Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics

Evolutionary debunking arguments abound, but it is widely assumed that they do not arise for our perceptual beliefs about midsized objects, insofar as the adaptive value of our object beliefs cannot be explained without reference to the objects themselves. I argue that this is a mistake. Just as with moral beliefs, the adaptive value of our object beliefs can be explained without assuming that the beliefs are accurate. I then explore the prospects for other sorts of vindications of our object beliefs—which involve “bootstrapping” from our experiences as of midsized objects—and I defend bootstrapping maneuvers against a variety of objections. Finally, I argue for an explanatory constraint on legitimate bootstrapping and show how some attempts to respond to debunking arguments run afoul of the constraint

Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument

Do the facts of evolution generate an epistemic challenge to moral realism? Some think so, and many “evolutionary debunking arguments” have been discussed in the recent literature. But they are all murky right where it counts most: exactly which epistemic principle is meant to take us from evolutionary considerations to the skeptical conclusion? Here, I will identify several distinct species of evolutionary debunking argument in the literature, each one of which relies on a distinct epistemic principle. Drawing on recent work in epistemology, I will show that most of these initially plausible principles are false, spoiling the arguments that rely on them. And we will see that each argument threatens only one popular view of moral psychology: a “Representationalist” view on which our moral judgments rely crucially on a mental intermediary—e.g. a sentiment, gut reaction, or affect-laden intuition—delivered by our evolved moral faculty. In the end, only one evolutionary debunking argument remains a menace: an “ Argument from Symmetry ” that I will introduce to the literature. But we will see that it should worry only all naturalists, pressuring them into a trilemma: give up moral realism, accept a rationalism that is incongruous with naturalism, or give up naturalism. Non-naturalists are free and clear

Aesthetic Properties, Mind-Independence, and Companions in Guilt

I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons

Naturalism, Theism, and the Origin of Life

Alvin Plantinga and Phillip E. Johnson strongly attack "metaphysical naturalism", a doctrine based, in part, on Darwinian concepts. They claim that this doctrine dominates American academic, educational, and legal thought, and that it is both erroneous and pernicious. Stuart Kauffman claims that currently accepted versions of Darwinian evolutionary theory are radically incomplete, that they should be supplemented by explicit recognition of the importance of coherent structures — the prevalence of "order for free". Both of these developments are here interpreted in relation to some contemporary theistic notions of "creation", including those of Lewis Ford, Robert Neville, and Robert Sokolowski. Kaufmann’s approach is consistent with the approach of process theism, and is not invalidated by the attacks of Plantinga and Johnson

On the narrative form of simulations.

Understanding complex physical systems through the use of simulations often takes on a narrative character. That is, scientists using simulations seek an understanding of processes occurring in time by generating them from a dynamic model, thereby producing something like a historical narrative. This paper focuses on simulations of the Diels-Alder reaction, which is widely used in organic chemistry. It calls on several well-known works on historical narrative to draw out the ways in which use of these simulations mirrors aspects of narrative understanding: Gallie for "followability" and "contingency"; Mink for "synoptic judgment"; Ricoeur for "temporal dialectic"; and Hawthorn for a related dialectic of the "actual and the possible". Through these reflections on narrative, the paper aims for a better grasp of the role that temporal development sometimes plays in understanding physical processes and of how considerations of possibility enhance that understanding

New World Order: Kauffman and Lonergan on the Emergence of Order in an Evolutionary Universe

Stuart Kauffman argues that Darwinian natural selection cannot account for the spontaneous order of self-organized systems. This paper looks in detail at two of Kauffman s claims: (I ) that life is an emergent property of autocatalytic sets of chemicals; and (2) that the ontogenetic development of living organisms is an emergent property of complex networks of genes. The author suggests that there are parallels between Kauffman\'s ideas about \" emergent properties\" and Bernard Lonergan \'s notion of \"emergent probability.\" He then briefly explores the different ways in which their work on the emergence of order in the universe raises religious questions

God, Evil, and Evolution

Most evil is compatible with the existence of God if He has an aim that He can achieve only by using an unguided process of evolution and if He cannot be condemned for trying to achieve His aim. It is argued that there is an aim that could reasonably be attributed to God and that God cannot achieve it without using evolution. There are independent grounds for thinking an evolutionary response is necessary if God is to be defended at all. Issues that require further investigation are pointed out and desirable features of the evolutionary response indicate

Enactivism, action and normativity: a Wittgensteinian analysis

In this paper, we offer a criticism, inspired by Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, of the enactivist account of perception and action. We start by setting up a non-descriptivist naturalism regarding the mind and continue by defining enactivism and exploring its more attractive theoretical features. We then proceed to analyse its proposal to understand normativity non-socially. We argue that such a thesis is ultimately committed to the problematic idea that normative practices can be understood as private and factual. Finally, we offer a characterization of normativity as an essentially social phenomenon and apply our criticisms to other approaches that share commitments with enactivism