1,154 research outputs found
Efficient Methods for Automated Multi-Issue Negotiation: Negotiating over a Two-Part Tariff
In this article, we consider the novel approach of a seller and customer negotiating bilaterally about a two-part tariff, using autonomous software agents. An advantage of this approach is that win-win opportunities can be generated while keeping the problem of preference elicitation as simple as possible. We develop bargaining strategies that software agents can use to conduct the actual bilateral negotiation on behalf of their owners. We present a decomposition of bargaining strategies into concession strategies and Pareto-efficient-search methods: Concession and Pareto-search strategies focus on the conceding and win-win aspect of bargaining, respectively. An important technical contribution of this article lies in the development of two Pareto-search methods. Computer experiments show, for various concession strategies, that the respective use of these two Pareto-search methods by the two negotiators results in very efficient bargaining outcomes while negotiators concede the amount specified by their concession strategy
Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice
Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model
strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these
theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they
provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand,
people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these
strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and
psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether
strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated
agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated
agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation
settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory
based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based
argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games
and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729
Autonomous agents in bargaining games : an evolutionary investigation of fundamentals, strategies, and business applications
Bargaining is becoming increasingly important due to developments within the field of electronic commerce, especially the development of autonomous software agents. Software agents are programs which, given instructions from a user, are capable of autonomously and intelligently realise a given task. By means of such agents, the bargaining process can be automated, allowing products and services together with related conditions, such as warranty and delivery time, to be flexible and tuned to the individual preferences of the people concerned. In this theses we concentrate on both fundamental aspects of bargaining as well as business-related applications of automated bargaining using software agents. The fundamental part investigates bargaining outcomes within a stylised world, and the factors that influence these outcomes. This can provide insights for the production of software agents, strategies, and setting up bargaining rules for practical situations. We study these aspects using computational simulations of bargaining agents. Hereby we consider adaptive systems, i.e., where agents learn to adjust their bargaining strategy given past experience. This learning behaviour is simulated using evolutionary algorithms. These algorithms originate from the field of artificial intelligence, and are inspired by the biological theory of evolution. Originally, evolutionary algorithms were designed for solving optimisation problems, but they are now increasingly being used within economics for modelling human learning behaviour. Besides computational simulations, we also consider mathematical solutions from game theory for relatively simple cases. Game theory is mainly concerned with the ārational manā, that is, with optimal outcomes within an stylised setting (or game) where people act rationally. We use the game-theoretic outcomes to validate the computational experiments. The advantage of computer simulations is that less strict assumptions are necessary, and that more complex interactions that are closer to real-world settings can be investigated. First of all, we study a bargaining setting where two players exchange offers and counter offers, the so-called alternating-offers game. This game is frequently used for modelling bargaining about for instance the price of a product or service. It is also important, however, to allow other product- and service-related aspects to be negotiated, such as quality, delivery time, and warranty. This enables compromises by conceding on less important issues and demanding a higher value for relatively important aspects. This way, bargaining is less competitive and the resulting outcome can be mutually beneficial. Therefore, we investigate using computational simulations an extended version of the alternating-offers game, where multiple aspects are negotiated concurrently. Moreover, we apply game theory to validate the results of the computational experiments. The simulation shows that learning agents are capable of quickly finding optimal compromises, also called Pareto-efficient outcomes. In addition, we study the effects of time pressure that arise if negotiations are broken off with a small probability, for example due to external eventualities. In absence of time pressure and a maximum number of negotiation rounds, outcomes are very unbalanced: the player that has the opportunity to make a final offer proposes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in the last round, which leaves the other player with a deal that is only slightly better than no deal at all. With relatively high time pressure, on the other hand, the first offer is most important and almost all agreements are reached in the first round. Another interesting result is that the simulation outcomes after a long period of learning in general coincide with the results from game theory, in spite of the fact that the learning agents are not ārationalā. In reality, not only the final outcome is important, but also other factors play a role, such as the fairness of an offer. Using the simulation we study the influence of such fairness norms on the bargaining outcomes. The fairness norms result in much more balanced outcomes, even with no time pressure, and seem to be closer outcomes in the real world. Negotiations are rarely isolated, but can also be influenced by external factors such as additional bargaining opportunities. We therefore also consider bargaining within a market-like setting, where both buyers and sellers can bargain with several opponents before reaching an agreement. The negotiations are executed consecutively until an agreement is reached or no more opportunities are available. Each bargaining game is reduced to a single round, where player 1 makes an offer and player 2 can only respond by rejecting or accepting this offer. Using an evolutionary simulation we study several properties of this market game. It appears that the outcomes depend on the information that is available to the players. If players are informed about the bargaining opportunities of their opponents, the first player in turn has the advantage and always proposes a take-it-or-leave-it deal that leaves the other player with a relatively poor outcome. This outcome is consistent with a game-theoretic analysis which we also present in this thesis. If this information is not available, a theoretical analysis is very hard. The evolutionary simulation, however, shows that in this case the responder obtains a better deal. This occurs because the first player can no longer anticipate the response of the other player, and therefore bids lower to avoid a disagreement. In this thesis, we additionally consider other factors that influence the outcomes of the market game, such as negotiation over multiple issues simultaneously, search costs, and break off probabilities. Besides fundamental issues, this thesis presents a number of business-related applications of automated bargaining, as well as generic bargaining strategies for agents that can be employed in related areas. As a first application, we introduce a framework where negotiation is used for recommending shops to customers, for example on a web page of an electronic shopping mall. Through a market-driven auction a relevant selection of shops is determined in a distributed fashion. This is achieved by selling a limited number of banner spaces in an electronic auction. For each arriving customer on the web page, shops can automatically place bids for this ācustomer attention spaceā through their shop agents. These software agents bid based on a customer profile, containing personal data of the customer, such as age, interests, and/or keywords in a search query. The shop agents are adaptive and learn, given feedback from the customers, which profiles to target and how much to bid in the auction. The highest bidders are then selected and displayed to the customer. The feasibility of this distributed approach for matching shops to customers is demonstrated using an evolutionary simulation. Several customer models and auction mechanisms are studied, and we show that the market-based approach results in a proper selection of shops for the customers. Bargaining can be especially beneficial if not only the price, but other aspects are considered as well. This allows for example to customise products and services to the personal preferences of a user. We developed a system makes use of these properties for selling and personalising so-called information goods, such as news articles, software, and music. Using the alternating-offers protocol, a seller agent negotiates with several buyers simultaneously about a fixed price, a per-item price, and the quality of a bundle of information goods. The system is capable of taking into account important business-related conditions such as the fairness of the negotiation. The agents combine a search strategy and a concession strategy to generate offers in the negotiations. The concession strategy determines the amount the agent will concede each round, whereas the search strategy takes care of the personalisation of the offer. We introduce two search strategies in this thesis, and show through computer experiments that the use of these strategies by a buyer and seller agent, result in personalised outcomes, also when combined with various concession strategies. The search strategies presented here can be easily applied to other domains where personalisation is important. In addition, we also developed concession strategies for the seller agent that can be used in settings where a single seller agent bargains with several buyer agents simultaneously. Even if bargaining itself is bilateral (i.e., between two parties), a seller agent can actually benefit from the fact that several such negotiations occur concurrently. The developed strategies are focussed on domains where supply is flexible and can be adjusted to meet demand, like for information goods. We study fixed strategies, time-dependent strategies and introduce several auction-inspired strategies. Auctions are often used when one party negotiates with several opponents simultaneously. Although the latter strategies benefit from the advantages of auctions, the actual negotiation remains bilateral and consists of exchanging offers and counter offers. We developed an evolutionary simulation environment to evaluate the seller agentās strategies. We especially consider the case where buyers are time-impatient and under pressure to reach agreements early. The simulations show that the auction-inspired strategies are able to obtain almost maximum profits from the negotiations, given sufficient time pressure of the buyers
Automated Bilateral Bargaining about Multiple Attributes in a OneĀ to ĀMany Setting
Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller agent negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with many buyer agents in a bilateral fashion. In this setting, "fairness", which corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller agent, which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers. Several of the developed strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even though bargaining is bilateral
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Automated Negotiation for Complex Multi-Agent Resource Allocation
The problem of constructing and analyzing systems of intelligent, autonomous agents is becoming more and more important. These agents may include people, physical robots, virtual humans, software programs acting on behalf of human beings, or sensors. In a large class of multi-agent scenarios, agents may have different capabilities, preferences, objectives, and constraints. Therefore, efficient allocation of resources among multiple agents is often difficult to achieve. Automated negotiation (bargaining) is the most widely used approach for multi-agent resource allocation and it has received increasing attention in the recent years. However, information uncertainty, existence of multiple contracting partners and competitors, agents\u27 incentive to maximize individual utilities, and market dynamics make it difficult to calculate agents\u27 rational equilibrium negotiation strategies and develop successful negotiation agents behaving well in practice. To this end, this thesis is concerned with analyzing agents\u27 rational behavior and developing negotiation strategies for a range of complex negotiation contexts. First, we consider the problem of finding agents\u27 rational strategies in bargaining with incomplete information. We focus on the principal alternating-offers finite horizon bargaining protocol with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents\u27 reserve prices. We provide an algorithm based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and search techniques which finds agents\u27 equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist. Our approach is sound, complete and, in principle, can be applied to other uncertainty settings. Simulation results show that there is at least one pure strategy sequential equilibrium in 99.7% of various scenarios. In addition, agents with equilibrium strategies achieved higher utilities than agents with heuristic strategies. Next, we extend the alternating-offers protocol to handle concurrent negotiations in which each agent has multiple trading opportunities and faces market competition. We provide an algorithm based on backward induction to compute the subgame perfect equilibrium of concurrent negotiation. We observe that agents\u27 bargaining power are affected by the proposing ordering and market competition and for a large subset of the space of the parameters, agents\u27 equilibrium strategies depend on the values of a small number of parameters. We also extend our algorithm to find a pure strategy sequential equilibrium in concurrent negotiations where there is one-sided uncertainty regarding the reserve price of one agent. Third, we present the design and implementation of agents that concurrently negotiate with other entities for acquiring multiple resources. Negotiation agents are designed to adjust 1) the number of tentative agreements and 2) the amount of concession they are willing to make in response to changing market conditions and negotiation situations. In our approach, agents utilize a time-dependent negotiation strategy in which the reserve price of each resource is dynamically determined by 1) the likelihood that negotiation will not be successfully completed, 2) the expected agreement price of the resource, and 3) the expected number of final agreements. The negotiation deadline of each resource is determined by its relative scarcity. Since agents are permitted to decommit from agreements, a buyer may make more than one tentative agreement for each resource and the maximum number of tentative agreements is constrained by the market situation. Experimental results show that our negotiation strategy achieved significantly higher utilities than simpler strategies. Finally, we consider the problem of allocating networked resources in dynamic environment, such as cloud computing platforms, where providers strategically price resources to maximize their utility. While numerous auction-based approaches have been proposed in the literature, our work explores an alternative approach where providers and consumers negotiate resource leasing contracts. We propose a distributed negotiation mechanism where agents negotiate over both a contract price and a decommitment penalty, which allows agents to decommit from contracts at a cost. We compare our approach experimentally, using representative scenarios and workloads, to both combinatorial auctions and the fixed-price model, and show that the negotiation model achieves a higher social welfare
Negotiating Concurrently with Unknown Opponents in Complex, Real-Time Domains
We propose a novel strategy to enable autonomous agents to negotiate concurrently with multiple, unknown opponents in real-time, over complex multi-issue domains. We formalise our strategy as an optimisation problem, in which decisions are based on probabilistic information about the opponents' strategies acquired during negotiation. In doing so, we develop the first principled approach that enables the coordination of multiple, concurrent negotiation threads for practical negotiation settings. Furthermore, we validate our strategy using the agents and domains developed for the International Automated Negotiating Agents Competition (ANAC), and we benchmark our strategy against the state-of-the-art. We find that our approach significantly outperforms existing approaches, and this difference improves even further as the number of available negotiation opponents and the complexity of the negotiation domain increases
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