An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index

We present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index for the case where issues are elements of two-dimensional space. This characterization employs a version of the transfer condition, which enables us to unravel a spatial game into spatial games connected to unanimity games. The other axioms include two conditions concerned particularly with the spatial positions of the players, besides spatial versions of anonymity and dummy. The last condition says that dummy players can be left out in a specific way without changing the power of the other players. We show that this condition can be weakened to requiring dummies to have zero power if we add a condition of positional continuity. We also show that the axioms in our characterization(s) are logically independent

An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial

We present an axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index for the case where issues are elements of two-dimensional space. This characterization employs a version of the transfer condition, which enables us to unravel a spatial game into spatial games connected to unanimity games. The other axioms are spatial versions of anonymity and dummy, and two conditions concerned particularly with the spatial positions of the players. We show that these axioms are logically independent

ASSESSMENT OF VOTING SITUATIONS: THE PROBABILISTIC FOUNDATIONS

In this paper we revise the probabilistic foundations of the theory of the measurement of 'voting power' either as success or decisiveness. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting procedure and the voters' behavior. We propose a simple model in which the voters' behavior is summarized by a probability distribution over all vote configurations. This basic model, at once simpler and more general that other probabilistic models, provides a clear conceptual common basis to reinterpret coherently from a unified point of view di.erent power indices and some related game theoretic notions, as well as a wider perspective for a dispassionate assessment of the power indices themselves, their merits and their limitations.Voting rules, voting power, decisiveness, success, power indices

Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 3. application to water resources

This paper reviews various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of water resources. With an increase in the competition over various water resources, the incidents of disputes have been in the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of various water uses, such as multi-objective water projects, irrigation, groundwater, hydropower, urban water supply, wastewater, and transboundary water disputes. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce water resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. In particular, the various approaches for cost sharing and for allocation of physical water infrastructure and flow can serve as a basis for stable and efficient agreement, such that long-term investments in water projects are profitable and sustainable. The latter point is especially important, given recent developments in water policy in various countries and regional institutions such as the European Union (Water Framework Directive), calling for full cost recovery of investments and operation and maintenance in water projects. The CGT approaches discussed and demonstrated in this paper can provide a solid basis for finding possible and stable cost-sharing arrangements.Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Water Supply and Systems,Water and Industry

The Impact of Council’s Internal Decision-Making Rules on the Future EU

This paper deals with the voting rules in the EU Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are evaluated. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the member states and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU. One of the main lessons of the analysis is clearly to explain why the design of Council voting rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations.European integration, Council of Ministers, power

Sharing and Cooperation in Markets and Organizations: Axiomatic Foundations for the Laws of Coalition Formation in Selected Scenarios

Interactions involving multiple parties and necessitating their agreement are pervasive in both market and non-market settings. As the number of participants increases, these situations become progressively complex to describe and analyze. Despite the prolific nature of such scenarios, a comprehensive conceptual framework addressing such settings is often lacking. The focus of this dissertation lies in a distinct type of multilateral interaction, where a commitment of a group, or a coalition, of participants is required for achieving a positive surplus. The analysis encompasses three scenarios, namely, government formation in parliamentary democracies, bilateral trading on a market with multiple buyers and sellers, and resource allocation in the US presidential campaign. This dissertation proposes an approach that provides axiomatic foundations for a theory of coalition formation in these settings, and, for two of these scenarios, simultaneously provides an empirically accurate forecast methodology

Allocation of risk capital in a cost cooperative game induced by a modified expected shortfall

The standard theory of coherent risk measures fails to consider individual institutions as part of a system which might itself experience instability and spread new sources of risk to the market participants. This paper fills this gap and proposes a cooperative market game where agents and institutions play the same role. We take into account a multiple institutions framework where some institutions jointly experience distress, and evaluate their individual and collective impact on the remaining institutions in the market. To carry out the analysis, we define a new risk measure (SCoES) which is a generalization of the Expected Shortfall of and we characterize the riskiness profile as the outcome of a cost cooperative game played by institutions in distress. Each institution’s marginal contribution to the spread of riskiness towards the safe institutions in then evaluated by calculating suitable solution concepts of the game such as the Banzhaf–Coleman and the Shapley–Shubik values. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Operational Research Society on 16/12/2019, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/01605682.2019.168695

Simple “Market Value” Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems

Feld, Grofman and Ray (2003) offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and the kernel. They look for a set of weights that preserves winning coalitions that has the property of minimizing the difference between the weight of the smallest and the weight of the largest Minimum Winning Coalition. They claim that such a set of weights provides an a priori measure of a weighted voter’s bribeworthiness or market value. Here, after reviewing the basic elements of their model, we provide a characterization result for this model and show its links to other bargaining model approaches in the literature. Then we offer some limit results showing that, with certain reasonable conditions on the distributions of weights, as the size of the voting body increases, the values of bribeworthiness we calculate will approach both the weights themselves and the Banzhaf scores for the weighted voting game. We also show that, even for relatively small groups using weighted voting, such as the membership of the European Council of Ministers (and its precedessors) 1958-2003, similarities among the usual a priori power scores, bribeworthiness/market value, and the weights themselves, will be quite strong

Effectivity and Power

We axiomatically develop a class of power indices for effectivity functions, both for the case where the set of alternatives is finite and where it is infinite. Such power indices make it possible to take the issues under consideration into account, in contrast to power indices defined just for simple games. As an example, we consider the US legislative system. We also show that our approach can be used to develop power indices for spatial political games. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved