Non-monotone Submodular Maximization with Nearly Optimal Adaptivity and Query Complexity

Submodular maximization is a general optimization problem with a wide range of applications in machine learning (e.g., active learning, clustering, and feature selection). In large-scale optimization, the parallel running time of an algorithm is governed by its adaptivity, which measures the number of sequential rounds needed if the algorithm can execute polynomially-many independent oracle queries in parallel. While low adaptivity is ideal, it is not sufficient for an algorithm to be efficient in practice---there are many applications of distributed submodular optimization where the number of function evaluations becomes prohibitively expensive. Motivated by these applications, we study the adaptivity and query complexity of submodular maximization. In this paper, we give the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for maximizing a non-monotone submodular function subject to a cardinality constraint $k$ that runs in $O(\log(n))$ adaptive rounds and makes $O(n \log(k))$ oracle queries in expectation. In our empirical study, we use three real-world applications to compare our algorithm with several benchmarks for non-monotone submodular maximization. The results demonstrate that our algorithm finds competitive solutions using significantly fewer rounds and queries.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure

Constrained Signaling in Auction Design

We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good (drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good that he is selling. Instead, he must come up with a constrained signalling scheme: a (non injective) mapping from goods to signals, that satisfies the constraints of his setting. For example, the auctioneer may be able to communicate only a bounded length message for each good, or he might be legally constrained in how he can advertise the item being sold. Each candidate signaling scheme induces an incomplete-information game among the buyers, and the goal of the auctioneer is to choose the signaling scheme and accompanying auction format that optimizes welfare. In this paper, we use techniques from submodular function maximization and no-regret learning to give algorithms for computing constrained signaling schemes for a variety of constrained signaling problems

Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online

The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms that have good approximation guarantees and never pay the participating agents (sellers) more than the budget. We focus on the case of general (non-monotone) submodular valuation functions and derive the first truthful, budget-feasible and $O(1)$-approximate mechanisms that run in polynomial time in the value query model, for both offline and online auctions. Prior to our work, the only $O(1)$-approximation mechanism known for non-monotone submodular objectives required an exponential number of value queries. At the heart of our approach lies a novel greedy algorithm for non-monotone submodular maximization under a knapsack constraint. Our algorithm builds two candidate solutions simultaneously (to achieve a good approximation), yet ensures that agents cannot jump from one solution to the other (to implicitly enforce truthfulness). Ours is the first mechanism for the problem where---crucially---the agents are not ordered with respect to their marginal value per cost. This allows us to appropriately adapt these ideas to the online setting as well. To further illustrate the applicability of our approach, we also consider the case where additional feasibility constraints are present. We obtain $O(p)$-approximation mechanisms for both monotone and non-monotone submodular objectives, when the feasible solutions are independent sets of a $p$-system. With the exception of additive valuation functions, no mechanisms were known for this setting prior to our work. Finally, we provide lower bounds suggesting that, when one cares about non-trivial approximation guarantees in polynomial time, our results are asymptotically best possible.Comment: Accepted to EC 201

Submodular memetic approximation for multiobjective parallel test paper generation

Parallel test paper generation is a biobjective distributed resource optimization problem, which aims to generate multiple similarly optimal test papers automatically according to multiple user-specified assessment criteria. Generating high-quality parallel test papers is challenging due to its NP-hardness in both of the collective objective functions. In this paper, we propose a submodular memetic approximation algorithm for solving this problem. The proposed algorithm is an adaptive memetic algorithm (MA), which exploits the submodular property of the collective objective functions to design greedy-based approximation algorithms for enhancing steps of the multiobjective MA. Synergizing the intensification of submodular local search mechanism with the diversification of the population-based submodular crossover operator, our algorithm can jointly optimize the total quality maximization objective and the fairness quality maximization objective. Our MA can achieve provable near-optimal solutions in a huge search space of large datasets in efficient polynomial runtime. Performance results on various datasets have shown that our algorithm has drastically outperformed the current techniques in terms of paper quality and runtime efficiency