Average-case Approximation Ratio of Scheduling without Payments

Apart from the principles and methodologies inherited from Economics and Game Theory, the studies in Algorithmic Mechanism Design typically employ the worst-case analysis and approximation schemes of Theoretical Computer Science. For instance, the approximation ratio, which is the canonical measure of evaluating how well an incentive-compatible mechanism approximately optimizes the objective, is defined in the worst-case sense. It compares the performance of the optimal mechanism against the performance of a truthful mechanism, for all possible inputs. In this paper, we take the average-case analysis approach, and tackle one of the primary motivating problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design -- the scheduling problem [Nisan and Ronen 1999]. One version of this problem which includes a verification component is studied by [Koutsoupias 2014]. It was shown that the problem has a tight approximation ratio bound of (n+1)/2 for the single-task setting, where n is the number of machines. We show, however, when the costs of the machines to executing the task follow any independent and identical distribution, the average-case approximation ratio of the mechanism given in [Koutsoupias 2014] is upper bounded by a constant. This positive result asymptotically separates the average-case ratio from the worst-case ratio, and indicates that the optimal mechanism for the problem actually works well on average, although in the worst-case the expected cost of the mechanism is Theta(n) times that of the optimal cost

A New Lower Bound for Deterministic Truthful Scheduling

We study the problem of truthfully scheduling $m$ tasks to $n$ selfish unrelated machines, under the objective of makespan minimization, as was introduced in the seminal work of Nisan and Ronen [STOC'99]. Closing the current gap of $[2.618,n]$ on the approximation ratio of deterministic truthful mechanisms is a notorious open problem in the field of algorithmic mechanism design. We provide the first such improvement in more than a decade, since the lower bounds of $2.414$ (for $n=3$) and $2.618$ (for $n\to\infty$) by Christodoulou et al. [SODA'07] and Koutsoupias and Vidali [MFCS'07], respectively. More specifically, we show that the currently best lower bound of $2.618$ can be achieved even for just $n=4$ machines; for $n=5$ we already get the first improvement, namely $2.711$; and allowing the number of machines to grow arbitrarily large we can get a lower bound of $2.755$.Comment: 15 page

Exact Distance Oracles for Planar Graphs with Failing Vertices

We consider exact distance oracles for directed weighted planar graphs in the presence of failing vertices. Given a source vertex $u$, a target vertex $v$ and a set $X$ of $k$ failed vertices, such an oracle returns the length of a shortest $u$-to-$v$ path that avoids all vertices in $X$. We propose oracles that can handle any number $k$ of failures. More specifically, for a directed weighted planar graph with $n$ vertices, any constant $k$, and for any $q \in [1,\sqrt n]$, we propose an oracle of size $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{n^{k+3/2}}{q^{2k+1}})$ that answers queries in $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(q)$ time. In particular, we show an $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n)$-size, $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{n})$-query-time oracle for any constant $k$. This matches, up to polylogarithmic factors, the fastest failure-free distance oracles with nearly linear space. For single vertex failures ($k=1$), our $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{n^{5/2}}{q^3})$-size, $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(q)$-query-time oracle improves over the previously best known tradeoff of Baswana et al. [SODA 2012] by polynomial factors for $q = \Omega(n^t)$, $t \in (1/4,1/2]$. For multiple failures, no planarity exploiting results were previously known

Cooperation and Competition when Bidding for Complex Projects: Centralized and Decentralized Perspectives

To successfully complete a complex project, be it a construction of an airport or of a backbone IT system, agents (companies or individuals) must form a team having required competences and resources. A team can be formed either by the project issuer based on individual agents' offers (centralized formation); or by the agents themselves (decentralized formation) bidding for a project as a consortium---in that case many feasible teams compete for the contract. We investigate rational strategies of the agents (what salary should they ask? with whom should they team up?). We propose concepts to characterize the stability of the winning teams and study their computational complexity