Security Weaknesses of Song's Advanced Smart Card Based Password Authentication Protocol

[[abstract]]Password based authentication with smart cards has been adopted as a more secure means in insecure networks to validate the legitimacy of users. Traditional authentication schemes are based on the tamper-resistant smart card; that is, the data stored in the smart card cannot be revealed. However, it is a challenging problem for considering non-tamper-resistant smart cards used in user authentication. Very recently, in 2010, Song proposed an efficient authentication scheme with such non-tamper resistant smart cards based on symmetric key cryptosystems as well as modular exponentiations. In this paper, we will show that Song's scheme is vulnerable to the offline password guessing attack and the insider attack. Besides, this scheme does not provide perfect forward secrecy and does not preserve user anonymity.[[conferencetype]]國際[[conferencelocation]]Shanghai, Chin

Efficient Three Party Key Exchange Protocol

Key exchange protocols allow two or more parties communicating over a public network to establish a common secret key called a session key. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman proposed the first practical key exchange (DH key exchange) protocol. In 2005, Abdalla and Pointcheval suggested a new variation of the computational DH assumption called chosen based computational Diffie Hellman (CCDH) and presented simple password based authenticated key exchange protocols. Since then several three party password authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed In 2007, Lu and Cao proposed a simple 3 party authenticated key exchange (S-3PAKE) protocol. Kim and Koi found that this protocol cannot resist undetectable online password guessing attack and gave fixed STPKE' protocol as a countermeasure using exclusive-or operation. Recently, Tallapally and Padmavathy found that STPKE' is still vulnerable to undetectable online password guessing attack and gave a modified STPKE' protocol. Unfortunately, we find that, although modified STPKE' protocol can resist undetectable online password guessing attack but it is vulnerable to man in the middle attack. Also, we propose and analyze an efficient protocol against all the known attacks

Key exchange with the help of a public ledger

Blockchains and other public ledger structures promise a new way to create globally consistent event logs and other records. We make use of this consistency property to detect and prevent man-in-the-middle attacks in a key exchange such as Diffie-Hellman or ECDH. Essentially, the MitM attack creates an inconsistency in the world views of the two honest parties, and they can detect it with the help of the ledger. Thus, there is no need for prior knowledge or trusted third parties apart from the distributed ledger. To prevent impersonation attacks, we require user interaction. It appears that, in some applications, the required user interaction is reduced in comparison to other user-assisted key-exchange protocols

Comments on Five Smart Card Based Password Authentication Protocols

In this paper, we use the ten security requirements proposed by Liao et al. for a smart card based authentication protocol to examine five recent work in this area. After analyses, we found that the protocols of Juang et al.'s , Hsiang et al.'s, Kim et al.'s, and Li et al.'s all suffer from offline password guessing attack if the smart card is lost, and the protocol of Xu et al.'s is subjected to an insider impersonation attack.Comment: 4 pages

Authentic-caller : self-enforcing authentication in a next generation network

The Internet of Things (IoT) or the Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is the network of connected devices, things and people which collect and exchange information using the emerging telecommunication networks (4G, 5G IP-based LTE). These emerging telecommunication networks can also be used to transfer critical information between the source and destination, informing the control system about the outage in the electrical grid, or providing information about the emergency at the national express highway. This sensitive information requires authorization and authentication of source and destination involved in the communication. To protect the network from unauthorized access and to provide authentication, the telecommunication operators have to adopt the mechanism for seamless verification and authorization of parties involved in the communication. Currently, the next-generation telecommunication networks use a digest-based authentication mechanism, where the call-processing engine of the telecommunication operator initiates the challenge to the request-initiating client or caller, which is being solved by the client to prove his credentials. However, the digest-based authentication mechanisms are vulnerable to many forms of known attacks e.g., the Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack and the password guessing attack. Furthermore, the digest-based systems require extensive processing overheads. Several Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) based and identity-based schemes have been proposed for the authentication and key agreements. However, these schemes generally require smart-card to hold long-term private keys and authentication credentials. In this paper, we propose a novel self-enforcing authentication protocol for the SIPbased next-generation network based on a low-entropy shared password without relying on any PKI or trusted third party system. The proposed system shows effective resistance against various attacks e.g., MITM, replay attack, password guessing attack, etc. We a..