2,920 research outputs found
Some Remarks on the Model Theory of Epistemic Plausibility Models
Classical logics of knowledge and belief are usually interpreted on Kripke
models, for which a mathematically well-developed model theory is available.
However, such models are inadequate to capture dynamic phenomena. Therefore,
epistemic plausibility models have been introduced. Because these are much
richer structures than Kripke models, they do not straightforwardly inherit the
model-theoretical results of modal logic. Therefore, while epistemic
plausibility structures are well-suited for modeling purposes, an extensive
investigation of their model theory has been lacking so far. The aim of the
present paper is to fill exactly this gap, by initiating a systematic
exploration of the model theory of epistemic plausibility models. Like in
'ordinary' modal logic, the focus will be on the notion of bisimulation. We
define various notions of bisimulations (parametrized by a language L) and show
that L-bisimilarity implies L-equivalence. We prove a Hennesy-Milner type
result, and also two undefinability results. However, our main point is a
negative one, viz. that bisimulations cannot straightforwardly be generalized
to epistemic plausibility models if conditional belief is taken into account.
We present two ways of coping with this issue: (i) adding a modality to the
language, and (ii) putting extra constraints on the models. Finally, we make
some remarks about the interaction between bisimulation and dynamic model
changes.Comment: 19 pages, 3 figure
Belief as Willingness to Bet
We investigate modal logics of high probability having two unary modal
operators: an operator expressing probabilistic certainty and an operator
expressing probability exceeding a fixed rational threshold . Identifying knowledge with the former and belief with the latter, we may
think of as the agent's betting threshold, which leads to the motto "belief
is willingness to bet." The logic for has an
modality along with a sub-normal modality that extends
the minimal modal logic by way of four schemes relating
and , one of which is a complex scheme arising out of a theorem due to
Scott. Lenzen was the first to use Scott's theorem to show that a version of
this logic is sound and complete for the probability interpretation. We
reformulate Lenzen's results and present them here in a modern and accessible
form. In addition, we introduce a new epistemic neighborhood semantics that
will be more familiar to modern modal logicians. Using Scott's theorem, we
provide the Lenzen-derivative properties that must be imposed on finite
epistemic neighborhood models so as to guarantee the existence of a probability
measure respecting the neighborhood function in the appropriate way for
threshold . This yields a link between probabilistic and modal
neighborhood semantics that we hope will be of use in future work on modal
logics of qualitative probability. We leave open the question of which
properties must be imposed on finite epistemic neighborhood models so as to
guarantee existence of an appropriate probability measure for thresholds
.Comment: Removed date from v1 to avoid confusion on citation/reference,
otherwise identical to v
Weak Assertion
We present an inferentialist account of the epistemic modal operator might. Our starting point is the bilateralist programme. A bilateralist explains the operator not in terms of the speech act of rejection ; we explain the operator might in terms of weak assertion, a speech act whose existence we argue for on the basis of linguistic evidence. We show that our account of might provides a solution to certain well-known puzzles about the semantics of modal vocabulary whilst retaining classical logic. This demonstrates that an inferentialist approach to meaning can be successfully extended beyond the core logical constants
Bisimulation in Inquisitive Modal Logic
Inquisitive modal logic, InqML, is a generalisation of standard Kripke-style
modal logic. In its epistemic incarnation, it extends standard epistemic logic
to capture not just the information that agents have, but also the questions
that they are interested in. Technically, InqML fits within the family of
logics based on team semantics. From a model-theoretic perspective, it takes us
a step in the direction of monadic second-order logic, as inquisitive modal
operators involve quantification over sets of worlds. We introduce and
investigate the natural notion of bisimulation equivalence in the setting of
InqML. We compare the expressiveness of InqML and first-order logic, and
characterise inquisitive modal logic as the bisimulation invariant fragments of
first-order logic over various classes of two-sorted relational structures.
These results crucially require non-classical methods in studying bisimulations
and first-order expressiveness over non-elementary classes.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825
Preference-Dependent Unawareness
Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge of belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006, 2008). By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is behaviorally characterized as the event being null and its negation being null.Unawareness, awareness, knowledge, preferences, subjective expected utility theory, decision theory, null event
Preference-Based Unawareness
Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge of belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006, 2008). By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is behaviorally characterized as the event being null and its negation being null.unawareness, awareness, knowledge, preferences, subjective expected utility theory, decision theory, null event
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