6 research outputs found

    An ownership-base message admission control mechanism for curbing spam

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    Unsolicited e-mail has brought much annoyance to users, thus, making e-mail less reliable as a communication tool. This has happened because current email architecture has key limitations. For instance, while it allows senders to send as many messages as they want, it does not provide adequate capability to recipients to prevent unrestricted access to their mailbox. This research develops a new approach to equip recipients with ability to control access to their mailbox.This thesis builds an ownership-based approach to control mailbox usage employing the CyberOrgs model. CyberOrgs is a model that provides facilities to control resources in multi-agent systems. We consider a mailbox to be a precious resource of its owner. Any access to the resource requires its owner's permission. Thus, we give recipients a capability to manage their valuable resource - mailbox. In our approach, message senders obtain a permission to send messages through negotiation. In this negotiation, a sender makes a proposal and the intended recipient evaluates the proposal according to their own policies. A sender's desired outcome of a negotiation is a contract, which conducts the subsequent communication between the sender and the recipient. Contracts help senders and recipients construct a long-term relationship.Besides allowing individuals to control their mailbox, we consider groups, which represent organizations in human society, in order to allow organizations to manage their resources including mailboxes, message sending allowances, and contracts.A prototype based on our approach is implemented. In the prototype, policies are separated from the mechanisms. Examples of policies are presented and a public policy interface is exposed to allow programmers to develop custom policies. Experimental results demonstrate that the system performance is policy-dependent. In other words, as long as policies are carefully designed, communication involving negotiation has minimal overhead compared to communication in which senders deliver messages to recipients directly

    An economic answer to unsolicited communication

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    An Economic Answer to Unsolicited Communication

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    We explore an alternative approach to spam based on economic rather than technological or regulatory screening mechanisms

    An Economic Answer to Unsolicited Communication ABSTRACT

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    We explore an alternative approach to spam based on economic rather than technological or regulatory screening mechanisms. We employ a model of email value which supports two intuitive notions: 1) mechanisms designed to promote valuable communication can often outperform those designed merely to block wasteful communication, and 2) designers of such mechanisms should shift focus away from the information in the message to the information known to the sender. We then use principles of information asymmetry to cause people who knowingly misuse communication to incur higher costs than those who do not. In certain cases, though not all, we can show this approach leaves recipients better off than even an idealized or “perfect ” filter that costs nothing and makes no mistakes. Our mechanism also accounts for individual differences in opportunity costs, and allows for bi-directional wealth transfers while facilitating both sender signaling and recipient screening.
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