanisms resulting in amplifier effects in a credit constrained economy. The paper characterizes conditions for asymmetric effects, causing systemic crises. By injecting liquidity, monetary policy can prevent a meltdown. Anticipating such a response, private agents are encouraged to take higher risks. Provision of liquidity works as a public good, but it may create potential conflicts with other policy objectives and may give incentives to build up leverage with a high systemic exposure to small probability events
Bank and sovereign debt risk connection : [draft december 2012]
Euro area data show a positive connection between sovereign and bank risk, which increases with banksâ and sovereign long run fragility. We build a macro model with banks subject to incentive problems and liquidity risk (in the form of liquidity based banksâ runs) which provides a link between endogenous bank capital and macro and policy risk. Our banks also invest in risky government bonds used as capital buffer to self-insure against liquidity risk. The model can replicate the positive connection between sovereign and bank risk observed in the data. Central bank liquidity policy, through full allotment policy, is successful in stabilizing the spiraling feedback loops between bank and sovereign risk
Regulatory instruments and their effects on investment behavior
Regulatory instruments have long been understood to have a powerful effect on investment, and part of the motivation for introducing higher-powered regulatory regimes and contracts was to reduce incentives for inefficiency and over-investment (gold plating) inherent in cost-plus regulatory schemes. In practice, the mix of incentives and the institutional framework that make up a higher-powered regulatory regime can also lead to unintended distortions on investment behavior. The authors examine the key drivers of investment behavior and provide some examples of how these drivers have affected investment in practice. They conclude with a set of key areas and interrelationships that are at the core of a regulatory settlement, and therefore need to be designed appropriately to drive efficient investment behavior.Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Business Environment,Economic Theory&Research,Decentralization,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Business Environment,Business in Development,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism
Leverhulme Lecture: Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets
Lecture given November 9, 2010, the second of three delivered by Prof. Schwarcz as Leverhulme Visiting Professor of Law, Oxford University.
Complexity is the greatest challenge to 21st Century financial regulation, having the potential to impair markets and investments in several interrelated ways. Furthermore, complexity can cause failures that individual market participants cannot, or will not have incentive to, remedy. These failures are driven by information uncertainty, misalignment of interests and incentives among market participants, and nonlinear feedback and tight coupling that result in sudden unexpected market changes. These are the same types of failures that engineers have long faced when working with complex engineering systems. The lecture uses engineering solutions such as chaos theory to examine how financial regulation should be structured to correct those failures
Leverhulme Lecture: Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets
Lecture given November 9, 2010, the second of three delivered by Prof. Schwarcz as Leverhulme Visiting Professor of Law, Oxford University.
Complexity is the greatest challenge to 21st Century financial regulation, having the potential to impair markets and investments in several interrelated ways. Furthermore, complexity can cause failures that individual market participants cannot, or will not have incentive to, remedy. These failures are driven by information uncertainty, misalignment of interests and incentives among market participants, and nonlinear feedback and tight coupling that result in sudden unexpected market changes. These are the same types of failures that engineers have long faced when working with complex engineering systems. The lecture uses engineering solutions such as chaos theory to examine how financial regulation should be structured to correct those failures
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