Using Data Envelopment Analysis to Assess the Relative Efficiency of Different Climate Policy Portfolios

Within the political, scientific and economic debate on climate change, the process of evaluating climate policies ex-ante, during and/or ex-post their lifetime, is receiving increasing attention from international institutions and organisations. The task becomes particularly challenging when the aim is to evaluate strategies or policies from a sustainability perspective. The three pillars of sustainability should then be jointly considered in the evaluation process, thus enabling a comparison of the social, the environmental and the economic dimensions of the policy’s impact. This is commonly done in a qualitative manner and is often based on subjective procedures. The present paper discusses a data-based, quantitative methodology to assess the relative performances of different climate policies, when long term economic, social and environmental impacts of the policy are considered. The methodology computes competitive advantages as well as relative efficiencies of climate policies and is here presented through an application to a sample of eleven global climate policies, considered as plausible for the near future. The proposed procedure is based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a technique commonly employed in evaluating the relative efficiency of a set of decision making units. We consider here two possible applications of DEA. In the first, DEA is applied coupled with Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) in order to evaluate the comparative advantages of policies when accounting for social and environmental impacts, as well as net economic benefits. In the second, DEA is applied to compute a relative efficiency score, which accounts for environmental and social benefits and costs interpreted as outputs and inputs. Although the choice of the model used to simulate future economic and environmental implications of each policy (in the present paper we use the FEEM RICE model), as well as the choice of indicators for costs and benefits, represent both arbitrary decisions, the methodology presented is shown to represent a practical tool to be flexibly adopted by decision makers in the phase of policy design.Climate, Policy, Valuation, Data envelopment analysis, Sustainability

Pollution responsibility allocation in supply networks: A game-theoretic approach and a case study

This study introduces a cooperative game theory approach aimed at addressing the problem of allocating pollution responsibility across partners collaborating in supply networks. The proposed framework includes three different allocation rules through which companies can share pollution responsibility across complex supply networks. A case study in the context of a supply network for the manufacturing of construction materials is illustrated for demonstrating the real-world applicability of the approach

Taxing Land Rent in an Open Economy

This paper analyzes the effects of a land rent tax on capital formation and foreign investment in a life-cycle small open economy with endogenous labor-leisure choices. Differently from the previous literature, the consequences of land taxation critically depend on how the tax proceeds are used by the government. A land tax depresses capital formation, crowds out foreign investment and pulls up national wealth and consumption when consumers are lump-sum compensated for the tax. If the proceeds from taxation were used for financing un-productive government expenditure, land taxation would be neutral in its effects on capital stock, nonhuman wealth and labor. When the tax proceeds are used to reduce labor taxes, the land tax exerts ambiguous effects on capital stock and manhours, and spurs nonhuman wealth accumulation.Land Taxation, Labor Supply, Capital Accumulation, Overlapping-generations

Estimating the Value of Oil Capital in a Small Open Economy: the Venezuela’s Example

The paper focuses in the calculation of the oil capital value in a small open economy depending on oil rents. The Venezuelan case is used as an example. In valuing the oil capital, two issues are recalled and discussed: how should the exploration costs and the capital gains be treated? It is shown that the estimations vary significantly depending on which set of assumptions are made about the way to account for them and the assumptions made about how the economy functions. It is argued that during the studied period the value of the Venezuelan stock of oil capital has increased, and it has done so faster than the population.Venezuela, Oil Capital, Capital Gains, Exploration Costs, Property Rights

Relative Quotas: Correct Answer to Uncertainty or Case of Regulatory Capture

There is a tendency among policy-makers and industry lobbyists toward "specific", "relative" or "output-based" quotas, i.e., freely distributed to firms proportionally to their output. With a stochastic analytical model, we demonstrate that relative quotas are dominated either by absolute quotas or by price instruments as regards expected social cost. Furthermore, price instruments entail a lower expected compliance cost than relative quotas. Why, then, do industry lobbyists favour quantity instruments over price instruments? A possible explanation is that if the industry anticipates that the State will underestimate output and overestimate the MAC curve slope, it has an interest in defending relative quotas. The problem is that in such a case, both the environmental damage and the social cost are higher with relative quotas than with absolute ones. The choice of relative quotas over price instruments or absolute quotas may thus be a case of regulatory capture, to use Stigler's vocabulary.Uncertainty, policy choice, environmental taxes, tradable permits, regulatory capture

Rationing in IPOs

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. We consider two allocation rules. Under share dispersion, before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We demonstrate that this mitigates the winner’s curse, that is, the incentive of bidders to shade their bids. It leads to more aggressive bidding, to the extent that rationing can be revenue-enhancing. In a parametric example, we characterize bid and revenue functions, and the optimal degree of rationing. We show that, when investors’ information is diffuse, maximal rationing is optimal. Conversely, when their information is concentrated, the seller should not ration shares. We determine the optimal degree of rationing in a class of credible mechanisms. Our model reconciles the documented anomaly that higher bidders in IPOs do not necessarily receive higher allocations.IPOs

Stable Matchings for a Generalised Marriage Problem

We show that a simple generalisation of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962) yields outcomes for a generalised marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e. there is no other outcome which all men prefer to an outcome of this procedure. In a final concluding section of this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, generalised contract choice problems. The model we propose is a generalisation of the model due to Shapley and Scarf (1974) called the housing market. We are able to show with the help of a three agent example, that there exists a generalised contract choice problem, which does not admit any stable outcome.Stable outcomes, Matchings, pay-offs, Generalised marriage problem, Contract choice problem

Revealing the Political Decision Toward Chinese Carbon Abatement: Based on Equity and Efficiency Criteria

China\u27s economic reform over the past 30 years has allowed the free market to drive economic development. However, government still plays a key role in the energy sector by allocating energy conservation and emissions abatement. How does the government make an equity decision as a tradeoff to market efficiency? This is an unanswered question. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the government\u27s preference toward equity and efficiency. Using the provincial level CO2 intensity allocation data, we investigate the political decision that the government made based on the equity and efficiency criteria. We find that the equity index plays a more important role than the efficiency index in determining the CO2 intensity target. In addition, political factors such as social stability are found to be important factors

Child Labor and Resistance to Change

We study the interactions between technological innovation, investment in human capital and child labor. In our setting new technologies require new skills and new skills can be developed only through schooling. In a two-stage game, first firms decide on innovation, then households decide on education. In equilibrium the presence of inefficient child labor depends on parameters related to technology, parents’ altruism and the diffusion of firm property. When child labor exists, it is due to either firms reluctance to innovate or households’ unwillingness to educate or both. The optimal policy to eliminate child labor depends crucially on its underlying cause. We show that, in some cases, compulsory schooling laws or a ban on child labor are welfare reducing, while a subsidy to innovation is the right tool to eliminate child labor and increase welfare.Child labor, Innovation