14 research outputs found

    An evaluation of DGA classifiers

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    Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are a popular technique used by contemporary malware for command-and-control (C&C) purposes. Such malware utilizes DGAs to create a set of domain names that, when resolved, provide information necessary to establish a link to a C&C server. Automated discovery of such domain names in real-time DNS traffic is critical for network security as it allows to detect infection, and, in some cases, take countermeasures to disrupt the communication and identify infected machines. Detection of the specific DGA malware family provides the administrator valuable information about the kind of infection and steps that need to be taken. In this paper we compare and evaluate machine learning methods that classify domain names as benign or DGA, and label the latter according to their malware family. Unlike previous work, we select data for test and training sets according to observation time and known seeds. This allows us to assess the robustness of the trained classifiers for detecting domains generated by the same families at a different time or when seeds change. Our study includes tree ensemble models based on human-engineered features and deep neural networks that learn features automatically from domain names. We find that all state-of-the-art classifiers are significantly better at catching domain names from malware families with a time-dependent seed compared to time-invariant DGAs. In addition, when applying the trained classifiers on a day of real traffic, we find that many domain names unjustifiably are flagged as malicious, thereby revealing the shortcomings of relying on a standard whitelist for training a production grade DGA detection system

    Hardening DGA classifiers utilizing IVAP

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    Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are used by malware to generate a deterministic set of domains, usually by utilizing a pseudo-random seed. A malicious botmaster can establish connections between their command-and-control center (C&C) and any malware-infected machines by registering domains that will be DGA-generated given a specific seed, rendering traditional domain blacklisting ineffective. Given the nature of this threat, the real-time detection of DGA domains based on incoming DNS traffic is highly important. The use of neural network machine learning (ML) models for this task has been well-studied, but there is still substantial room for improvement. In this paper, we propose to use Inductive Venn-Abers predictors (IVAPs) to calibrate the output of existing ML models for DGA classification. The IVAP is a computationally efficient procedure which consistently improves the predictive accuracy of classifiers at the expense of not offering predictions for a small subset of inputs and consuming an additional amount of training data

    CharBot: A Simple and Effective Method for Evading DGA Classifiers

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    Domain generation algorithms (DGAs) are commonly leveraged by malware to create lists of domain names which can be used for command and control (C&C) purposes. Approaches based on machine learning have recently been developed to automatically detect generated domain names in real-time. In this work, we present a novel DGA called CharBot which is capable of producing large numbers of unregistered domain names that are not detected by state-of-the-art classifiers for real-time detection of DGAs, including the recently published methods FANCI (a random forest based on human-engineered features) and LSTM.MI (a deep learning approach). CharBot is very simple, effective and requires no knowledge of the targeted DGA classifiers. We show that retraining the classifiers on CharBot samples is not a viable defense strategy. We believe these findings show that DGA classifiers are inherently vulnerable to adversarial attacks if they rely only on the domain name string to make a decision. Designing a robust DGA classifier may, therefore, necessitate the use of additional information besides the domain name alone. To the best of our knowledge, CharBot is the simplest and most efficient black-box adversarial attack against DGA classifiers proposed to date

    Inline detection of DGA domains using side information

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    Malware applications typically use a command and control (C&C) server to manage bots to perform malicious activities. Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) are popular methods for generating pseudo-random domain names that can be used to establish a communication between an infected bot and the C&C server. In recent years, machine learning based systems have been widely used to detect DGAs. There are several well known state-of-the-art classifiers in the literature that can detect DGA domain names in real-time applications with high predictive performance. However, these DGA classifiers are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks in which adversaries purposely craft domain names to evade DGA detection classifiers. In our work, we focus on hardening DGA classifiers against adversarial attacks. To this end, we train and evaluate state-of-the-art deep learning and random forest (RF) classifiers for DGA detection using side information that is harder for adversaries to manipulate than the domain name itself. Additionally, the side information features are selected such that they are easily obtainable in practice to perform inline DGA detection. The performance and robustness of these models is assessed by exposing them to one day of real-traffic data as well as domains generated by adversarial attack algorithms. We found that the DGA classifiers that rely on both the domain name and side information have high performance and are more robust against adversaries

    CharBot : a simple and effective method for evading DGA classifiers

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    Domain generation algorithms (DGAs) are commonly leveraged by malware to create lists of domain names, which can be used for command and control (C&C) purposes. Approaches based on machine learning have recently been developed to automatically detect generated domain names in real-time. In this paper, we present a novel DGA called CharBot, which is capable of producing large numbers of unregistered domain names that are not detected by state-of-the-art classifiers for real-time detection of the DGAs, including the recently published methods FANCI (a random forest based on human-engineered features) and LSTM.MI (a deep learning approach). The CharBot is very simple, effective, and requires no knowledge of the targeted DGA classifiers. We show that retraining the classifiers on CharBot samples is not a viable defense strategy. We believe these findings show that DGA classifiers are inherently vulnerable to adversarial attacks if they rely only on the domain name string to make a decision. Designing a robust DGA classifier may, therefore, necessitate the use of additional information besides the domain name alone. To the best of our knowledge, the CharBot is the simplest and most efficient black-box adversarial attack against DGA classifiers proposed to date

    Analyzing the Real-World Applicability of DGA Classifiers

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    Separating benign domains from domains generated by DGAs with the help of a binary classifier is a well-studied problem for which promising performance results have been published. The corresponding multiclass task of determining the exact DGA that generated a domain enabling targeted remediation measures is less well studied. Selecting the most promising classifier for these tasks in practice raises a number of questions that have not been addressed in prior work so far. These include the questions on which traffic to train in which network and when, just as well as how to assess robustness against adversarial attacks. Moreover, it is unclear which features lead a classifier to a decision and whether the classifiers are real-time capable. In this paper, we address these issues and thus contribute to bringing DGA detection classifiers closer to practical use. In this context, we propose one novel classifier based on residual neural networks for each of the two tasks and extensively evaluate them as well as previously proposed classifiers in a unified setting. We not only evaluate their classification performance but also compare them with respect to explainability, robustness, and training and classification speed. Finally, we show that our newly proposed binary classifier generalizes well to other networks, is time-robust, and able to identify previously unknown DGAs.Comment: Accepted at The 15th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2020

    False Sense of Security: Leveraging XAI to Analyze the Reasoning and True Performance of Context-less DGA Classifiers

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    The problem of revealing botnet activity through Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) detection seems to be solved, considering that available deep learning classifiers achieve accuracies of over 99.9%. However, these classifiers provide a false sense of security as they are heavily biased and allow for trivial detection bypass. In this work, we leverage explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) methods to analyze the reasoning of deep learning classifiers and to systematically reveal such biases. We show that eliminating these biases from DGA classifiers considerably deteriorates their performance. Nevertheless we are able to design a context-aware detection system that is free of the identified biases and maintains the detection rate of state-of-the art deep learning classifiers. In this context, we propose a visual analysis system that helps to better understand a classifier's reasoning, thereby increasing trust in and transparency of detection methods and facilitating decision-making.Comment: Accepted at The 26th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID '23
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