Towards A Resolution Of The Dispute - Introduction

The chapters in Part Four fall into four sections. The first three chapters represent Patinkin’s ongoing scholarly interest in explaining the evolution of Keynes’ economics and his relationship to the Chicago economists. In his Sir Dennis Robertson lecture, Patinkin (chapter 44 [1974], 4, 27, 12) explained that he was using the term “Keynesian monetary theory” in contrast to “the quantity theory” to describe “the General Theory and the literature to which it gave rise – though I should note that the aspect of the theory that is my primary concern here (namely, the treatment of money from the viewpoint of the choice of an optimum portfolio) is in some respects more precisely developed in Keynes’ Treatise on Money … There is no doubt that Keynes of the General Theory is at one with Keynes of the Tract (1923, pp.78-9) in taking as his point of departure the individual’s demand for money holdings”. ISBN: 185196767

Principal concerns concentrating on the costs and benefits of immigration in developed countries

The present paper aims to acquaint concisely about the principal concerns surrounding the theme immigration, founded in the literature. This acquaintance is ensured through first (comprising the first part of the corpus) a global view drawing the portrait of immigrants – by focusing on three main developed countries of immigration: the United Kingdom, Spain and France – and the reasons explaining the immigration phenomenon. Second, (comprising the second part of the corpus), an overall focus on the question of assessing, on the one hand the benefits and on the other hand the costs of immigration, through the exploitation of many theories and arguments – especially concentrated on the economic and fiscal aspects - each being illustrated with specific examples of various developed countries – thus giving a frame for intra and inter-continental comparisons and analysis. Lastly (comprising the third part of the corpus), this acquaintance is ensured through proceeding to the evaluation and comparison between costs and benefits – by presenting new arguments, more focused on the social and political aspects - in order to seize objectively whether costs overweight benefits or whether not.Immigration; Costs; Benefits; Country of Immigration; Developed Countries; Issues; Consequences; Comparison

Inequality and Environmental Protection

Social and economic inequalities can influence both the distribution of the costs and benefits from environmental degradation and the extent of environmental protection. When those who benefit from environmentally degrading economic activities are powerful relative to those who bear the costs, environmental protection is generally weaker than when the reverse is true. This can lead to environmental inequalities along lines of class, race, ethnicity, gender, and age. At the same time, inequalities may affect the overall extent of environmental quality. There are good theoretical reasons to expect inequalities to reduce environmental protection and exacerbate environmental degradation. The available empirical evidence generally is consistent with this expectation.

Toward a Jurisprudence of the Civil Rights Acts

What is the nature of the “rights,” jurisprudentially, that the 1964 Civil Rights Act legally prescribed? And, more generally, what is a “civil right”? Today, lawyers tend to think of civil rights and particularly those that originated in the 1964 Act, as antidiscrimination rights: our “civil rights,” on this understanding, are our rights not to be discriminated against, by employers, schools, landlords, property vendors, hoteliers, restaurant owners, and providers of public transportation, no less than by states and state actors, on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, age, sexuality or disability. Contemporary civil rights scholarship overwhelmingly reflects the same conception: our civil rights are quasi-constitutional rights to be free of discrimination in the private as well as public world. But this conventional lawyerly understanding-–basically, that “civil rights” are “antidiscrimination rights”-–is clearly inadequate, certainly with respect to civil rights generally but also, and more tellingly, even with respect to the rights created and then protected by the ‘64 Act itself. First, on the general point: some of the “civil rights” sought or held across our history have not been antidiscrimination rights of any sort at all: labor rights, welfare rights, free speech rights, and the constitutional rights of criminal defendants have all, at various times, been championed as “civil rights,” and these rights are neither logically nor jurisprudentially tied to any conception of antidiscrimination. But furthermore, even the “civil rights” which are defined and then protected against discrimination by the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as by various Civil Rights Acts both before and subsequent to it, are not, in circular fashion, simply our rights not to be discriminated against on the basis of impermissible characteristics. Rather, the “civil rights” of which we cannot be discriminatorily deprived, whether originating in the ‘64 Act or elsewhere, are, after all, rights to something: a right to vote, or to physical security, or to enter contracts, or to own, buy or sell property, or to legal recourse in the aftermath of a wrong committed against us, or to write a will, or to be considered for or to hold down a job and to be paid fairly for our labor, or to the use of a restaurant or a hotel or a city bus, or to a public education, or to marry whom we love. And, these are just some of the public goods that have been recognized at various times as “civil rights,” of which we cannot be deprived by discriminatory action. Even if just that much is right, then the “civil right” protected by all of our Civil Rights Acts, including the ‘64 one, is considerably more complex, jurisprudentially, than the conventionally legalistic and formulaic equation of “civil rights” with “antidiscrimination rights” suggests. Minimally, the “civil right” recognized or protected by the various Civil Rights Acts is almost invariably a multilayered right, or a “right to a right”: it is a right to not be discriminatorily deprived of some underlying right. Only the first right in that phrase “a right to a right” is the antidiscrimination right. The second “right,” though, is the underlying civil right of which we cannot be discriminatorily deprived, and it is both itself complex, and highly variable: it might be a common law right, such as a right to enter contracts or sell property, or a statutory right, such as a right to vote, or simply a right to a social or public good, such as employment or educational opportunities, or the protection of a trustworthy police force against private violence. And, while we have generated a library of writing, and jurisprudence, and judicial opinions, on the nature of the first right in that phrase-–the right not to be deprived of various rights, on the basis of race, sex, and so forth-–we have devoted much less to the second: the nature of the underlying right of which we cannot be deprived. So, what is the jurisprudential nature of that right? What is a “civil right,” jurisprudentially, both with respect to the rights protected against discrimination by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and more broadly? Again, and more generally, what is a “civil right”

Media(ting) Between Generations: Common Sense and Perceptions of New Media by Young People and Teachers

The wide spread of mobile communication devices, the expansion of social media and participatory media platforms, the ease to edit, share and produce media content, indicate a trend of change in the media system that influences the production and consumption of knowledge and generates new paths for the young\u2019s identity construction. This raises necessary questions about the ways not only young, but also the education agencies \u2013 school in particular \u2013 relate to these transformations, starting from taking into account the production of common sense on the use, risks and opportunities of the media. Based on these considerations, in this paper, we will discuss the results of a qualitative case study carried out in the Veneto Region (Italy) on upper secondary school students and teachers in order to detect and compare the perception that young and educators have of the media, trying to identify boundaries or land on which to build exchange opportunities for dialogue between the generations

Size matters: entrepreneurial entry and government

We explore the country-specific institutional characteristics likely to influence an individual's decision to become an entrepreneur. We focus on the size of the government, on freedom from corruption, and on 'market freedom' defined as a cluster of variables related to protection of property rights and regulation. We test these relationships by combining country-level institutional indicators for 47 countries with working age population survey data taken from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. Our results indicate that entrepreneurial entry is inversely related to the size of the government, and more weakly to the extent of corruption. A cluster of institutional indicators representing 'market freedom' is only significant in some specifications. Freedom from corruption is significantly related to entrepreneurial entry, especially when the richest countries are removed from the sample but unlike the size of government, the results on corruption are not confirmed by country-level fixed effects models

Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda

The incentives-for-authors formulation of copyright’s purpose is so deeply ingrained in our discourse and our thought processes that it is astonishingly hard to avoid invoking, even when one is consciously trying not to do so. Yet avoiding that formulation is exactly what we ought to be doing. Everything we know about creativity and creative processes suggests that copyright plays very little role in motivating creative work. In the contemporary information society, the purpose of copyright is to enable the provision of capital and organization so that creative work may be exploited. And the choice of copyright as a principal means of promoting cultural production has consequences for the content of culture as well.This reframing has four important consequences for debates about copyright law and policy. First, abandoning the incentives-for-authors story requires us to talk about cultural progress differently. The incentives-for-authors story has functioned as a smokescreen, enabling scholars, judges, and legislators to conflate economic and creative motivation. Severing the motivational link between creativity and economics requires us to come up with a better understanding of how cultural progress emerges, and a more accurate account of how the economic incentives that copyright provides affect progress more generally. Second, an account of copyright as incentives-for-capital suggests a different approach to conceptualizing the kind of “property” that copyright represents. Copyright scholars habitually compare copyright to property in land, a conceptual move that passes over an important stage in the evolution of economic activity and associated economic rights. There are important benefits to be gained from comparing post-industrial, information property to industrial, corporate property, and copyright law more explicitly to corporate law. Specifically, copyright law in the post-industrial era works to separate authorship from control of creative works so that a set of coordination and governance problems closely associated with information resources can be solved. Third, comparing copyright more explicitly to industrial, corporate property and legal regimes governing its use suggests some different ways of thinking and talking about problems of social welfare that so often bedevil regimes of property law. Fourth, comparing copyright more explicitly to industrial, corporate property foregrounds copyright law’s (largely unrealized) potential to function as a tool for ensuring accountability to the authors without whom the copyright system could not function