Collaborative signal and information processing for target detection with heterogeneous sensor networks

In this paper, an approach for target detection and acquisition with heterogeneous sensor networks through strategic resource allocation and coordination is presented. Based on sensor management and collaborative signal and information processing, low-capacity low-cost sensors are strategically deployed to guide and cue scarce high performance sensors in the network to improve the data quality, with which the mission is eventually completed more efficiently with lower cost. We focus on the problem of designing such a network system in which issues of resource selection and allocation, system behaviour and capacity, target behaviour and patterns, the environment, and multiple constraints such as the cost must be addressed simultaneously. Simulation results offer significant insight into sensor selection and network operation, and demonstrate the great benefits introduced by guided search in an application of hunting down and capturing hostile vehicles on the battlefield

Synthesized cooperative strategies for intelligent multi-robots in a real-time distributed environment : a thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Computer Science at Massey University, Albany, New Zealand

In the robot soccer domain, real-time response usually curtails the development of more complex Al-based game strategies, path-planning and team cooperation between intelligent agents. In light of this problem, distributing computationally intensive algorithms between several machines to control, coordinate and dynamically assign roles to a team of robots, and allowing them to communicate via a network gives rise to real-time cooperation in a multi-robotic team. This research presents a myriad of algorithms tested on a distributed system platform that allows for cooperating multi- agents in a dynamic environment. The test bed is an extension of a popular robot simulation system in the public domain developed at Carnegie Mellon University, known as TeamBots. A low-level real-time network game protocol using TCP/IP and UDP were incorporated to allow for a conglomeration of multi-agent to communicate and work cohesively as a team. Intelligent agents were defined to take on roles such as game coach agent, vision agent, and soccer player agents. Further, team cooperation is demonstrated by integrating a real-time fuzzy logic-based ball-passing algorithm and a fuzzy logic algorithm for path planning. Keywords Artificial Intelligence, Ball Passing, the coaching system, Collaborative, Distributed Multi-Agent, Fuzzy Logic, Role Assignmen

Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks with Hostile Camps: Consensus vs. Polarization

Most of the distributed protocols for multi-agent consensus assume that the agents are mutually cooperative and "trustful," and so the couplings among the agents bring the values of their states closer. Opinion dynamics in social groups, however, require beyond these conventional models due to ubiquitous competition and distrust between some pairs of agents, which are usually characterized by repulsive couplings and may lead to clustering of the opinions. A simple yet insightful model of opinion dynamics with both attractive and repulsive couplings was proposed recently by C. Altafini, who examined first-order consensus algorithms over static signed graphs. This protocol establishes modulus consensus, where the opinions become the same in modulus but may differ in signs. In this paper, we extend the modulus consensus model to the case where the network topology is an arbitrary time-varying signed graph and prove reaching modulus consensus under mild sufficient conditions of uniform connectivity of the graph. For cut-balanced graphs, not only sufficient, but also necessary conditions for modulus consensus are given.Comment: scheduled for publication in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2016, vol. 61, no. 7 (accepted in August 2015

Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance

This article proposes a new, functional explanation of the different roles of non-shareholder groups (particularly labor) in different corporate governance systems. The argument depends on the analysis of a factor that has so far received relatively little attention in corporate governance research: the level of shareholder influence on managerial decision making. Pro-employee laws mitigate holdup problems- opportunism from which shareholders benefit ex post, but which will deter firm-specific investment in human capital ex ante. Since holdup takes place within what is considered legitimate managerial business judgment and all shareholders (both majority and minority) are its financial beneficiaries, the degree of managerial autonomy from shareholders is an important factor. In the United States, proponents of a stakeholder view of corporate law have argued that the insulation that U.S. boards of directors have from shareholders mitigates the risk of holdup of non shareholder constituencies by shareholders, thus encouraging firm-specific investment such as investment in human capital. However, the large degree of autonomy of U.S. boards is unusual. This autonomy is eliminated, for example, by concentrated ownership, which prevails in Continental Europe. This article therefore suggests that, given their costs, laws aiming at the protection of stakeholders-such as codetermination and restrictive employment laws-may be normatively more desirable in the presence of stronger shareholder influence, particularly under concentrated ownership. The theory is corroborated by the observation that such laws tend to be more strongly developed in corporate governance systems with stronger shareholder influence. The United Kingdom, which has both stronger shareholder influence and stronger employment law than the United States, is classified as an intermediate case

Inferring Interpersonal Relations in Narrative Summaries

Characterizing relationships between people is fundamental for the understanding of narratives. In this work, we address the problem of inferring the polarity of relationships between people in narrative summaries. We formulate the problem as a joint structured prediction for each narrative, and present a model that combines evidence from linguistic and semantic features, as well as features based on the structure of the social community in the text. We also provide a clustering-based approach that can exploit regularities in narrative types. e.g., learn an affinity for love-triangles in romantic stories. On a dataset of movie summaries from Wikipedia, our structured models provide more than a 30% error-reduction over a competitive baseline that considers pairs of characters in isolation

Preserving a combat commander’s moral agency: The Vincennes Incident as a Chinese Room

We argue that a command and control system can undermine a commander’s moral agency if it causes him/her to process information in a purely syntactic manner, or if it precludes him/her from ascertaining the truth of that information. Our case is based on the resemblance between a commander’s circumstances and the protagonist in Searle’s Chinese Room, together with a careful reading of Aristotle’s notions of ‘compulsory’ and ‘ignorance’. We further substantiate our case by considering the Vincennes Incident, when the crew of a warship mistakenly shot down a civilian airliner. To support a combat commander’s moral agency, designers should strive for systems that help commanders and command teams to think and manipulate information at the level of meaning. ‘Down conversions’ of information from meaning to symbols must be adequately recovered by ‘up conversions’, and commanders must be able to check that their sensors are working and are being used correctly. Meanwhile ethicists should establish a mechanism that tracks the potential moral implications of choices in a system’s design and intended operation. Finally we highlight a gap in normative ethics, in that we have ways to deny moral agency, but not to affirm it

Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model

This article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991, the United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational liability. Under this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exercised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organization had in place internal compliance structures ostensibly designed to detect and discourage such conduct. I argue, however, that any internal compliance-based organizational liability regime is likely to fail because courts and agencies lack sufficient information about the effectiveness of such structures. As a result, an internal compliance-based liability system encourages the implementation of largely cosmetic internal compliance structures that reduce legal liability without reducing the incidence of organizational misconduct. Furthermore, a review of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of internal compliance structures suggests that many organizations have adopted precisely this cosmetic approach to internal compliance. This leads to two potential problems: first, an underdeterrence of organizational misconduct and, second, a proliferation of costly but ineffective internal compliance structures

The Stock Market, the Market for Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm: Legal and Economic Perspectives and Implications for Public Policy

It is argued here that - contrary to current conventional wisdom - an active market for corporate control is not an essential ingredient of either company law reform or financial and economic development. The absence of such a market in coordinated market systems during their modern economic development was not an evolutionary deficit, but an effective and positive institutional arrangement. The economic and social costs associated with restructuring driven by hostile takeover bids, which are increasingly seen as prohibitive in the liberal market economies, would most likely harm the prospects for growth in developing and transition systems.takeovers, market for corporate control, varieties of capitalism

Luck as Risk

The aim of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that luck is a risk-involving phenomenon. I start by explaining why this hypothesis is prima facie plausible in view of the parallelisms between luck and risk. I then distinguish three ways to spell it out: in probabilistic terms, in modal terms, and in terms of lack of control. Before evaluating the resulting accounts, I explain how the idea that luck involves risk is compatible with the fact that risk concerns unwanted events whereas luck can concern both wanted and unwanted events. I turn to evaluating the modal and probabilistic views and argue, firstly, that they fail to account for the connection between risk and bad luck; secondly, that they also fail to account for the connection between risk and good luck. Finally, I defend the lack of control view. In particular, I argue that it can handle the objections to the probabilistic and modal accounts and that it can explain how degrees of luck and risk covary