19,732 research outputs found
You better play 7: mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a weak-link experiment
This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff- dominant equilibrium. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and the percentage of efficient equilibrium play are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficient to significantly increase the salience of the efficient equilibrium with respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 induces, under suitable conditions, successful coordination more frequently than common knowledge
The Complexity of Synthesizing Uniform Strategies
We investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve
sets of plays in order to express useful constraints on strategies that are not
\mu-calculus definable. Typically, we can state that a strategy is
observation-based. We propose a formal language to specify uniformity
properties, interpreted over two-player turn-based arenas equipped with a
binary relation between plays. This way, we capture e.g. games with winning
conditions expressible in epistemic temporal logic, whose underlying
equivalence relation between plays reflects the observational capabilities of
agents (for example, synchronous perfect recall). Our framework naturally
generalizes many other situations from the literature. We establish that the
problem of synthesizing strategies under uniformity constraints based on
regular binary relations between plays is non-elementary complete.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2013, arXiv:1303.007
You Better Play 7: Mutual versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-link Experiment
This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowl- edge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimen- tal subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff-dominant equilib- rium. In the mutual knowledge of level 1 treatment, the suggestion appears on every subject's monitor at the beginning of every round, with no common knowledge that everybody sees the same suggestion. In the mutual knowledge of level 2 treatment, the same suggestion appears on each subject's monitor, accompanied by the request to "send" the suggestion to the partner in the round, followed by a notification that the message has been read. Finally, in the common knowledge treatment, the suggestion is read aloud by the experimenter at the end of the learning phase. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and the percentage of efficient equilibrium play are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficient to significantly increase the salience of the efficient equilibrium with respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 (as the one occurring in our "message" treatment) induces successful coordination more frequently than common knowledge.Coordination games; experimental philosophy; epistemic attitudes, weak-link game; conventions
You Better Play 7: Mutual versus Common Knowledge of Advice in a Weak-link Experiment
This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowl- edge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimen- tal subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payo-dominant equilib- rium. In the mutual knowledge of level 1 treatment, the suggestion appears on every subject's monitor at the beginning of every round, with no common knowledge that everybody sees the same suggestion. In the mutual knowledge of level 2 treatment, the same suggestion appears on each subject's monitor, accompanied by the request to "send" the suggestion to the partner in the round, followed by a notication that the message has been read. Finally, in the common knowledge treatment, the suggestion is read aloud by the experimenter at the end of the learning phase. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and the percentage of e cient equilibrium play are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficient to signicantly increase the salience of the e cient equilibrium with respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 (as the one occurring in our "message" treatment) induces successful coordination more frequently than common knowledge.Coordination games; experimental philosophy; epistemic attitudes, weak-link game; conventions
Games with recurring certainty
Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect
information are known to be intractable, unless the information flow is
severely restricted. Examples of undecidable cases typically feature a
situation where players become uncertain about the current state of the game,
and this uncertainty lasts forever. Here we consider games where the players
attain certainty about the current state over and over again along any play.
For finite-state games, we note that this kind of recurring certainty implies a
stronger condition of periodic certainty, that is, the events of state
certainty ultimately occur at uniform, regular intervals. We show that it is
decidable whether a given game presents recurring certainty, and that, if so,
the problem of synthesising coordination strategies under w-regular winning
conditions is solvable.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2014, arXiv:1404.041
EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
We give an introduction to the literature on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts in game theory. Only normal-form games are considered. The solution concepts analyzed are rationalizability, strong rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. The analysis is carried out locally in terms of properties of the belief hierarchies. Several examples are used throughout to illustrate definitions and concepts.
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