Protection of LAN-wide, P2P interactions: a holistic approach

This article advocates the need of a holistic approach to protect LAN interactions and presents a solution for implementing it based on secure LAN (SLAN), a novel security architecture. SLAN uses the 802.1X access control mechanisms and is supported by a key distribution centre (KDC) built upon an 802.1X authentication server. The KDC is used, together with a new host identification policy and modified DHCP servers, to provide proper resource allocation and message authentication in DHCP transactions. The KDC is used to authenticate ARP transactions and to distribute session keys to pairs of LAN hosts, allowing them to set up arbitrary, LAN-wide peer-to-peer security associations using such session keys. We show how PPPoE and IPSec security associations may be instantiated and present a prototype implementation for IPSec

How To Re-initialize a Hash Chain

Hash Chains are used extensively in various cryptographic systems such as one-time passwords, server supported signatures, secure address resolution, certificate revocation, micropayments etc. However, currently they suffer from the limitation that they have a finite number of links which when exhausted requires the system to be re-initialized. In this paper, we present a new kind of hash chain which we call a Re-initializable Hash Chain (RHC). A RHC has the property that if its links are exhausted, it can be securely re-initialized in a non-repudiable manner to result in another RHC. This process can be continued indefinitely to give rise to an infinite length hash chain, or more precisely, an infinite number of finite length hash chains tied together. Finally we illustrate how a conventional hash chain (CHC) may be profitable replaced with a RHC in cryptographic systems

Cross-validation based man-in-the-middle attack protection

A thesis submitted to the University of Bedfordshire, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science by researchIn recent years, computer network has widely used in almost all areas of our social life. It has been profoundly changing the way of our living. However, various network attacks have become an increasingly problem at the same time. In local area networks, Man-in-the-Middle attack, as one kind of ARP attack, is the most common attack. This research implemented a cross-validation based Man-in-the-Middle attack protection method (CVP). This approach enables a host to check whether another host that responds the initialising host with an ARP reply packet is genuine. It then allows the ARP cache table of the initialising hosts to be updated with the MAC address and IP address pairs of the genuine host and to place the MAC address of inauthentic hosts into a blacklist. This research introduced ARP and ICMP firstly, including the structure of ARP and ICMP packets, and their workflows. Secondly, this research discussed the types of ARP attacks and the existing ARP attacks protection methods, including their principles, applicable environment, advantages and disadvantages. Then, this research proposed and implemented a cross-validation based Man-in-the-Middle attack protection method. Simulations and experiments were performed to examine the effect of CVP method. The results show the effectiveness of the proposed cross-validation based method in protecting network from Man-in-the-Middle attack. Compared with the existing Man-in-the-Middle attack protection methods, CVP requires no extra devices and administration, leading to more secure local area networks and low cost. It also has made a “tabu” to attackers. That is, it places the MAC address of attackers into a blacklist. So they will be identified immediately if they try to attack the network again