Agents with a Moral Dimension (Doctoral Consortium)

ABSTRACT As argued by Categories and Subject Descriptors MORAL EMOTIONS Based on [9, 13] we argue that moral emotions are complex emotions involving cognitive processes. Given [9], we identify the following moral emotions : Pride, Self-reproach, Reproach, Admiration, Gratification, Gratitude, Anger and Remorse. In the field of Artificial Intelligence, we observed an increased interest in studying computational models of emotions; many computational models have been modele

The moral agency of family and consumer sciences teacher candidates: a grounded theory

If we are to agree that teaching is a moral endeavor, exploring the moral dimension of teacher candidates, as future moral agents, should be considered indispensable. Assessing someone\u27s moral development based on the hypothetico-deductive method is valuable, yet learning how an individual views him/herself as a moral agent is also important.;This research describes family and consumer sciences teacher candidates\u27 (FCSTCs\u27) sense of their moral agency, that is their understanding of what is good or bad and right or wrong. Based on FCSTCs\u27 constructed meaning developed through semi-structured interviews, this research disclosed factors that shape FCSTCs\u27 moral agency. To gain insight into the FCSTCs\u27 understanding of themselves as moral agents, I used grounded theory, as an inductive research method, to avoid the influence of preconceived notions and existing theories that might skew the horizon of my research. Data were obtained from 13 female FCSTCs at Iowa State University (I.S.U.) via focus groups and individual semi-structured interviews. Following grounded theory procedures, a Moral Agency Framework with communicative and socio-psychological dimensions emerged to conceptualize key factors in FCSTCs\u27 moral agency.;The descriptive nature of this research acknowledges the complexity of individuals\u27 moral agency. This framework accounts for the multidimensional aspects that influence participants\u27 sense of moral agency. Communication, mainly through sharing perspectives and experiences, and less frequently through definitions and strategies, showed the participants\u27 understanding of their moral agency as they brought the past into the present and drew conclusions for the future. The interaction between the self and the world is recognized in the socio-psychological dimension and highlights the concept of moral understanding, in which the individual\u27s value commitment to the good and right is triggered by her perception of social cues and influences. This dimension also brings to light the concept of consequentiality, in which the consequences to self and others of what is good or bad and right or wrong are considered.;This Moral Agency Framework emerged from and was grounded in the data. Credibility, transferability, and confirmability were three criteria that were used to evaluate the trustworthiness of this research

A logical analysis of responsibility attribution : emotions, individuals and collectives

International audienceThe aim of this article is to provide a logical analysis of the concept of responsibility attribution; that is, how agents ascribe responsibility about the consequences of actions, either to themselves or to other agents. The article is divided in two parts. The first part investigates the importance of the concept of responsibility attribution for emotion theory in general and, in particular, for the theory of attribution emotions such as guilt, pride, moral approval and moral disapproval. The second part explores the collective dimension of responsibility attribution and attribution emotions, namely the concepts of collective responsibility and collective guilt. The proposed analysis is based on an extension of the logic STIT (the logic of ‘Seeing To It That’) with three different types of knowledge and common knowledge modal operators depending on the time of choice: before one’s choice, after one’s choice but before knowing the choices of other agents, and after the choices of all agents have become public. Decidability of the satisfiability problem of the logic is studied in the article

Application of ethical reinforcement learning to a resource gathering scenario

Treballs Finals de Grau d'Enginyeria Informàtica, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2019, Director: Maite López Sánchez[en] In this project we present an application of a formal framework for defining moral values to a multi-agent system simulation of a society facing a social dilemma. First, a description of the framework and the motivation and key concepts for the understanding of this project are explained. Then we describe the case study: A resource gathering scenario, where agents have to face a dilemma between being benevolent and helping others or not, which has an obvious impact in the survival rate of their society. We use a Python 3 framework for agent-based modelling, MESA, and describe its structure along with which classes will be used in this project. We will also describe the class design for the implementation of the project as well as any other design decision. Our goal is to successfully add a moral dimension to learning agents by modifying its learning process, through the usage of norms, in order to instill our desired moral values. The results are discussed and compared to what we expect to be the optimal performance of a society facing said dilemma. We are interested in measuring its cooperation, which impacts directly in its survival rate, with and without the application of moral values. An improvement is expected to be seen in those measures when moral values are applied. Last, further work and possible projects derived from this one are also discussed as well as possible improvements to this project

Price Gouging, Non-Worseness, and Distributive Justice

This paper develops my position on the ethics of price gouging in response to Jeremy Snyder\u27s article, What\u27s the Matter with Price Gouging. First, it explains how the nonworseness claim supports the moral permissibility of price gouging, even if it does not show that price gougers are morally virtuous agents. Second, it argues that questions about price gouging and distributive justice must be answered in light of the relevant possible institutional alternatives, and that Snyder\u27s proposed alternatives to price gouging fare worse on the dimension of justice than a system in which goods are allocated by a system of market prices

On transparency in organizations

Non-transparency both in the form of incomplete information disclosure and in the form of coarse feedback disclosure is optimal in virtual all organizational arrangements of interest. Speci�cally, in moral hazard interactions, some form of non-transparency is always desirable, as soon as the dimensionality of the problem exceeds the dimensionality of the action spaces of the various agents

A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief

In virtue of what are we responsible for our beliefs? I argue that doxastic responsibility has a crucial social component: part of being responsible for our beliefs is being responsible to others. I suggest that this responsibility is a form of answerability with two distinct dimensions: an individual and an interpersonal dimension. While most views hold that the individual dimension is grounded in some form of control that we can exercise over our beliefs, I contend that we are answerable for our beliefs as long as they reflect our evaluative commitments and dispositions, or are products of our reasoning, where this does not amount to a form of control. I next argue that answerability has a second, largely neglected dimension: the interpersonal dimension, which is grounded in what I call our relations of doxastic dependence. As social creatures, we depend on one another in our capacity as believers. We depend on one another as believers not only in epistemic ways, but also in practical ways, because our beliefs inform and motivate our actions, and allow us to participate in shared practical goals. Depending on one another in these ways is an unavoidable part of cooperating in the shared project of pursuing epistemic and practical success, and it makes us vulnerable to both epistemic and moral harm. It is because of this, I argue, that answerability has interpersonal normative force upon us: we are subject to legitimate expectations associated with participating in relations of doxastic dependence

For whom will the Bayesian agents vote?

Within an agent-based model where moral classifications are socially learned, we ask if a population of agents behaves in a way that may be compared with conservative or liberal positions in the real political spectrum. We assume that agents first experience a formative period, in which they adjust their learning style acting as supervised Bayesian adaptive learners. The formative phase is followed by a period of social influence by reinforcement learning. By comparing data generated by the agents with data from a sample of 15000 Moral Foundation questionnaires we found the following. 1. The number of information exchanges in the formative phase correlates positively with statistics identifying liberals in the social influence phase. This is consistent with recent evidence that connects the dopamine receptor D4-7R gene, political orientation and early age social clique size. 2. The learning algorithms that result from the formative phase vary in the way they treat novelty and corroborative information with more conservative-like agents treating it more equally than liberal-like agents. This is consistent with the correlation between political affiliation and the Openness personality trait reported in the literature. 3. Under the increase of a model parameter interpreted as an external pressure, the statistics of liberal agents resemble more those of conservative agents, consistent with reports on the consequences of external threats on measures of conservatism. We also show that in the social influence phase liberal-like agents readapt much faster than conservative-like agents when subjected to changes on the relevant set of moral issues. This suggests a verifiable dynamical criterium for attaching liberal or conservative labels to groups.Comment: 31 pages, 5 figure