Living Innovation Laboratory Model Design and Implementation

Living Innovation Laboratory (LIL) is an open and recyclable way for multidisciplinary researchers to remote control resources and co-develop user centered projects. In the past few years, there were several papers about LIL published and trying to discuss and define the model and architecture of LIL. People all acknowledge about the three characteristics of LIL: user centered, co-creation, and context aware, which make it distinguished from test platform and other innovation approaches. Its existing model consists of five phases: initialization, preparation, formation, development, and evaluation. Goal Net is a goal-oriented methodology to formularize a progress. In this thesis, Goal Net is adopted to subtract a detailed and systemic methodology for LIL. LIL Goal Net Model breaks the five phases of LIL into more detailed steps. Big data, crowd sourcing, crowd funding and crowd testing take place in suitable steps to realize UUI, MCC and PCA throughout the innovation process in LIL 2.0. It would become a guideline for any company or organization to develop a project in the form of an LIL 2.0 project. To prove the feasibility of LIL Goal Net Model, it was applied to two real cases. One project is a Kinect game and the other one is an Internet product. They were both transformed to LIL 2.0 successfully, based on LIL goal net based methodology. The two projects were evaluated by phenomenography, which was a qualitative research method to study human experiences and their relations in hope of finding the better way to improve human experiences. Through phenomenographic study, the positive evaluation results showed that the new generation of LIL had more advantages in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.Comment: This is a book draf

Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics: The Problem of Client Selection

Monroe Freedman is well known as a proponent of the standard conception of legal ethics - that is, that a lawyer cannot be criticized in moral terms for actions taken in a representative capacity. Surprisingly, however, Freedman has argued that client selection is a decision for which a lawyer may be required to provide a justification in ordinary moral terms. This apparent inconsistency reveals a conceptual distinction in normative ethical theory, which is often blurred, between justifying a practice (in this case, the legal system or some specialized practice such as criminal defense) and justifying an action falling within the practice (here, either actions of a lawyer while representing a client or the decision to accept or decline the representation of a client). A practice as a whole must be justified on the basis of moral concepts, such as consequences, rights, and other values. Once a practice exists, however, particular moves within the practice are justified on the basis of the constitutive rules which make up the practice, not on the basis of underlying moral concepts. This is the practice conception of rules, defended by John Rawls in an influential 1955 paper. This paper makes two arguments - one metatheoretical and one a substantive argument within legal ethics. The methodological or metatheoretical argument is that professional ethics should proceed at one level of abstraction or another, but not equivocate back and forth between them. One can give systemic reasons why a lawyer ought to act on rules of a practice, and not on the basis of an all-things-considered moral evaluation of what she ought to do in the situation. Once committed to this style of reasoning, however, consistency demands that the frame of reference for the argument not suddenly be shifted to ordinary moral considerations. On the other hand, one might believe that clarity or some other consideration demands addressing questions of professional ethics exclusively in terms of first-order moral values. If one adopts that stance, however, it is impermissible to appeal to blanket permissions on the basis of the rules of the game. Every action must be justified on an all-things-considered basis. Subtle shifting between the two levels of justification creates unnecessary confusion, and may account for the occasionally frustrating nature of debates in legal ethics, where the participants seem to be talking past each other. Moreover, it is part of the general pattern of ethical justification in the public domain - including political and legal ethics - that the primary focus of evaluation is the institutional structure through which action occurs. This evaluative perspective, which is one rough distinction between political and moral philosophy, excludes from deliberation the full range of reasons that would ordinarily be relevant in practical reasoning. The client-selection debate, like any controversy within legal ethics, should therefore be resolved not as a matter of straightforwardly applying ordinary moral values, but in the way suggested by Rawls, with due attention given to the institutional setting of the action. The substantive argument within legal ethics is that the concept of agency does not require that a practice build in significant opportunities for the exercise of judgment on the basis of ordinary moral values. Reflective self-consciousness, which is constitutive of moral agency, is consistent with opting into a practice at a relatively high level of generality, and considering onself bound by the rules of the game. At the very least, whatever one may say in terms of moral agency, in support of an argument that a lawyer has moral discretion in client selection, can be said in support of an argument that a lawyer ought not to follow the standard conception while acting in a representative capacity. Client selection and representation stand or fall together, from the point of view of their effect on agency

Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics: The Problem of Client Selection

Monroe Freedman is well known as a proponent of the standard conception of legal ethics - that is, that a lawyer cannot be criticized in moral terms for actions taken in a representative capacity. Surprisingly, however, Freedman has argued that client selection is a decision for which a lawyer may be required to provide a justification in ordinary moral terms. This apparent inconsistency reveals a conceptual distinction in normative ethical theory, which is often blurred, between justifying a practice (in this case, the legal system or some specialized practice such as criminal defense) and justifying an action falling within the practice (here, either actions of a lawyer while representing a client or the decision to accept or decline the representation of a client). A practice as a whole must be justified on the basis of moral concepts, such as consequences, rights, and other values. Once a practice exists, however, particular moves within the practice are justified on the basis of the constitutive rules which make up the practice, not on the basis of underlying moral concepts. This is the practice conception of rules, defended by John Rawls in an influential 1955 paper. This paper makes two arguments - one metatheoretical and one a substantive argument within legal ethics. The methodological or metatheoretical argument is that professional ethics should proceed at one level of abstraction or another, but not equivocate back and forth between them. One can give systemic reasons why a lawyer ought to act on rules of a practice, and not on the basis of an all-things-considered moral evaluation of what she ought to do in the situation. Once committed to this style of reasoning, however, consistency demands that the frame of reference for the argument not suddenly be shifted to ordinary moral considerations. On the other hand, one might believe that clarity or some other consideration demands addressing questions of professional ethics exclusively in terms of first-order moral values. If one adopts that stance, however, it is impermissible to appeal to blanket permissions on the basis of the rules of the game. Every action must be justified on an all-things-considered basis. Subtle shifting between the two levels of justification creates unnecessary confusion, and may account for the occasionally frustrating nature of debates in legal ethics, where the participants seem to be talking past each other. Moreover, it is part of the general pattern of ethical justification in the public domain - including political and legal ethics - that the primary focus of evaluation is the institutional structure through which action occurs. This evaluative perspective, which is one rough distinction between political and moral philosophy, excludes from deliberation the full range of reasons that would ordinarily be relevant in practical reasoning. The client-selection debate, like any controversy within legal ethics, should therefore be resolved not as a matter of straightforwardly applying ordinary moral values, but in the way suggested by Rawls, with due attention given to the institutional setting of the action. The substantive argument within legal ethics is that the concept of agency does not require that a practice build in significant opportunities for the exercise of judgment on the basis of ordinary moral values. Reflective self-consciousness, which is constitutive of moral agency, is consistent with opting into a practice at a relatively high level of generality, and considering onself bound by the rules of the game. At the very least, whatever one may say in terms of moral agency, in support of an argument that a lawyer has moral discretion in client selection, can be said in support of an argument that a lawyer ought not to follow the standard conception while acting in a representative capacity. Client selection and representation stand or fall together, from the point of view of their effect on agency

Jogos Digitais para Idosos – uma experiência de ensino

Esse artigo descreve a experiência de aprendizado e interação com os jogos desenvolvidos pelo Prof. Dr. Kaufman para o programa AGEWELL do Canadá. Os jogos de paciência e jogo da velha foram adaptados para o português possibilitando a aplicação no Brasil. Os primeiros resultados coletados de um piloto apontam concordância com os resultados levantados no Canadá, os quais sugerem um maior entrosamento dos participantes e aprendizado através dos questionários embutidos nos jogos. Esse artigo apresenta ainda alguns requisitos para ambientes de jogos voltados especificamente para usuários idosos. Os resultados sugerem que o engajamento dos idosos é maior quando as interfaces com os jogos apresentam menos elementos intermediários, preferindo atividades que permitem o movimento do corpo ou interação direta com o jogo através de telas de toque ou sensores de movimento. Esses dados são exemplificados nos jogos apresentados

Jogos Digitais para Idosos – uma experiência de ensino

Esse artigo descreve a experiência de aprendizado e interação com os jogos desenvolvidos pelo Prof. Dr. Kaufman para o programa AGEWELL do Canadá. Os jogos de paciência e jogo da velha foram adaptados para o português possibilitando a aplicação no Brasil. Os primeiros resultados coletados de um piloto apontam concordância com os resultados levantados no Canadá, os quais sugerem um maior entrosamento dos participantes e aprendizado através dos questionários embutidos nos jogos. Esse artigo apresenta ainda alguns requisitos para ambientes de jogos voltados especificamente para usuários idosos. Os resultados sugerem que o engajamento dos idosos é maior quando as interfaces com os jogos apresentam menos elementos intermediários, preferindo atividades que permitem o movimento do corpo ou interação direta com o jogo através de telas de toque ou sensores de movimento. Esses dados são exemplificados nos jogos apresentados

Journal of Accessibility and Design for All

This volume 2, number 1 of the Journal of Accessibility and Design for All comprises a selection of papers presented at the IV International Congress on Design, Research Networks, and Technology for all held in Madrid, June, 27 - 29, 2011. This congress is promoted by the ONCE Foundation for cooperation and social inclusion of persons with disabilities and intends to monitor the progress of assistive technologies for people with disabilities. Therefore, papers here presented cover different areas related to learning, health, communication and social life, which are also in line with the philosophy of the journal and complement some of the five research areas of this journal.Peer Reviewe