PADS: Privacy-preserving Auction Design forAllocating Dynamically Priced Cloud Resources

With the rapid growth of Cloud Computing technologies, enterprises are increasingly deploying their services in the Cloud. Dynamically priced cloud resources such as the Amazon EC2 Spot Instance provides an efficient mechanism for cloud service providers to trade resources with potential buyers using an auction mechanism. With the dynamically priced cloud resource markets, cloud consumers can buy resources at a significantly lower cost than statically priced cloud resources such as the on-demand instances in Amazon EC2. While dynamically priced cloud resources enable to maximize datacenter resource utilization and minimize cost for the consumers, unfortunately, such auction mechanisms achieve these benefits only at a cost significant of private information leakage. In an auction-based mechanism, the private information includes information on the demands of the consumers that can lead an attacker to understand the current computing requirements of the consumers and perhaps even allow the inference of the workload patterns of the consumers. In this paper, we propose PADS, a strategy-proof differentially private auction mechanism that allows cloud providers to privately trade resources with cloud consumers in such a way that individual bidding information of the cloud consumers is not exposed by the auction mechanism. We demonstrate that PADS achieves differential privacy and approximate truthfulness guarantees while maintaining good performance in terms of revenue gains and allocation efficiency. We evaluate PADS through extensive simulation experiments that demonstrate that in comparison to traditional auction mechanisms, PADS achieves relatively high revenues for cloud providers while guaranteeing the privacy of the participating consumers

A Reliable and Cost-Efficient Auto-Scaling System for Web Applications Using Heterogeneous Spot Instances

Cloud providers sell their idle capacity on markets through an auction-like mechanism to increase their return on investment. The instances sold in this way are called spot instances. In spite that spot instances are usually 90% cheaper than on-demand instances, they can be terminated by provider when their bidding prices are lower than market prices. Thus, they are largely used to provision fault-tolerant applications only. In this paper, we explore how to utilize spot instances to provision web applications, which are usually considered availability-critical. The idea is to take advantage of differences in price among various types of spot instances to reach both high availability and significant cost saving. We first propose a fault-tolerant model for web applications provisioned by spot instances. Based on that, we devise novel auto-scaling polices for hourly billed cloud markets. We implemented the proposed model and policies both on a simulation testbed for repeatable validation and Amazon EC2. The experiments on the simulation testbed and the real platform against the benchmarks show that the proposed approach can greatly reduce resource cost and still achieve satisfactory Quality of Service (QoS) in terms of response time and availability

On-demand or Spot? Selling the cloud to risk-averse customers

In Amazon EC2, cloud resources are sold through a combination of an on-demand market, in which customers buy resources at a fixed price, and a spot market, in which customers bid for an uncertain supply of excess resources. Standard market environments suggest that an optimal design uses just one type of market. We show the prevalence of a dual market system can be explained by heterogeneous risk attitudes of customers. In our stylized model, we consider unit demand risk-averse bidders. We show the model admits a unique equilibrium, with higher revenue and higher welfare than using only spot markets. Furthermore, as risk aversion increases, the usage of the on-demand market increases. We conclude that risk attitudes are an important factor in cloud resource allocation and should be incorporated into models of cloud markets.Comment: Appeared at WINE 201

Reliable Provisioning of Spot Instances for Compute-intensive Applications

Cloud computing providers are now offering their unused resources for leasing in the spot market, which has been considered the first step towards a full-fledged market economy for computational resources. Spot instances are virtual machines (VMs) available at lower prices than their standard on-demand counterparts. These VMs will run for as long as the current price is lower than the maximum bid price users are willing to pay per hour. Spot instances have been increasingly used for executing compute-intensive applications. In spite of an apparent economical advantage, due to an intermittent nature of biddable resources, application execution times may be prolonged or they may not finish at all. This paper proposes a resource allocation strategy that addresses the problem of running compute-intensive jobs on a pool of intermittent virtual machines, while also aiming to run applications in a fast and economical way. To mitigate potential unavailability periods, a multifaceted fault-aware resource provisioning policy is proposed. Our solution employs price and runtime estimation mechanisms, as well as three fault tolerance techniques, namely checkpointing, task duplication and migration. We evaluate our strategies using trace-driven simulations, which take as input real price variation traces, as well as an application trace from the Parallel Workload Archive. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of executing applications on spot instances, respecting QoS constraints, despite occasional failures.Comment: 8 pages, 4 figure

Combining Spot and Futures Markets: A Hybrid Market Approach to Dynamic Spectrum Access

Dynamic spectrum access is a new paradigm of secondary spectrum utilization and sharing. It allows unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to exploit opportunistically the under-utilized licensed spectrum. Market mechanism is a widely-used promising means to regulate the consuming behaviours of users and, hence, achieves the efficient allocation and consumption of limited resources. In this paper, we propose and study a hybrid secondary spectrum market consisting of both the futures market and the spot market, in which SUs (buyers) purchase under-utilized licensed spectrum from a spectrum regulator, either through predefined contracts via the futures market, or through spot transactions via the spot market. We focus on the optimal spectrum allocation among SUs in an exogenous hybrid market that maximizes the secondary spectrum utilization efficiency. The problem is challenging due to the stochasticity and asymmetry of network information. To solve this problem, we first derive an off-line optimal allocation policy that maximizes the ex-ante expected spectrum utilization efficiency based on the stochastic distribution of network information. We then propose an on-line VickreyCClarkeCGroves (VCG) auction that determines the real-time allocation and pricing of every spectrum based on the realized network information and the pre-derived off-line policy. We further show that with the spatial frequency reuse, the proposed VCG auction is NP-hard; hence, it is not suitable for on-line implementation, especially in a large-scale market. To this end, we propose a heuristics approach based on an on-line VCG-like mechanism with polynomial-time complexity, and further characterize the corresponding performance loss bound analytically. We finally provide extensive numerical results to evaluate the performance of the proposed solutions.Comment: This manuscript is the complete technical report for the journal version published in INFORMS Operations Researc