The NOW dilemma

Energy efficiency has found its place at the very core of the discussion in Architecture and Urban Planning. Research & Development, Political Agendas and Education Curriculums are increasingly driven by the need to reach a fair balance between the way we inhabit the world and the energy we require for it. After many decades neglecting this discussion a growing awareness about the carrying capacity of our environment is being brought to actual policies on the built environment. The dominant tendency today privileges economic growth, thus being the maximization of performed labor per energy unit its ultimate goal. Renewal energy sources and energy efficiency are means for, on the one hand, an alternative to finite fossil fuel sources and, on the other hand, the optimization in the use of energy. Very little attention has been paid, however, to a more profound paradigm shift in economy. Some authors, however, have also claimed replacing the myth of economic growth by a more steady-state development as a solution for the current sustainability conundrum. The question is whether withholding the use of energy might be an alternative to its hi-tech optimization. Some of the contemporary authors who have discussed the issue in recent energy crisis are recounted here for a wider and holistic understanding of the problem.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

Sharing economy vs sharing cultures? Designing for social, economic and environmental good

This paper explores the story behind a crowdfunding service as an example of sharing technology. Research in a small neighborhood of London showed how locally-developed initiatives can differ in tone, scale, ambition and practice to those getting attention in the so-called sharing economy. In local accounts, we see an emphasis on organizing together to create shared spaces for collaborative use of resources and joint ownership of projects and places. Whereas, many global business models feature significant elements of renting, leasing and hiring and focus only on resource management, sometimes at the expense of community growth. The service we discuss is based in the area we studied and has a collective model of sharing, but hopes to be part of the new global movement. We use this hybridity to problematize issues of culture, place and scalability in developing sharing resources and addressing sustainability concerns. We relate this to the motivation, rhetoric and design choices of other local sharing enterprises and other global sharing economy initiatives, arguing, in conclusion, that there is no sharing economy, but a variety of new cultures being fostered

The New International Tax Diplomacy

International tax avoidance by multinational corporations is now frontpage news. At its core, the issue is simple: the tax regimes of different countries allow multinational corporations to book much of their income in low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions, and many of their expenses in high-tax jurisdictions, thereby significantly reducing their tax liabilities. In a time of public austerity, citizens and legislators around the world have been more focused on the resulting erosion of the corporate income tax base than ever before. In response, in 2012, the G-20—the gathering of the leaders of the world’s twenty largest economies—launched the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, the most extensive attempt to change international tax norms since the 1920s. In the course of the BEPS project, the field of international tax has adopted the institutional and procedural architecture for multilateral action used in international financial law. This Article is the first to ask whether that architecture will work in the international tax context. To answer that question, this Article first applies lessons from the international financial law literature to assess international tax agreements that are now being reached through soft-law instruments and procedures comparable to those that characterize international financial law. This initial analysis, which draws from the experience in international financial law, is largely pessimistic. However, this Article then describes how model tax treaty law—although also a form of soft law—is highly effective, and differentiates the political economy of international tax law from that of international financial law. As a result, a key theoretical point emerges: bifurcating analysis of multilateral efforts to change international tax norms into their Model Treaty-based and non-Model Treaty-based components is necessary in order to understand the new regime for international tax governance. At a more practical level, bifurcating the analysis highlights that observers should expect the Model Treaty-based parts of the BEPS project to be implemented, as well as most parts of the project focused on tax transparency. By contrast, sustained international coordination in implementing other dimensions of the project is doubtful. In reaching these conclusions, the Article contributes to the broader international economic governance literature by using a high-profile example from international tax diplomacy to show how underlying legal institutions affect the prospects for implementation of international regulatory agreements

Stabilizing “Pillar One”: Corporate Profit Reallocation in an Uncertain Environment

This paper is about how the world reestablishes international tax order. The paper focuses on the OECD’s work on profit reallocation and asks whether this multilateral effort can be successful in stabilizing the international tax system. The analysis centers on the current leading concepts for reallocating profit among jurisdictions under what is known as “Pillar One” of the OECD work programme. To analyze whether any Pillar One concept can be turned into a stable multilateral regime, it is necessary to specify certain elements of what a proposal to reallocate profits might entail. Accordingly, this paper sets out two strawman proposals. One strawman uses a “market intangibles” concept that explicitly separates routine and residual returns. The other strawman may reach a similar result, but does not explicitly attempt to separate routine and residual returns. Instead, in current OECD parlance, it might be described as a “distribution-based” approach. The paper asks whether either of the two strawmen could be agreed and stabilized multilaterally given the tools of modern international tax diplomacy. I conclude that the current procedural and institutional architecture for cementing international tax relations among states is inadequate to stabilize either of the strawmen. Nevertheless, with certain changes, reestablishing order may be possible. Moreover, I conclude that there are six key structural decisions that impact the ability to stabilize the international tax architecture in any Pillar One approach, and that these decisions are likely to be implicitly made in the course of choosing a political direction for Pillar One work in 2019. The choices made with regard to these decisions determine whether or not it will be possible to stabilize Pillar One. Even if good resolutions are reached along these six dimensions, there are only a couple paths to stabilize the system. One path would involve using every tool in the current OECD arsenal in new and more expansive ways, and then substantially depoliticize international tax matters and remove G20 involvement, such that logics of appropriateness developed among tax administrators isolated from political pressures and acting through transnational networks could lend stability to a new set of rules and principles. Even then, only a few Pillar One compromises could be stabilized this way. The alternative path, which could stabilize a broader range of proposals, requires formalizing the new regime in international law through a true multilateral treaty

2 P2P or Not 2 P2P?

In the hope of stimulating discussion, we present a heuristic decision tree that designers can use to judge the likely suitability of a P2P architecture for their applications. It is based on the characteristics of a wide range of P2P systems from the literature, both proposed and deployed.Comment: 6 pages, 1 figur

Comparing the 'Four Pillars' of Global Economic Governance: A Critical Analysis of the Institutional Design of the FSB, IMF, World Bank, and WTO

Why are the intergovernmental organizations referred to as the ‘four pillars’ of international economic governance designed the way they are? Although much of their institutional design—issues like voting, membership, mandate, and funding—can be traced back to the history of the organization and the circumstances in which states established it, the institutional setup of each organization should ideally correspond with the type of public good it seeks to provide. Formal organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) are treaty-based, requiring strict conditions for membership and a high degree of legal rules and enforcement. They were also established to carry out a specific function, such as balance of payment issues for the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Bodies such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the new player in the field of economic governance, are less formal, and are concerned with monitoring, advising, and coordination of regulatory efforts. In some cases, the roles of these organizations have expanded into new areas, or they have had functions replaced by other international bodies, especially in the wake of events such as the 1997 and 2008 financial crises. This article seeks to understand how the design of these institutions is influenced not only by the states that established them, but also by the overarching goals the organization seeks to achieve, and its place within the broader framework of global economic governance. The article begins by comparing the institutional design of the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank, and the FSB. It compares the organizations’ legal basis, membership, organs, and decision-making processes, as well as the methods by which they develop and enforce rules for the global economy. The article examines how these very different institutional setups relate to the goals of each organization. How has the design and function of these organizations changed over time, and to what extent has this change been due to the changing role of the organization, especially in light of events such as the 1997 and 2008 financial crises? Particular emphasis is given to the level of formality with which these organizations operate—when does the organization require strict rules regarding funding, voting, and membership, and when are more informal processes more appropriate? Finally, the article seeks to understand to what extent these organizations, despite their differences in terms of mandate, structure, and methods are able to work together effectively and develop policies that are mutually consistent. An understanding of these dynamics will be useful in further discussions about how these organizations might be designed and structured better in order to address the challenges facing the global economy

G 20 - A STEPPING STONE TOWARDS A NEW WORLD ORDER?

The paper examines the main decisions made at the 24 - 25 September 2009 Pittsburg Summit of G20 and their implications on the design and implementation of a new world order. The analysis reflects the long term trends and changes in the world economy that have led to the necessity of significant changes in the institutions and procedures that govern international economic relations.economic crisis, world order, G20, G8, peer review, 21st century international economic architecture