Employment and skills in Newark and Sherwood

In this report we present the findings of a survey of businesses located in the Newark and Sherwood district of Nottinghamshire. The survey focuses on growth, employment, skills, training and business advice and includes businesses across a wider range of sectors, from sole traders to large employers and from recent start-ups to long established businesses. The majority of firms have fewer than five employees. When recruiting, smaller firms tend to prefer local advertising and word of mouth rather than more formal channels. Almost 60% of businesses are seeking growth, with just 5.6% expecting to downsize. Low confidence in the economy is the main restraint on growth, with the cost of staff and a lack of finance for investment also cited by over a third of respondents. Over half of the business owners who responded had moved into the district during their adult lives and they are more likely to be looking for growth in the next 2 years compared to indigenous business owners. These in-migrants conduct the majority of their trade within the local area but also have higher levels of export and nationwide trade compared to locally owned businesses. Therefore local development policy must take into account wider business dynamics and networks. A lack of motivation in the workforce is seen as a problem when recruiting staff across most business sectors, although not in manufacturing. The most difficult skills to find when recruiting are identified as customer service skills, technical skills and written communication

Band of brothers (and sisters): gender framing in U.S. Army commercial advertising and the role of gender in on-the-ground recruitment strategies

Master of ScienceDepartment of Journalism and Mass CommunicationsRaluca CozmaThe U.S. Army spends more than 7 billion dollars in recruitment advertising, with its largest percentages going toward television marketing. However, little research has been dedicated to military advertising and recruiting efforts besides strategic recommendations. This thesis offers a critical investigation on the depiction of gender in military advertising and on-the-ground recruiting. This study uses a mixed-methods approach involving the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study on Army recruitment in relation to gender. First, a content analysis on a sample of U.S. Army commercials produced between 2008 and 2018 offers an exploratory discussion on the Army’s advertorial recruitment. Second, longform interviews with present and past recruiters shares a view of on-the-ground recruiting strategies of the U.S. Army over the last decade, and how gender plays a role

Key advertising components and media channels for recruiting long haul drivers

This research examines how trucking companies can develop effective advertising media and messages for reaching and recruiting qualified long distance long distance truck drivers. Long distance truck driver candidates seem most interested in competitive pay, paid vacation, a weekly payment schedule (along with direct deposit), assigned equipment, 24/7 dispatch, a large volume of hub group freight, and flexible home time. To reach this audience and its needs, we suggest advertisements emphasizing these benefits be placed on the Internet and social media sites, as well as in selected professional magazines frequented by truck drivers searching for jobs

U.S. Election Assistance Commission Urban-Rural Study: Final Report

In May, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission released a report comparing election administration in urban and rural jurisdictions. The survey uncovered more similarities than differences, in part because many small, urban jurisdictions have more in common with rural offices than with very large metropolitan ones. The size of the registered voter population seemed to influence administration more than did the degree of urbanization.The report was based on a national survey of local election administrators that focused on voter-outreach efforts and office personnel -- topics identified by a working group of election officials and researchers as likely to vary based on a jurisdiction's urbanization

Key staff recruitment in small firms in the UK : a survey by Cranfield School of Management

School of Managemen

No. 59: The Third Wave: Mixed Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa

Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has been extremely well-documented by researchers. In this paper, we suggest that there is a need to periodize these migration flows in order to understand how and why they have changed over time, not simply in terms of the volume of migration but the changing drivers of migration and the shifting nature of the migrant stream. Few previous studies have taken a longitudinal approach to Zimbabwean migration, primarily because most research takes place at one point in time. SAMP is in the fortunate position of having a large database at its disposal which allows us to compare migration from Zimbabwe at three different points in time: 1997, 2005 and 2010. Although migration from Zimbabwe since 1990 has consistently increased over time, it can be periodized into three ‘waves’ with distinctive drivers of migration, migration patterns and migrant profiles. The first wave occurred in the 1990s, the second from around 2000 to 2005 and the third in the years since. In this paper we identify continuities and shifts in migrant profiles and behaviours during each of these periods. The paper also examines contemporary migration from Zimbabwe during what we refer to as the third wave of migration.Our findings are based on a survey of Zimbaweans in Cape Town and Johannesburg conducted in late 2010. All of the respondents had come to South Africa for the very first time in 2005 or more recently. The main characteristics of third wave migrants are as follows: With regard to the feminization of migration, the proportion of female migrants in the third wave is the same as in the second wave (44%) which suggests that the gender balance has stabilised. However, unlike first and second wave migrants, females are now engaged in a much wider variety of occupations. There are more children and young people in the third wave. The proportion of young Zimbabwean migrants (aged 15-24) rose dramatically from 15% in 2005 to 31% in 2010. Our survey found that 28% of migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town were children living with their parents or guardians. Consistent with the younger age profile of the third wave, the proportion of unmarried migrants continued to rise (from 25% in 1997 to 31% in 2005 to 49% in 2010). More of the third wave migrants are school-leavers (the proportion of those with a primary or secondary education rising from 48% in 2005 to 60% in 2010). Some 35% of third wave migrants have never had a job in Zimbabwe. The proportion of working age migrants has continued to increase, as it has since the 1990s. The unemployed in Zimbabwe are a major component of the migration flow. Half of the third wave migrants (50%) were unemployed before leaving Zimbabwe, whereas only 18% are unemployed in South Africa. Wage employment rose from 45% in Zimbabwe to 62% in South Africa and participation in the informal economy from 8% in Zimbabwe to 20% in South Africa. Sixty-two percent of third wave migrants are employed and another 20% work in the informal economy. However, the third wave of migrants do seem to occupy more menial jobs than their predecessors. In 2005, for example, over 40% of migrants from Zimbabwe were in skilled and professional positions. Only 15% of the third wave are employed in these types of position. Nearly a quarter (24%) are engaged in manual work (compared to only 7% in 2005), 13% are in the service sector (compared to 9.5% in 2005), 8% are in domestic work (compared to 2% in 2005) and 4% are in the security industry (compared to less than 1% in 2005). In addition, many migrants have a second job or source of income, the most common being casual work and informal trading. Only 11% of the migrants have no income at all but a quarter earn less than R2,000 per month. Another 32% earn between R2,000 and R5,000 per month. Only 14% earn more than R10,000 per month and 3% more than R20,000 per month. Although the majority of migrants still move in their individual capacity, social networks (including kin and friendship ties) are playing an increasingly important role. For example, 51% of third wave migrants were preceded to South Africa by immediate family members. In addition, 52% had extended family members, 63% had friends and 65% had community members already in South Africa. Social networking not only influences the decision to migrate to South Africa, it has a cumulative impact on the decisions of later migrants. For example, while 49% of migrants had no immediate family members in South Africa prior to migrating, the number without immediate family members had dropped to 26% at the time of the survey. A defining characteristic of migration from Zimbabwe since the 1990s has been that the vast majority of migrants engage in circular migration, only spending short periods in South Africa, returning home frequently and showing very little inclination to remain in South Africa for any length of time. In 2005, nearly a third of migrants returned to Zimbabwe at least monthly and 50% of migrants returned at least once every few months. Amongst third wave migrants, less than 1% return monthly and only 9% return once every few months. As many as 46% had not been back to Zimbabwe since coming to South Africa. South Africa is seen by many in the third wave as a longer-term destination rather than a temporary place to earn quick money. Nearly half of the respondents, for example, want to remain in South Africa for a few years. Another 13% wish to remain indefinitely and another 8% permanently. In other words, two thirds of the migrants view a long-term stay in South Africa as desirable. Like their compatriots, third wave migrants are significant remitters of cash and goods to Zimbabwe. However, they occupy lowlier jobs which impacts on their incomes and remitting behaviour. Remitting continues, though not with the frequency or in the same amounts as with earlier rounds of migrants. Nearly a quarter of the migrants (24%) had not remitted any money to Zimbabwe. In 2005, 62% of migrants remitted at least monthly. Amongst the third wave, only 27% remit this frequently. The third wave relies much more on informal remittance channels than its predecessors. The proportion of migrants using formal banking channels dropped from 27% in 2005 to only 11% in 2010. On the other hand, the proportion of migrants taking money home themselves also dropped (from 35% in 2005 to only 9% in 2010). This is consistent with the fact that the third wave visits Zimbabwe far less frequently. Instead, these migrants tend to use returning friends and co-workers (up from 11% in 2005 to 27% in 2010) and informal money transfer channels (up from 3% in 2005 to 30% in 2010). All of this indicates that the nature of migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa is undergoing a significant shift and that without major economic and political changes in Zimbabwe, and possibly even despite them, the trends identified in this analysis of the third wave are likely to continue and even intensify

No. 58: The Disengagement of the South African Medical Diaspora

Conventional wisdom holds that the ‘brain drain’ of health professionals from Africa is deeply damaging to the continent. Recently, a group of North American and European neo-liberal economists has challenged this conventional wisdom, variously arguing that the negative impacts are highly exaggerated and the compensating benefits many. The benefits include various forms of “diaspora engagement” in which those who have left then engage through sending remittances, direct investment, knowledge and skills transfer, return migration and involvement in diaspora associations. A previous SAMP study of Zimbabwean physicians outside the country provided clear evidence for the “diaspora engagement” hypothesis (see No 56 in this series). This paper examines the case of South African physicians who have left South Africa. South Africa provides an ideal case for examining the conflicting viewpoints on the health brain drain given the significant loss of physicians the country has experienced over the past two decades. A 2000 global survey of the location of physicians found that as many as 7,363 South African-trained doctors (or 21% of the total number in practice) were living and practising abroad. In 2005, the OECD estimated that more than 13,000 South African trained physicians were working in OECD countries, of whom 7,718 were in the United Kingdom, 2,215 in the United States, 1,877 in Canada and 1,022 in New Zealand. More recent data from Canada indicates that there were 2,193 South African physicians in that country in 2009. The research reported in this paper consists of a survey of 415 South African doctors in Canada conducted in 2009-10 (representing almost 20% of the total number working in Canada.) More than half of the survey respondents (58%) had acquired Canadian citizenship since leaving South Africa. Of the rest, around one quarter (26%) were permanent residents in Canada and only 16% were on work permits. At the same time, 70% still hold South African citizenship. This raised the possibility that they want to retain their South African citizenship because they feel a strong affinity with South Africa. Nearly 90% agreed with the statement that “being from South Africa is an important part of how I view myself” and 81% with the statement that “I feel strong ties with people from South Africa.” The vast majority (over 80%) buy or make South African foods, listen to South African music and want their children to know about South Africa. Some 80% regularly consult South African newspapers online. As many as 60% want their children to learn a South African language. Forty percent say that their best friends in Canada are South Africans. Family links with South Africa also remain strong. As many as 81% have siblings still living in South Africa and 71% still have parents there. About 95% of the respondents had visited South Africa since migrating to Canada. More than 75% visit South Africa at least every 2-3 years, with 28% visiting once a year. However, despite all this evidence of a persistent South African identity and the maintenance of strong links with the country, the vast majority (80%) disagreed with the statement that they had “an important role to play in the development of South Africa.” Only 16% said they are likely to send money for development projects in South Africa, 15% said they would participate in educational and other exchanges with South Africa, while 13% would participate in fundraising projects in South Africa. Only 10% said they would invest in a business in South Africa and just 8% might work for a period of time in South Africa. By most standards, the physicians surveyed were high income earners. As many as two-thirds earn above CAN$200,000 (ZAR 1.6 million) per annum and fewer than 5$100,000 (ZAR 800,000) annually. In general, remitting is often positively correlated with income: the more a migrant earns the greater the amount that they tend to remit. However, despite their high earnings South African physicians in Canada are not significant remitters: Only half (52%) had sent money to South Africa in the previous year and only 19% can be considered regular remitters who send money to South Africa at least once a month. A considerable number do not remit regularly (21% do so less than once a year) and 28% have never sent remittances to South Africa. Less than a third (27%) had sent more than CAN$5,000 (ZAR40,000) to South Africa. The median amount sent by remitters was only CAN$4,250 (ZAR 33,000) per annum, which falls to only CAN$1,000 (ZAR8,000) per annum for the whole sample. Such small amounts are unlikely to yield significant development outcomes in the country of origin or compensate the country for the loss of skills incurred in the brain drain. The majority of the remitters (82$1,000 (ZAR8,000) annually. The mean value of goods sent by the physicians was CAN$340 (ZAR2,430) annually. In other words, the amounts remitted by South African physicians are small in comparison to their incomes and remitting is infrequent. The South African physicians differ markedly in their remitting behaviour from physicians from other African countries and from African diasporas in general. Further evidence of the disengagement of the South African physician diaspora is provided by patterns of property ownership and other investments in South Africa. As many as 57% of the physicians maintain an active bank account in South Africa but these are funds ostensibly for use during their visits. Only 25% have substantial savings in their bank accounts. At the same time 17% own property, 35% have investments and 27% have a house in South Africa. However, these are generally acquired before leaving. Only 5% had bought a house or property in South Africa and only 4% had invested in a South African business in the year prior to the survey. The vast majority of those still holding these assets in South Africa are recent (post 2000) immigrants to Canada. There is a consistent pattern of decline in South African asset ownership over time as the physicians sell their property, close their bank accounts and disinvest. In order to gauge the potential for return migration, the respondents were asked whether they had considered returning to South Africa. About 36% have never considered the possibility of returning while 21% had given it hardly any thought. About 43% indicated that they have considered returning to South Africa. However, only 7% said they are likely to return within the next two years and another 10% within the next five years. Few had taken any concrete steps to return. Less than 2% had applied for a job in South Africa in the previous year. While this group of South African professionals are proud to think of themselves as South African and take a relatively keen interest in events in that country, they are disengaged from any serious diasporic interest in and commitment (beyond contact with and some limited support for family members who remain). Almost without exception, they paint a very negative picture of life in South Africa and they do not see any role for themselves in helping address South Africa’s deep social and economic inequalities and needs. Neo-liberal economists and proponents of diaspora engagement will find little to support their arguments in the views of this particular component of the South African diaspora

No. 62: Heading North: The Zimbabwean Diaspora in Canada

Studies of the Zimbabwean diaspora tend to focus on migrants in South Africa and the United Kingdom. This is the first major study of Zimbabwean migration to Canada. The report presents and discusses the findings of a SAMP survey conducted across Canada in 2010. It first discusses the recent history of migration from Zimbabwe to Canada and then provides a demographic and socio-economic profile of the Zimbabwean diaspora in Canada. The report also examines the linkages that Zimbabweans in Canada maintain with Zimbabwe, and the potential for return migration. According to the 2006 Canadian Census, there were 8,040 Zimbabweborn people in Canada, comprising 6,525 immigrants (permanent residents and naturalized citizens) and 1,515 non-permanent residents (students and temporary workers). Immediately after independence in Zimbabwe in 1980, there was an increase in migration to Canada. The numbers rose briefly again in the late 1980s and then remained relatively low and stable for most of the 1990s. In other words, although emigration from Zimbabwe increased in the 1990s as economic prospects deteriorated, only a small number moved to Canada. This changed dramatically after 2000. Between 2003 and 2009, at least 400 Zimbabweans per annum were granted permanent residence in Canada. The peak year was 2004, when 1,456 Zimbabweans became permanent residents. Prior to 2000, most Zimbabwean migrants to Canada entered in the economic immigration class. After 2002, refugees came to dominate the inflow. Ontario is by far the most popular destination for Zimbabweans. Between 1980 and 2009, for example, nearly 60% of all immigrants settled first in that province. Other significant populations of Zimbabweans are found in the provinces of Alberta (13% of the total), British Columbia (12%) and Quebec (10%). The Zimbabwean population in Canada generally settles in major urban centres: over 80% live in cities with populations of more than 350,000. Toronto is the most popular destination with 41% of all immigrants. Although immigration from Zimbabwe to Canada is dominated by refugees, the survey showed that most possessed good professional qualifications upon entry. For instance, at least 30% had a university degree before leaving Zimbabwe. However, 40% were asked to re-certify or re-train in Canada in order to work in a field for which they were already trained. This highlights the more general problem of recognition of qualifications that foreign-trained professionals face in Canada. After moving to Canada, 70% continued with their formal education. Immigrants to Canada frequently discover that their credentials are less desirable on the job market or they have to settle for significantly less skilled occupations than in their countries of origin. This certainly seems to be the case with Zimbabweans, with 35% of respondents noting that they are working in a job that does not make full use of their professional qualifications and experience. Once they have gained entry to Canada, many Zimbabweans acquire more secure status that enables them to stay permanently. Nearly 50% of the respondents indicated that they are now Canadian citizens, while 33% are landed immigrants (permanent residents). The survey presented the respondents with 15 quality-of-life indicators and asked them to consider which country they rated more highly on each indicator. On virtually all of the indicators, Canada was ranked better than Zimbabwe by a significant margin. These included medical services, personal or family safety, future of children, prospects for professional advancement, availability of employment and job security, and level of income. Zimbabwe ranked more highly than Canada on only one indicator: the quality of social life. Most of the respondents have a significant number of family members still in Zimbabwe: 68% have siblings, 59% have parents and 55% have grandparents in the country. A smaller number have children (16%) and spouses (5%) in Zimbabwe. Despite these family ties, just over half of the respondents (52%) said they had not visited Zimbabwe since moving to Canada. One in five respondents visit Zimbabwe at least once every 2-3 years and a further 27% at least once every 5–10 years. Among those who have visited Zimbabwe at least once since arriving in Canada, the main purpose was for family issues and events. While Zimbabweans in Canada are not frequent visitors to Zimbabwe, this does not mean that they do not maintain links there. For example, 29% have bank accounts, 24% own a house, 19% own land and 8% have investments in Zimbabwe. Two-thirds of the respondents remit money to Zimbabwe. The average annual amount sent is CAD2,703, similar to that sent by Zimbabweans in the United Kingdom. Nearly one-third send money to Zimbabwe at least once a month. A further 28% remit a few times a year. Over 60% of those remitting send money to close family members while another 20% send money to their extended family. Only 4% said they deposit funds into a bank account for their own future use. Formal channels such as money transfer agencies and banks are the main mechanism for sending money to Zimbabwe. Informal transfer channels are used by only 17%. Consumption dominates the use of remittances. Over 80% of respondents said that the recipients purchase food with the funds, while other significant uses of remittances include paying for medical expenses, school fees and meeting other household day-to-day expenses. Investment of remittances was not very common: in the previous year only 8% had sent remittances to start or run a business, 7% for savings and 4% to buy property in Zimbabwe. Diaspora engagement has the potential to address some of the challenges facing Zimbabwe, providing a potential avenue for Zimbabweans in Canada to contribute to the country’s reconstruction. More than half of the survey respondents (55%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that they have an important role to play in the development of Zimbabwe. Zimbabweans in Canada clearly maintain strong social, religious and cultural links with each other. There is a strong sense of community among Zimbabweans, especially those in smaller cities, and it is not uncommon to find a large Zimbabwean presence at family events such as birthday celebrations, weddings and funerals. Many also belong to organizations and attracting growing interest. For almost 15 years South Africa. The survey found that, given the opportunity, the Zimbabwean diaspora in Canada is primed to engage directly in development-related activities. At present, only a minority are involved with development organizations that have links and programmes in Zimbabwe, but there are high levels of interest in activities such as skills transfer through training, educational exchanges, working in Zimbabwe and providing distance teaching via the internet. Financial support would take the form of fundraising for projects in Zimbabwe, investment in business, sending remittances for development projects, and making charitable donations. Economic activities of interest include investment in infrastructure and import and export of goods between Canada and Zimbabwe. Studies among Zimbabweans in the diaspora elsewhere have shown that two-thirds of those based in the United Kingdom and South Africa are likely to return to Zimbabwe. What is the likelihood of return among Zimbabwean migrants in Canada? The survey respondents were almost equally divided, with 52% indicating that they have given some thought to return and at least 45% saying that they had given no or hardly any thought to the possibility. However, only 8% indicated that it was likely or very likely that they would return to Zimbabwe within two years. The likelihood of return rises to 20% within five years and to 49% at some point in the future. Clearly, Zimbabweans in Canada are worried about the state of Zimbabwe’s economy and political environment, and expect things to improve, which would set a platform for their return to the country. The survey suggests that there is unlikely to be a large-scale return movement of the Zimbabwean diaspora in the immediate future. Most Zimbabweans in Canada want to see positive signs of real economic and political change before they would seriously consider returning

No. 54: Medical Xenophobia: Zimbabwean Access to Health Services in South Africa

Medical xenophobia refers to the negative attitudes and practices of health sector professionals and employees towards migrants and refugees on the job. There is considerable evidence that many officials (especially the police, home affairs officials, refugee determination officers and customs agents) bring xenophobic attitudes with them when they come to work. Those in the “helping professions” (such as teachers, social workers and health care professionals) also come into contact with migrants and refugees in the course of their jobs. They have the power to withhold services and they can certainly influence the way in which those services are delivered. This report asks whether and how xenophobia manifests itself within the public institutions that offer health services to citizens and non-citizens. It presents and discusses the question from the perspective and experi­ences of the foreign patients who try to access the system. The study extends the findings of earlier research and suggests that the phenomenon of “medical xenophobia” is very real in the contemporary South African public health system. The bad treatment of foreign migrants and refugees in public health facilities cannot all be ascribed to xenophobia, however. Migrants are also caught up in the “crisis of care” that affects every patient in the public health system. The paper concen­trates on those forms of ill-treatment that can be attributed to xenopho­bia and argues that the withholding of treatment from those who need it, and any form of discrimination motivated by hostility to the patient based on their national origins, is a form of xenophobic violence. The fieldwork for this study was conducted in Cape Town and Johannesburg in August and September 2010. Within each city, three different types of neighbourhood were selected: a middle-income suburb, an informal settlement and a township. The survey focused on Zimbabwean migrants and used two major data collection methods: 100 in-depth interviews and 10 focus group discussions, half in each city. The findings of this survey are therefore indicative rather than representative. What they do show is a troubling disregard on the part of some public health professionals and workers towards the law and their ethical responsibili­ties to patients. We do not wish to claim that all health workers display the kinds of attitudes and behaviours described in the paper. Some clearly do take their ethical and legal obligations seriously and act with concern and care towards all patients, regardless of where they are from, and despite often trying circumstances. The Southern African Clinicians Society is a major case in point as they played a leading role in promoting equal treatment for all People Living With HIV (PLHIV), both foreign and local. However, by conducting research in six different communities in two major cities, this report suggests that there is a pattern of medical xenophobia that is not just confined to one or two rogue individuals or institutions. Medical xenophobia is a fundamental breach of South Africa’s Constitution and Bill of Rights, international human rights obligations and various professional codes of ethics governing the treatment of patients. Medical xenophobia manifests itself in several ways in the public health system. Amongst the practices uncovered in this study were the following: first, patients are required to show identity documentation, proof of residence status and evidence of a home address before treat­ment is provided. Patients who, for one reason or another, do not have such documentation on their persons can be denied treatment. Second, communication difficulties arise when health staff refuse to communi­cate with patients in a common language or allow the use of translators. Third, treatment is often accompanied by verbal abuse and xenophobic statements and insults. Fourth, non-South African patients often have to wait until all South African patients have been attended to even if they have been waiting longer for treatment. Finally, migrants and refugees have such difficulty accessing anti-retroviral therapy (ART) for HIV in public institutions that many are forced to rely on the NGO sector. All of these manifestations of medical xenophobia are examined at length, with supporting testimony, in this report. The report concludes with a set of recommendations for rooting out xenophobia in the public health system