Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition

We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models. When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit complementarity as well: If an agent wants to do what others do, they want to know what others know. This makes heterogeneous beliefs difficult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria. In models with substitutability, agents prefer to differentiate their information choices. We use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price-setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness

Learning to alternate

The Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) model explains human subjects’ behavior in a wide range of repeated games which have unique Nash equilibria. Using a variation of ‘better response’ strategies, IEL agents quickly learn to play Nash equilibrium strategies and their dynamic behavior is like that of humans subjects. In this paper we study whether IEL can also explain behavior in games with gains from coordination. We focus on the simplest such game: the 2 person repeated Battle of Sexes game. In laboratory experiments, two patterns of behavior often emerge: players either converge rapidly to one of the stage game Nash equilibria and stay there or learn to coordinate their actions and alternate between the two Nash equilibria every other round. We show that IEL explains this behavior if the human subjects are truly in the dark and do not know or believe they know their opponent’s payoffs. To explain the behavior when agents are not in the dark, we need to modify the basic IEL model and allow some agents to begin with a good idea about how to play. We show that if the proportion of inspired agents with good ideas is chosen judiciously, the behavior of IEL agents looks remarkably similar to that of human subjects in laboratory experiments

A comparative case study of appreciative inquiries in one organization: implications for practice

Eight different sites in a large, Canadian urban school district engaged in an appreciative inquiry into “what do we know about learning”. Data collected over the following year indicate that four of the sites experienced transformational changes, two sites had incremental changes and two showed little or no change. This paper describes the AI intervention in detail and then explores differences in each site that may explain differences in level of change. The level of positive affect and ratings of success of the AI Summits at each site showed no meaningful relationship to change outcomes. Level of change did appear to be related to how generative the inquiries were, how well the Discovery phase was managed and the quality of Design statements that came out of the summits. Other factors exogenous to the design of the AI also appeared to play a role. These included relations between teachers and principals, credibility of local change agents, passionate and engaged leadership, and linkage to pre-existing, shared concerns. Recommendations for AI practice are given.Appreciative Inquiry Summit; Collective Dream; Transformation; Case Study

Players with Limited Memory

This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited and imperfect. We study how agents with such memory limitations, who have very little information about their choice environment, play games. In particular, the players do not know if they are playing a game. We show that players do better in games than in decision problems. This is because the players, unknowingly, improve the environment they face in games. We also show that people can do quite well in games even with severely limited memories, although memory restrictions tend to make them behave cautiously. Lastly, we introduce a solution concept approiate for analysis games in which the players may have limited knowledge of their environment and have some memory restictions. We show hos this solution concept is related to other like the iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies.

Learning and Selfconfirming Equilibria in Network Games

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an unknown state that in reality is an aggregate of the actions of their neighbors. Each time, every agent chooses an action that maximizes her subjective expected payoff and then updates her beliefs according to what she observes. In particular, we assume that each agent only observes her realized payoff. A steady state of such dynamic is a selfconfirming equilibrium given the assumed feedback. We characterize the structure of the set of selfconfirming equilibria in network games and we relate selfconfirming and Nash equilibria. Thus, we provide conditions on the network under which the Nash equilibrium concept has a learning foundation, despite the fact that agents may have incomplete information. In particular, we show that the choice of being active or inactive in a network is crucial to determine whether agents can make correct inferences about the payoff state and hence play the best reply to the truth in a selfconfirming equilibrium. We also study learning dynamics and show how agents can get stuck in non--Nash selfconfirming equilibria. In such dynamics, the set of inactive agents can only increase in time, because once an agent finds it optimal to be inactive, she gets no feedback about the payoff state, hence she does not change her beliefs and remains inactive

Collective Corporate Knowledge, the Federal False Claims Act, and the Future of Federal Health Programs

While recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have drawn focus to whether what corporations “say” is protected by the First Amendment or what they “believe” is protected by the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the more relevant inquiry for a wide range of statutory and regulatory regimes is what corporations “know.” At the core of that question is what guides information relevant for legal compliance (including product safety, employee welfare, and material risks considered by investors) from its source to any given point in the firm, including decision-makers. This Article analyzes the federal False Claims Act as an underexploited resource in developing answers to how and why corporations “know” or fail to “know” relevant information. That law provides for monetary sanctions against an individual or firm that “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” by the U.S. federal government. In the context of business entities, attribution of “knowledge” has generated disagreement between federal courts. Some courts reason that liability only attaches if a single individual, no matter how large the enterprise, knew the claim to be false. Others have determined that firms are responsible for the entire universe of knowledge obtained by employees and agents in the course and scope of their employment or agency. Finally, others have created a system of rebuttable presumptions about what firms are deemed to know or not know for purposes of the law. This article concludes that the False Claims Act’s design and legislative history strongly suggest that it was intended to hold firms accountable for the collective knowledge agents and employees possess about compliance with government payment programs, even where it appears that information channels between employees, agents and decision-makers are disaggregated and violations of payment program terms cannot be traced to a single individual. The article explains the significance of this conclusion both in the context of federal health programs, where the application of a “collective corporate knowledge” doctrine will play a vital role in ensuring the financial viability of Medicare, Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act as well as in the broader literature on organizational behavior approached by economists, psychologists, and sociologists

Interrogation and the Roberts Court

Through 2010, the Roberts Court decided five cases involving the rules for police interrogation under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: Kansas v. Ventris; Montejo v. Louisiana; Florida v. Powell; Maryland v. Shatzer; and Berghuis v. Thompkins. This Article argues that these decisions show the Roberts Court reshaping constitutional interrogation rules according to a new (as-yet unarticulated) principle: “fair play” in interrogations. The Warren Court believed that suspects in police interrogation were vulnerable to inherent compelling pressures; the Court correspondingly created procedural interrogation rules under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (Miranda and Massiah) to protect suspects. The Roberts Court does not share that motivating concern. But rather than overruling Miranda and Massiah, the Court is reanimating those doctrines according to the new principle of “fair play” in interrogations. This “fair play” rubric presupposes interrogation suspects who are autonomous agents, expected to know and protect their rights. Part I describes how the Roberts Court’s Fifth Amendment decisions are best explained by the new rubric of “fair play” in interrogations. Part II does the same for the Court’s Sixth Amendment decisions. Part III evaluates this new “fair play” rubric, concluding that it is not a fair and adequate principle for organizing constitutional interrogation doctrine. While the Warren Court’s specific rules and remedies for interrogation law have been criticized over the years from both the left and the right, its underlying premise—that suspects facing police interrogation are vulnerable to abuse and overreaching — has proven robust and continues to find support in decades of empirical work. The Roberts Court’s presumption that suspects in interrogation are autonomous agents capable of protecting their own interests is wrong. The resulting rules of “fair play” in interrogation fail to adequately protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination and the guarantee of the assistance of counsel in all criminal cases

Interrogation and the Roberts Court

Through 2010, the Roberts Court decided five cases involving the rules for police interrogation under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: Kansas v. Ventris; Montejo v. Louisiana; Florida v. Powell; Maryland v. Shatzer; and Berghuis v. Thompkins. This Article argues that these decisions show the Roberts Court reshaping constitutional interrogation rules according to a new (as-yet unarticulated) principle: “fair play” in interrogations. The Warren Court believed that suspects in police interrogation were vulnerable to inherent compelling pressures; the Court correspondingly created procedural interrogation rules under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (Miranda and Massiah) to protect suspects. The Roberts Court does not share that motivating concern. But rather than overruling Miranda and Massiah, the Court is reanimating those doctrines according to the new principle of “fair play” in interrogations. This “fair play” rubric presupposes interrogation suspects who are autonomous agents, expected to know and protect their rights. Part I describes how the Roberts Court’s Fifth Amendment decisions are best explained by the new rubric of “fair play” in interrogations. Part II does the same for the Court’s Sixth Amendment decisions. Part III evaluates this new “fair play” rubric, concluding that it is not a fair and adequate principle for organizing constitutional interrogation doctrine. While the Warren Court’s specific rules and remedies for interrogation law have been criticized over the years from both the left and the right, its underlying premise—that suspects facing police interrogation are vulnerable to abuse and overreaching — has proven robust and continues to find support in decades of empirical work. The Roberts Court’s presumption that suspects in interrogation are autonomous agents capable of protecting their own interests is wrong. The resulting rules of “fair play” in interrogation fail to adequately protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination and the guarantee of the assistance of counsel in all criminal cases

Interrogation and the Roberts Court

Through 2010, the Roberts Court decided five cases involving the rules for police interrogation under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments: Kansas v. Ventris; Montejo v. Louisiana; Florida v. Powell; Maryland v. Shatzer; and Berghuis v. Thompkins. This Article argues that these decisions show the Roberts Court reshaping constitutional interrogation rules according to a new (as-yet unarticulated) principle: “fair play” in interrogations. The Warren Court believed that suspects in police interrogation were vulnerable to inherent compelling pressures; the Court correspondingly created procedural interrogation rules under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (Miranda and Massiah) to protect suspects. The Roberts Court does not share that motivating concern. But rather than overruling Miranda and Massiah, the Court is reanimating those doctrines according to the new principle of “fair play” in interrogations. This “fair play” rubric presupposes interrogation suspects who are autonomous agents, expected to know and protect their rights. Part I describes how the Roberts Court’s Fifth Amendment decisions are best explained by the new rubric of “fair play” in interrogations. Part II does the same for the Court’s Sixth Amendment decisions. Part III evaluates this new “fair play” rubric, concluding that it is not a fair and adequate principle for organizing constitutional interrogation doctrine. While the Warren Court’s specific rules and remedies for interrogation law have been criticized over the years from both the left and the right, its underlying premise-that suspects facing police interrogation are vulnerable to abuse and overreaching-has proven robust and continues to find support in decades of empirical work. The Roberts Court’s presumption that suspects in interrogation are autonomous agents capable of protecting their own interests is wrong. The resulting rules of “fair play” in interrogation fail to adequately protect the constitutional right against self-incrimination and the guarantee of the assistance of counsel in all criminal cases