Decision-Making with Belief Functions: a Review

Approaches to decision-making under uncertainty in the belief function framework are reviewed. Most methods are shown to blend criteria for decision under ignorance with the maximum expected utility principle of Bayesian decision theory. A distinction is made between methods that construct a complete preference relation among acts, and those that allow incomparability of some acts due to lack of information. Methods developed in the imprecise probability framework are applicable in the Dempster-Shafer context and are also reviewed. Shafer's constructive decision theory, which substitutes the notion of goal for that of utility, is described and contrasted with other approaches. The paper ends by pointing out the need to carry out deeper investigation of fundamental issues related to decision-making with belief functions and to assess the descriptive, normative and prescriptive values of the different approaches

Topics in inference and decision-making with partial knowledge

Two essential elements needed in the process of inference and decision-making are prior probabilities and likelihood functions. When both of these components are known accurately and precisely, the Bayesian approach provides a consistent and coherent solution to the problems of inference and decision-making. In many situations, however, either one or both of the above components may not be known, or at least may not be known precisely. This problem of partial knowledge about prior probabilities and likelihood functions is addressed. There are at least two ways to cope with this lack of precise knowledge: robust methods, and interval-valued methods. First, ways of modeling imprecision and indeterminacies in prior probabilities and likelihood functions are examined; then how imprecision in the above components carries over to the posterior probabilities is examined. Finally, the problem of decision making with imprecise posterior probabilities and the consequences of such actions are addressed. Application areas where the above problems may occur are in statistical pattern recognition problems, for example, the problem of classification of high-dimensional multispectral remote sensing image data

An Axiomatic Utility Theory for Dempster-Shafer Belief Functions

International audienceThe main goal of this paper is to describe an axiomatic utility theory for Dempster-Shafer belief function lotteries. The axiomatic framework used is analogous to von Neumann-Morgenstern's utility theory for proba-bilistic lotteries as described by Luce and Raiffa. Unlike the probabilistic case, our axiomatic framework leads to interval-valued utilities, and therefore, to a partial (incomplete) preference order on the set of all belief function lotteries. If the belief function reference lotteries we use are Bayesian belief functions, then our representation theorem coincides with Jaffray's representation theorem for his linear utility theory for belief functions. We illustrate our framework using some examples discussed in the literature. Finally, we compare our decision theory with those proposed by Jaffray and Smets

On ϱ in a decision-theoretic apparatus of Dempster-Shafer theory

AbstractThomas M. Strat has developed a decision-theoretic apparatus for Dempster-Shafer theory (Decision analysis using belief functions, Intern. J. Approx. Reason. 4(5/6), 391–417, 1990). In this apparatus, expected utility intervals are constructed for different choices. The choice with the highest expected utility is preferable to others. However, to find the preferred choice when the expected utility interval of one choice is included in that of another, it is necessary to interpolate a discerning point in the intervals. This is done by the parameter ϱ, defined as the probability that the ambiguity about the utility of every nonsingleton focal element will turn out as favorable as possible. If there are several different decision makers, we might sometimes be more interested in having the highest expected utility among the decision makers rather than only trying to maximize our own expected utility regardless of choices made by other decision makers. The preference of each choice is then determined by the probability of yielding the highest expected utility. This probability is equal to the maximal interval length of ϱ under which an alternative is preferred. We must here take into account not only the choices already made by other decision makers but also the rational choices we can assume to be made by later decision makers. In Strats apparatus, an assumption, unwarranted by the evidence at hand, has to be made about the value of ϱ. We demonstrate that no such assumption is necessary. It is sufficient to assume a uniform probability distribution for ϱ to be able to discern the most preferable choice. We discuss when this approach is justifiable