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THE THIRD WAVE:
MIXED MIGRATION FROM
ZIMBABWE TO SOUTH AFRICA

THE THIRD WAVE: MIXED
MIGRATION FROM ZIMBABWE
TO SOUTH AFRICA

JONATHAN CRUSH, ABEL CHIKANDA
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2012

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CONTENTS	PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
INTRODUCTION	4
THE ROOTS OF MIXED MIGRATION	7
THE CONSOLIDATION OF MIXED MIGRATION	12
CHANGING DRIVERS OF MIGRATION	12
MIGRANT PROFILE	15
THE THIRD WAVE	21
SURVEY METHODOLOGY	21
ARE ZIMBABWEANS REFUGEES?	22
SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE	25
SOCIAL NETWORKS	26
CIRCULAR MIGRATION	29
JOBS, INCOMES AND REMITTANCES	30
RETURN MIGRATION TO ZIMBABWE	34
STRATEGIES FOR STAYING	37
CONCLUSION	37
ENDNOTES	39
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES	45

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: MIGRATION FROM ZIMBABWE IN THE 1990s	9
TABLE 2: DEPORTATIONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA, 1990-97	12
TABLE 3: INFLATION TRENDS IN ZIMBABWE, 1995-2008	13
TABLE 4: REPORTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ZIMBABWE, 2001-8	14

TABLE 5:	STATED PURPOSE OF ENTRY FROM ZIMBABWE TO SOUTH AFRICA, 2002-8	16
TABLE 6:	REVISED ESTIMATES FOR ZIMBABWEAN POPULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA	17
TABLE 7:	PROFILE OF THE ZIMBABWEAN MIGRANT POPULATION, 1997 AND 2005	18
TABLE 8:	OCCUPATIONS OF ZIMBABWEAN MIGRANTS, 2005	20
TABLE 9:	YEAR OF ARRIVAL IN SOUTH AFRICA OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS	21
TABLE 10:	RECOGNITION RATES OF ASYLUM CLAIMS FILED BY ZIMBABWEANS (%)	22
TABLE 11:	ASYLUM APPLICATIONS BY ZIMBABWEANS IN SOUTH AFRICA	23
TABLE 12:	MIGRATION STATUS OF ZIMBABWEANS IN SOUTH AFRICA	24
TABLE 13:	MAIN REASONS FOR COMING TO SOUTH AFRICA	24
TABLE 14:	CHANGING PROFILE OF THE ZIMBABWEAN MIGRANT POPULATION	25
TABLE 15:	EMPLOYMENT STATUS PRIOR AND POST MIGRATION	26
TABLE 16:	OCCUPATIONS IN ZIMBABWE PRIOR TO MIGRATING	26
TABLE 17:	SOCIAL CONTACTS IN SOUTH AFRICA PRIOR TO AND AFTER MIGRATION	27
TABLE 18:	NUMBER OF FAMILY MEMBERS LIVING WITH MIGRANT IN SOUTH AFRICA	28
TABLE 19:	FREQUENCY OF RETURN TO ZIMBABWE	29
TABLE 20:	DESIRED LENGTH OF STAY IN SOUTH AFRICA	29
TABLE 21:	CHANGING OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE IN SOUTH AFRICA	30
TABLE 22:	OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME	30
TABLE 23:	APPROXIMATE AMOUNT (ZAR) SENT	32
TABLE 24:	REASON FOR REMITTING MONEY TO ZIMBABWE	33
TABLE 25:	REMITTING CHANNELS TO ZIMBABWE	33
TABLE 26:	LENGTH OF TIME BEFORE RETURNING PERMANENTLY TO ZIMBABWE	34

TABLE 27: ATTITUDES TO PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA	35
TABLE 28: LIKELIHOOD OF RETURNING TO ZIMBABWE TO LIVE/WORK	36
TABLE 29: CHANGES IN ZIMBABWE WHICH WOULD MAKE RETURN MORE LIKELY	36

LIST OF FIGURES	PAGE
FIGURE 1: LEGAL ENTRIES FROM ZIMBABWE TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1983-2010	8
FIGURE 2: FREQUENCY OF MIGRATION TO SOUTH AFRICA	10
FIGURE 3: LENGTH OF STAY IN SOUTH AFRICA	10
FIGURE 4: ZIMBABWEAN OVERSTAYERS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1997	11
FIGURE 5: MAIN REASON FOR LEAVING ZIMBABWE BY YEAR OF DEPARTURE	15
FIGURE 6: AVERAGE LENGTH OF STAY IN SOUTH AFRICA	18
FIGURE 7: FREQUENCY OF RETURN TO ZIMBABWE	19
FIGURE 8: AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME OF MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA	31
FIGURE 9: FREQUENCY OF REMITTING TO ZIMBABWE	32

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has been extremely well-documented by researchers. In this paper, we suggest that there is a need to periodize these migration flows in order to understand how and why they have changed over time, not simply in terms of the volume of migration but the changing drivers of migration and the shifting nature of the migrant stream. Few previous studies have taken a longitudinal approach to Zimbabwean migration, primarily because most research takes place at one point in time. SAMP is in the fortunate position of having a large database at its disposal which allows us to compare migration from Zimbabwe at three different points in time: 1997, 2005 and 2010. Although migration from Zimbabwe since 1990 has consistently increased over time, it can be periodized into three 'waves' with distinctive drivers of migration, migration patterns and migrant profiles.

The first wave occurred in the 1990s, the second from around 2000 to 2005 and the third in the years since. In this paper we identify continuities and shifts in migrant profiles and behaviours during each of these periods. The paper also examines contemporary migration from Zimbabwe during what we refer to as the third wave of migration. Our findings are based on a survey of Zimbabweans in Cape Town and Johannesburg conducted in late 2010. All of the respondents had come to South Africa for the very first time in 2005 or more recently. The main characteristics of third wave migrants are as follows:

- With regard to the feminization of migration, the proportion of female migrants in the third wave is the same as in the second wave (44%) which suggests that the gender balance has stabilised. However, unlike first and second wave migrants, females are now engaged in a much wider variety of occupations.
- There are more children and young people in the third wave. The proportion of young Zimbabwean migrants (aged 15-24) rose dramatically from 15% in 2005 to 31% in 2010. Our survey found that 28% of migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town were children living with their parents or guardians.
- Consistent with the younger age profile of the third wave, the proportion of unmarried migrants continued to rise (from 25% in 1997 to 31% in 2005 to 49% in 2010).
- More of the third wave migrants are school-leavers (the proportion of those with a primary or secondary education rising from 48% in 2005 to 60% in 2010). Some 35% of third wave migrants have never had a job in Zimbabwe.
- The proportion of working age migrants has continued to increase, as it has since the 1990s. The unemployed in Zimbabwe

are a major component of the migration flow. Half of the third wave migrants (50%) were unemployed before leaving Zimbabwe, whereas only 18% are unemployed in South Africa. Wage employment rose from 45% in Zimbabwe to 62% in South Africa and participation in the informal economy from 8% in Zimbabwe to 20% in South Africa.

- Sixty two percent of third wave migrants are employed and another 20% work in the informal economy. However, the third wave of migrants do seem to occupy more menial jobs than their predecessors. In 2005, for example, over 40% of migrants from Zimbabwe were in skilled and professional positions. Only 15% of the third wave are employed in these types of position. Nearly a quarter (24%) are engaged in manual work (compared to only 7% in 2005), 13% are in the service sector (compared to 9.5% in 2005), 8% are in domestic work (compared to 2% in 2005) and 4% are in the security industry (compared to less than 1% in 2005). In addition, many migrants have a second job or source of income, the most common being casual work and informal trading.
- Only 11% of the migrants have no income at all but a quarter earn less than R2,000 per month. Another 32% earn between R2,000 and R5,000 per month. Only 14% earn more than R10,000 per month and 3% more than R20,000 per month.
- Although the majority of migrants still move in their individual capacity, social networks (including kin and friendship ties) are playing an increasingly important role. For example, 51% of third wave migrants were preceded to South Africa by immediate family members. In addition, 52% had extended family members, 63% had friends and 65% had community members already in South Africa. Social networking not only influences the decision to migrate to South Africa, it has a cumulative impact on the decisions of later migrants. For example, while 49% of migrants had no immediate family members in South Africa prior to migrating, the number without immediate family members had dropped to 26% at the time of the survey.
- A defining characteristic of migration from Zimbabwe since the 1990s has been that the vast majority of migrants engage in circular migration, only spending short periods in South Africa, returning home frequently and showing very little inclination to remain in South Africa for any length of time. In 2005, nearly a third of migrants returned to Zimbabwe at least monthly and 50% of migrants returned at least once every few months. Amongst third wave migrants, less than 1% return monthly and only 9%

return once every few months. As many as 46% had not been back to Zimbabwe since coming to South Africa.

- South Africa is seen by many in the third wave as a longer-term destination rather than a temporary place to earn quick money. Nearly half of the respondents, for example, want to remain in South Africa for a few years. Another 13% wish to remain indefinitely and another 8% permanently. In other words, two thirds of the migrants view a long-term stay in South Africa as desirable.
- Like their compatriots, third wave migrants are significant remitters of cash and goods to Zimbabwe. However, they occupy lower jobs which impacts on their incomes and remitting behaviour. Remitting continues, though not with the frequency or in the same amounts as with earlier rounds of migrants. Nearly a quarter of the migrants (24%) had not remitted any money to Zimbabwe. In 2005, 62% of migrants remitted at least monthly. Amongst the third wave, only 27% remit this frequently.
- The third wave relies much more on informal remittance channels than its predecessors. The proportion of migrants using formal banking channels dropped from 27% in 2005 to only 11% in 2010. On the other hand, the proportion of migrants taking money home themselves also dropped (from 35% in 2005 to only 9% in 2010). This is consistent with the fact that the third wave visits Zimbabwe far less frequently. Instead, these migrants tend to use returning friends and co-workers (up from 11% in 2005 to 27% in 2010) and informal money transfer channels (up from 3% in 2005 to 30% in 2010).

All of this indicates that the nature of migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa is undergoing a significant shift and that without major economic and political changes in Zimbabwe, and possibly even despite them, the trends identified in this analysis of the third wave are likely to continue and even intensify.

INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades, the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe has transformed the country from an immigrant-receiving to a migrant-sending country.¹ Migration from Zimbabwe now includes both skilled and unskilled, men and women, married and unmarried, families and individuals, young and old. The profile of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa differs significantly from other SADC countries such as Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland where younger male migrants continue to dominate migration streams. The dramatic increase in migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has prompted a flurry of research in the last five years on issues such as the volume of migration;² irregular migration;³ the brain drain of skilled professionals;⁴ the living and working conditions of migrants in South Africa;⁵ remitting behaviour and remittance flows;⁶ the xenophobic treatment and human rights abuse of migrants;⁷ migrant identity;⁸ prospects for diaspora engagement;⁹ and the confused policy responses of the South African authorities.¹⁰

The label “mixed migration” has increasingly emerged in policy debates around Zimbabwean migration to South Africa. The term is most often used in government and refugee protection circles to acknowledge that it is often difficult to distinguish between refugees and economic migrants within a single migration stream.¹¹ In Southern Africa, the UNHCR has championed the idea of “mixed migration” to describe recent migration to South Africa from the rest of the continent. For the UNHCR, mixed migration includes “refugees, asylum seekers, people who are leaving their own country in response to governance and development failures, those who are seeking economic, educational and family reunion opportunities, as well as some who regard the journey to South Africa as a first step towards more distant destinations such as Europe and North America.”¹² The UNHCR’s objective is to promote policy instruments which will help governments to sort irregular migrants from “genuine” refugees (as defined in the relevant UN and OAU Conventions) so that the former do not clog up refugee protection systems and the latter can be offered suitable protection.¹³ The IOM has proposed that “mixed flows concern irregular movements, frequently involving transit migration, where persons move without the requisite documentation, crossing borders and arriving at their destination in an unauthorized manner.”¹⁴

To restrict the term “mixed migration” only to “irregular” migrants is unnecessarily confining since it is based on a state-centred rather than migrant-centred understanding of migration. A more appropriate and inclusive definition is the following:

Migration can be mixed in several senses, which to some degree relate to stages of the migratory process: motivations may be mixed at the point of making the decision to move; migrants may make use of the same agents and brokers; they may travel with others in mixed migratory flows; motivations may change en route and after arrival; and people may find themselves in mixed communities during their journeys or at their destination.¹⁵

As this definition suggests, mixed migration streams from one country to another are extremely heterogeneous, encompassing diverse motives and reasons for migration, different forms of cross-border movement (permanent, temporary, circular, chain, return and so on), various legal and extra-legal categories and diverse migrant characteristics.

Recent migration from Zimbabwe has also been dubbed “survival migration” which is said to occur when people “flee an existential threat to which they have no domestic remedy.” Refugees represent one group of survival migrants but the category of survival migration is broader than the legal definition of a refugee. It also includes people who are forced to cross an international border to flee state failure, severe environmental distress or widespread livelihood collapse.”¹⁶ Under conditions of survival migration the traditional distinction between refugees and economic migrants breaks down. Migrants are in the ‘neither/nor’ status of not being refugees nor being voluntary, economic migrants.

The argument that all Zimbabwean migrants should be defined as “survival migrants” and protected accordingly is an attractive one but requires close scrutiny. Firstly, it is based in part on the view that conditions in Zimbabwe are so dire that out-migration for survival is the only option. However, this does not explain why the majority of Zimbabweans have not left nor the role of migration in reducing pressures for further out-migration through remittances of cash and in-kind.¹⁷ Secondly, the argument that all Zimbabweans are “survival migrants” runs the danger of homogenizing migrant flows and downplaying the heterogeneity implicit in the idea of “mixed migration”. Thirdly, the argument that all migrants from Zimbabwe are “survival migrants” seems to largely rest on the desperate situation of migrants in squalid transit shelters in the border town of Musina and at the Central Methodist Church in Johannesburg:

As of April 2009, there were around 3400 Zimbabweans living inside and outside the church... conditions in the church are dire and illustrate the desperate situation of the urban Zimbabweans. Within the church it is difficult to stroll around corridors and rooms without stepping over

or treading on sleeping bodies strewn across the floor. The church is overcrowded and has extremely poor sanitation. Young mothers and pregnant women, and small children, were sleeping on the floor. We also found 102 UAMs (unaccompanied minors) as young as seven sleeping on the floor of one room of about 10m x 10m, with supervision from just one MSF volunteer. Meanwhile, a small, cramped upstairs room with foam mattresses was the only space for seriously ill Zimbabweans, looked after by Zimbabwean volunteers, suffering from illnesses including HIV/AIDS, cholera, and tuberculosis.¹⁸

As the authors conclude, “these characteristics of survival migration make it almost impossible to ethically or normatively distinguish between the validity of the claim of a refugee and that of another non-refugee survival migrant.” The idea of “survival migration” certainly fits with this sub-set of Zimbabwean migrants but certainly does not encompass them all.


This report focuses on the emergence of mixed migration from Zimbabwe over the last two decades. The report combines findings from previous SAMP research in 1997 and 2005 with new data collected in 2010 to identify three waves of migration from Zimbabwe since 1990. The use of data from three different surveys allows for a unique longitudinal perspective which shows how migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has changed over time. We argue here that “mixed migration” is not a recent phenomenon but has its roots in the 1990s during the “first wave” of post-1990 migration from Zimbabwe. After 2000, the migration both intensified and diversified in the second wave. The third wave exhibits distinctive characteristics from earlier waves as well as a shift in migration behaviour and intentions. South Africa is increasingly seen as a place to try and build a new life rather than a place of temporary respite and quick income. Whether the large number of Zimbabweans now in South Africa return home, and under what conditions, depends partly on how the South African government responds to their presence.

THE ROOTS OF MIXED MIGRATION

Prior to 1990, migration streams from Zimbabwe tended to be relatively homogenous: whether of white Zimbabweans leaving the country after independence in the 1980s; or young male migrants crossing the border to work clandestinely on South African farms and in towns; or male mineworkers legally recruited to go and work on the South African gold mines.¹⁹ The volume of these movements waxed and waned over time but most black migrants were from rural households, went to work and earn for short periods, and generally returned home to establish their own households when they had accumulated sufficient resources. During the war for independence in the 1970s and 1980s, Zimbabwe also experienced its first major refugee outflow to neighbouring countries although few went to apartheid South Africa.

The roots of present day migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa are to be found in the economic circumstances of Zimbabwe in the early 1990s. For much of the 1980s, recorded cross-border movements between Zimbabwe and South Africa were relatively stable at around 200,000 per annum. From 1991 onwards, the numbers began to increase rapidly, rising to a high of over 700,000 in 1995 (Figure 1). In 1991, Zimbabwe had joined the long list of African countries pressured by the IMF and World Bank to embark on an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP).²⁰ The rhetorical objectives of the programme were to ensure higher medium- and long-term economic growth, attract more foreign direct investment, reduce poverty, improve living conditions and address burgeoning unemployment. The Zimbabwean government undertook to reduce public expenditure by removing subsidies on basic foodstuffs, reducing budgetary allocations to essential social services such as education and health care, and downsizing the public service. Between 1991 and 1997, the public service lost over 23,000 jobs.²¹

The Zimbabwean ESAP, like most others, failed to deliver on its promise, bringing greater economic hardship, not only to the poorest groups but also to middle-income households.²² The advances made in social service delivery in Zimbabwe during the 1980s were eroded as the government implemented cost recovery measures and user fees in education and health care. The envisaged level of foreign investment failed to materialise. Indeed, increased competition from imports led to de-industrialization and widespread lay-offs in the manufacturing sector. Between 1991 and 1997, over 50,000 workers were retrenched by private sector companies with government sanction. Many other firms also retrenched labour without reporting to government. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions reported that its membership dropped from 1.5 million in 1992 to less than one million in 1998.

Figure 1: Legal Entries from Zimbabwe to South Africa, 1983-2010

Source: Data from Statistics South Africa

Growing unemployment and economic hardship prompted some households to look elsewhere for economic livelihoods, either in the urban informal economy or outside the country or both. The increase in the numbers of people crossing into South Africa in the early 1990s soon led to exaggerated claims that the country was being “swamped” by Zimbabweans. The South Africans responded by imposing draconian visa restrictions in 1996.²³ The cost of acquiring visas, the financial guarantees demanded of migrants and a processing slowdown led to large line-ups outside the South African Embassy in Harare and considerable tension between the two governments. For some in the South African government (especially Home Affairs) the policy had the desired effect of reducing the legal cross-border flow (see Figure 1). In practice, the visa regime was punitive, inhibited trade and economic integration between the two countries, and pushed migrants into clandestine channels.

Two main migration streams emerged in the 1990s. SAMP’s 1997 national household survey in Zimbabwe found that just under one third (29%) of all migrants (mainly men) had gone to work or to look for work in South Africa. Another 40% (mainly women) had gone to buy and/or sell goods in the informal economy (Table 1).²⁴ A total of 41% of male migrants went to South Africa to work or look for work compared to only 4% of female migrants. On the other hand, 65% of women went to shop and/or buy and sell goods compared to 32% of men. Amongst the work stream were growing numbers of professionals. A 1999 study of the Zimbabwean health sector noted that nurses and doctors were expressing

their displeasure at the worsening living and working conditions under ESAP by “voting with their feet.”²⁵ Only 360 of 1,200 doctors trained during the 1990s in Zimbabwe were still practicing in the country in 2000.²⁶ By 2000, 51% of all Zimbabwean-trained medical doctors were abroad.²⁷ South Africa was the most popular destination, accounting for 643 (or 39%) of the 1,662 Zimbabwean doctors in the diaspora in 2000.

	% of Total
Purpose of Last Visit to SA	
Work/Look for Work	29
Buy and Sell Goods	42
Business	8
Visit Family/Friends	13
Other	6
Sex of Migrants	
Male	61
Female	39

The migrants ranged considerably in age: 25% were between 15 and 24, 58% were between 25 and 44, 17% were between 45 and 64 and 9% were 65 and older. In contrast to earlier decades (when migrants going to South Africa tended to be young and unmarried), only 22% of migrants in 1997 were unmarried sons or daughters in the household. Fully 73% of migrants were married, 40% were household heads and 25% were spouses of heads of household. In other words, the profile of the first wave was considerably more diverse than anything seen in the past: women were migrating in significant numbers for the first time, all ages were represented (though there was little evidence of family or unaccompanied child migration) and the majority of migrants were the main breadwinners in the household.

Most cross-border movement to South Africa was highly temporary and circular in nature, although with a distinctive gendered imprint. For example, 45% of female migrants visited South Africa at least once a month but only 10% of men went this frequently (Figure 2). Women also stayed in South Africa for much shorter periods: 87% stayed for less than a month (compared to 57% of men) (Figure 3). This is consistent with the fact that more men went for employment while women’s income potential depended on being highly mobile and trading goods across the border on a regular basis. Neither men nor women stayed in South Africa for extended periods: only 9% of men and 3% of women had spent more than a year in South Africa in the five years prior to the survey.

Figure 2: Frequency of Migration to South Africa





Figure 3: Length of Stay in South Africa




There were also high levels of interest in temporary migration to South Africa amongst the adult population of Zimbabwe. Fifty percent of respondents said they were interested in short term (less than 2 years) residence in South Africa and 39% said it was likely that they would actually go to South Africa for a short period. On the other hand, only 19%

said they were interested in permanent migration to South Africa and 12% that it was actually likely. Most Zimbabweans in the 1990s therefore saw South Africa as nothing more than a place to help their households cope with poor economic conditions and prospects in Zimbabwe. Asked to compare their country with South Africa, Zimbabwe came out on top on every measure except the availability of jobs and goods.

One of the unintended consequences of South Africa's 1996 visa policy was that it led to an upsurge in irregular migration. Migrants without visas, for example, could pay for the services of guides who would take them across the Limpopo River at various points, a hazardous journey vividly portrayed in Jonathan Nkala's autobiographical play *The Crossing*.²⁸ Migrants from the border areas with South Africa also used informal crossing points where they were illegally recruited by white farmers to work on commercial farms in Limpopo Province.²⁹ Because South Africa refused to offer work permits to Zimbabweans (except the most skilled), others entered legally as visitors and then worked or traded. Visitor's permits were only issued for short periods so migrants overstayed in order to continue working. In 1997, for example, 78,000 Zimbabwean "overstayers" were recorded in South Africa (Figure 4). The vast majority had been in the country for less than two years and fewer than 500 had been there for more than 5 years, confirming that most migrants did not overstay with the intention of remaining permanently in South Africa.

Figure 4: Zimbabwean Overstayers in South Africa, 1997



Source: Department of Home Affairs

Increasing numbers of irregular migrants from Zimbabwe were arrested as post-apartheid South Africa intensified its efforts to rid the country of foreign migrants. Total deportations rose from around 53,000 in 1990 to 180,000 in 1996 (a total of almost 900,000 between 1990 and 1997) (Table 2). Of these, just over 100,000 were Zimbabweans (around 12% of the total) with the numbers growing every year (a trend that continued after 1997).

	Deportations		
	Total Deportees	Zimbabwean Deportees	Zimbabwean Deportees as % of Total
1990	53,445	5,363	10.0
1991	61,345	7,174	11.7
1992	82,575	12,033	14.6
1993	96,697	10,961	11.3
1994	90,682	12,931	14.3
1995	157,075	17,549	11.2
1996	180,704	14,651	8.1
1997	176,349	21,673	12.3
Total	898,872	102,335	11.4

THE CONSOLIDATION OF MIXED MIGRATION

CHANGING DRIVERS OF MIGRATION

The economic hardships experienced by Zimbabwean households in the 1990s paled in comparison with what was to follow. Perhaps the best indicator of the depth of the country's economic crisis is the astronomical inflation rate and accompanying fall in the value of the Zimbabwean dollar (Table 3).

The chaotic land reform programme introduced by the Mugabe government in 1999 was a major turning point for the Zimbabwean economy as it effectively destroyed the commercial agriculture export sector, the country's major foreign exchange earner. One legacy of the programme was the widespread displacement of Zimbabweans, particularly farm labourers and their families. As many as one million families were replaced by only 140,000 families who were resettled on the expropriated farms.³⁰ A number of those displaced from the farms found their way to the northern part of South Africa where they were employed as farm labourers.³¹ They were later joined by some of the victims of

Operation Murambatsvina following the destruction of their urban-based livelihoods and homes in various Zimbabwean towns and cities starting in May 2005.³²

Date	Inflation Rate (%)
1995	26
1996	17
1997	20
1998	47
1999	57
2000	55
2001	112
2002	199
2003	599
2004	133
2005	586
2006	1,281
2007	66,212
January 2008	100,580
February 2008	164,900
March 2008	417,823
April 2008	650,599
May 2008	2,233,713
June 2008	11,268,758
July 2008	231,150,889
August 2008	9,690,000,000
September 2008	471,000,000,000
October 2008	3,840,000,000,000,000,000
14 November 2008	89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000

Source: Hanke, 2008; Hanke and Kwok, 2009.³³

Another new and important driver of out-migration was the political violence that began as part of the land reform programme and later turned into an all-out assault on opponents of the Mugabe government. In an effort to maintain power, the Mugabe government recruited former liberation war fighters (called the war veterans) and trained a youth militia that unleashed a reign of terror nationwide.³⁴ The Solidarity Peace Trust estimated that as many as 300,000 people were victims of human rights violations during the period 2000 to 2004. The violations ranged from torture and destruction of homesteads to denial of food to those perceived to support the opposition party. Most of the cases went


unreported as the victims feared further reprisals if they reported the incidents to the authorities. More often, the Zimbabwean police were accused of inaction on violence against the ruling party's political opponents.³⁵ In 2009, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum provided a summary of the human rights violations reported to their organisation between July 2001 and December 2008 (Table 4).³⁶ Their records show a marked growth in the number of politically-motivated human rights violations over time.

Table 4: Reported Human Rights Violations in Zimbabwe, 2001–8

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
Abductions	116	223	52	62	18	11	19	137	638
Arrest and detention	670	274	627	389	1,286	2,611	1,676	461	7,994
Assault	0	86	388	401	530	486	855	1,913	4,659
Attempted murder	0	2	10	8	1	3	0	8	32
Death threats	0	1	80	35	9	7	7	51	201
Disappearance	0	28	4	0	0	0	0	19	51
Displacement	0	11	208	189	609	55	6	629	1,707
Interference with freedoms	12	39	809	760	1,036	1,866	3,477	2,532	10,531
Murder	34	61	10	3	4	2	3	107	224
Political discrimination	194	388	450	514	476	288	980	2,787	6,077
Property violation	356	807	153	132	61	55	13	596	2,173
Rape	0	7	6	3	4	1	0	6	27
School closure	0	45	1	0	0	0	0	26	72
Torture	903	1,172	497	160	136	366	536	723	4,493
Total	2,285	3,155	3,295	2,656	4,170	5,751	7,572	9,995	38,879

Source: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Reports

Shifts in the relative importance of migration drivers were captured in a 2007 study of Zimbabweans in Johannesburg (Figure 5).³⁷ The number of migrants citing political factors as the primary reason for migration peaked during the period 2002 to 2005 when they ranged from 44-56% of respondents. On the other hand, economic and employment factors again became the dominant push factors after 2006. In 2007, the proportion citing political factors dropped to less than 20%. As Makina himself notes, the distinction between economic and political reasons should be treated with caution since the roots of the economic crisis of hyperinflation and unemployment were so clearly political.

Figure 5: Main Reason for Leaving Zimbabwe by Year of Departure

Source: Makina, *Zimbabwe in Johannesburg*.

MIGRANT PROFILE

Other SAMP surveys conducted in Zimbabwe demonstrated the mounting pressures on ordinary Zimbabweans and the strong desire to get out of the country. A 2001 survey of Zimbabwean professionals, for example, showed that 86% had considered emigration.³⁸ A 2002 study found that 68% of health professionals in Zimbabwe were considering leaving the country.³⁹ The major reasons given for likely exit were economic (55%) and political (31%). Another survey in 2003 showed that emigration potential among Zimbabwean students was very high, with 71% indicating that they had given a great deal of thought to leaving the country.⁴⁰ More than half of the students (52%) said they were likely to leave because of economic factors. Even though emigration intentions are not necessarily translated into action, the trends noted in these surveys clearly indicated the fragility of the situation in Zimbabwe. In the next decade, many put their thoughts into action.

Legal entries into South Africa from Zimbabwe rose rapidly from around 500,000 in 2000 to over 1.0 million in 2006 (see Figure 1). In the absence of exit and overstay data, it is impossible to say how many of these entrants left or stayed. Most declared their purpose of entry as “holiday,” an all-purpose category that concealed a multitude of motives for entry and provides no insights into what people actually did in South Africa (Table 5). The number of entrants on ‘business’ remained virtually stable over the period. The number of legal entrants with work and

study permits did increase but remained a small proportion of the total. The numbers with work permits increased from 3,500 in 2001 to 9,000 in 2006, suggesting that it became easier to legally employ Zimbabweans in South Africa after the 2002 Immigration Act was passed. Zimbabwean maths and science teachers in particular are in demand in South Africa. Recent press reports indicate that of the 5,400 foreign workers in government schools, 3,796 (or 70.3%) are from Zimbabwe. Citing a government education minister, Chireshe and Shumba note that Zimbabwe had lost at least 20,000 teachers to its southern neighbour.⁴¹

Year	Holiday	Business	Work	Study	Other*	Total
2002	566,838	28,910	3,557	6,644	6,594	612,543
2003	526,479	26,620	4,749	7,227	3,551	568,626
2004	507,016	31,995	6,980	8,920	3,222	558,093
2005	679,562	25,286	7,079	9,909	4,183	727,726
2006	937,766	24,853	9,043	12,646	5,306	989,614
2007	916,093	28,876	13,074	13,389	5,669	977,101
2008	1,178,733	27,345	21,050	13,387	7,528	1,248,043

* Includes in transit and border passes
Source: Statistics South Africa

The rapid expansion of migration after 2000 was confirmed in SAMP's 2005 national survey of migrant-sending households in Zimbabwe. Nearly three-quarters of the migrants (72%) had been migrating to South Africa for less than 5 years. Another 21% had been migrating for 6-10 years. Only 10% had been migrating to South Africa since before 1995.

The 2001 South African Census recorded a total of 131,886 Zimbabwean-born people in South Africa, 50% of whom were black. Using the 2001 Census figure as a baseline and the rate of growth of the Zimbabwean population in Johannesburg, Makina estimated that there were 1,022,965 Zimbabweans in South Africa in 2007.⁴² However, this assumes that the rate of increase of the black Zimbabwean population in South Africa was the same as the white which seems unlikely. If, instead, we use the 2001 figure for the black population and the same growth rate estimates, we arrive at a revised, and smaller, estimate of the number of black Zimbabweans in South Africa in 2007 (509,063) (Table 6).

Table 6: Revised Estimates for Zimbabwean Population in South Africa			
Year	Annual Growth Rate (%)	Estimated Migrant Population (Makina)	Revised Estimate of Black Migrant Population
2001		131,866	66,033
2002	33	175,715	87,824
2003	45	255,604	127,345
2004	47	375,935	187,197
2005	39	522,364	260,204
2006	46	763,425	379,898
2007	34	1,022,965	509,063

A comparison of the 1997 and 2005 SAMP surveys shows how the profile of migrants was shifting as migration intensified (Table 7). The major shifts included:

- Continuation of the feminization of migration (with the proportion of female migrants rising from 39% in 1997 to 44% in 2005);
- A marked increase in the relative importance of the working age population and relative decline in the younger and older population;
- A change in the relative importance of married and unmarried migrants with a growing proportion of the latter;
- A relative decline in the proportion of household heads and spouses and increase in the proportion of sons and daughters of the household (from 20% to 50% of migrants);
- Migrants were staying for longer periods in South Africa. In 1997, 70% of migrants went to South Africa for less than one month, a figure that dropped to only 18% in 2005 (Figure 6). By 2005, half of all migrants were going for 6 months or more (an increase from only 16% in 1997);
- Circular migration was still the predominant form of movement. Nearly 80% of migrants returned to Zimbabwe at least once a year with many returning more frequently than that (Figure 7). Nearly a third (31%) returned to Zimbabwe at least once a month.

Table 7: Profile of the Zimbabwean Migrant Population, 1997 and 2005		
	1997	2005
Gender (%)		
Male	61	56
Female	39	44
Age (%)		
15–24	26	15
25–44	50	56 (25–39)
45–64	17	23 (40–59)
65+	6	1 (60+)
Marital Status (%)		
Married	66	58
Separated/divorced/abandoned	5	6
Widowed	3	5
Unmarried	25	31
Household Status (%)		
Household Head	34	28
Spouse	26	13
Child	20	50
Other family	7	9
Other	13	1

Figure 6: Average Length of Stay in South Africa





Figure 7: Frequency of Return to Zimbabwe



There was also marked diversification in the employment profile of Zimbabwean migrants. In 1997, for example, 42% of Zimbabwean migrants went to South Africa to trade or to buy for resale. The numbers continued to grow as many more unemployed males joined what had formerly been a predominantly female occupation. However, in relative terms the proportion of migrants working as informal traders, vendors, hawkers or producers actually fell to 20% in 2005. Not only was wage employment in South Africa much more important than in 1997, migrants were employed in a wider variety of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. The second wave included many skilled professionals (15% of the total), health workers (12%), service workers (9%), teachers (7%), manual workers (6%) and office workers (5%) (Table 8).

The occupational profile of Zimbabwean migrants provided evidence both of upward and downward mobility (or deskilling). A 2003 study showed that Zimbabwean professionals abroad were accepting posts in other sectors which made no use of their professional training.⁴³ For instance, only 47% of migrant teachers were working in this sector. A further 12% had retrained to join the health professions while 41% were working in other professions. In the UK, many skilled Zimbabweans were forced to work in old age homes and other care facilities.⁴⁴ In South Africa, too, there was considerable inter-sector mobility. A 2006 study showed pre- and post-departure shifts towards low-skilled jobs in farm-work, the service industry, informal trade and security, and away from more skilled jobs like teaching, the trades, financial services and

administrative/clerical work.⁴⁵ Some migrants were able to take advantage of the move abroad by furthering their studies and acquiring additional qualifications.⁴⁶ However, the acquisition of additional qualifications did not necessarily mean that the professionals were progressing career-wise as these new qualifications were often at a lower level.⁴⁷

Table 8: Occupations of Zimbabwean Migrants, 2005

	%
Highly Skilled	
Professionals	15.8
Health Workers	12.1
Teachers	7.4
Businesspersons	4.4
Management	5.1
Skilled	
Service Workers	9.5
Office Workers	5.3
Mineworkers	3.2
Police/Security	0.7
Less Skilled	
Manual Workers	6.6
Domestic Workers	2.4
Farmworkers	1.5
Other	
Students	1.3
Other Jobs	25.3

A new cohort of socially and economically marginalized people began to enter South Africa after 2000. The most visible, and troubling, case concerned disabled Zimbabweans who made their way to South Africa because there was no longer a viable social support system in Zimbabwe. By early 2005, several hundred blind Zimbabweans were living in cramped and squalid conditions in inner-city Johannesburg, surviving on handouts and begging on the streets.⁴⁸ Most lived in constant fear of arrest and deportation back to Zimbabwe. The Central Methodist Church in downtown Johannesburg became the only shelter that they and other destitute Zimbabweans could find. In 2004 and 2005, Zimbabweans began arriving at the church to seek accommodation, basic provisions and financial assistance. By mid-2008, the church housed over 4,000 refugees and migrants including unaccompanied child migrants and orphans.⁴⁹

THE THIRD WAVE

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

In August 2010, SAMP undertook a survey of urban migrants in the cities of Cape Town and Johannesburg to build a profile of the latest wave of Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa. The study focused only on migrants who had come to South Africa for the first time in 2005 or later (Table 9). The survey was administered to a total of 493 Zimbabwean migrants in six contrasting residential areas: Observatory, Masiphumelele and Du Noon in Cape Town and Alexandra Park, Orange Farm and the Inner City in Johannesburg.

	No.	%
2005	97	19.7
2006	41	8.3
2007	81	16.4
2008	112	22.7
2009	102	20.7
2010	60	12.2
Total	493	100.0

Although the survey is reasonably representative of recent migrants to urban South Africa, it excludes important groups such as those who work temporarily on the farms of northern South Africa.⁵⁰ The survey also did not include migrants living in other (smaller) South African towns. However, many had lived in other South African towns before moving to Johannesburg or Cape Town. One of the most striking aspects of the survey results was how many of the migrants interviewed in Cape Town and Johannesburg did not come straight there from Zimbabwe. At least 30% had been in other SADC countries prior to coming to South Africa including Botswana (19%), Mozambique (5%), Zambia (3%) and Namibia (2%). Once inside South Africa, Zimbabweans often started out in other towns and provinces before moving to Cape Town or Johannesburg. Fully 42% had started out living in another province before moving to Gauteng or the Western Cape.

ARE ZIMBABWEANS REFUGEES?

A fundamental tenet of the UNHCR's conception of "mixed migration" is the idea that refugees and migrants are increasingly hard to distinguish from one another. The concept of "survival migration" argues that in the Zimbabwean case the distinction is essentially meaningless. All migrants are part of a broader category of "survival migrants" deserving of the kind of protection once reserved for Convention refugees. However, South Africa does have a refugee protection system and legislation premised on the Conventions. A key question, then, is whether Zimbabwean migrants are refugees in the conventional sense. This is a much easier question to pose than answer for it seems clear from various policy statements by the South African government that Zimbabwe is not considered a "refugee-generating" state and Zimbabweans are not considered refugees.⁵¹

The South African policy derives from its broader position on Zimbabwe where to acknowledge that Zimbabwe generates refugees would be to criticise a government and leader that the ANC has bent over backwards to accommodate.⁵² Migration from Zimbabwe is a matter of "business as usual" for the South African government.⁵³ However this should not pre-empt the implementation of the South African refugee protection system under the 1997 Refugee Act. If a Zimbabwean asylum-seeker can demonstrate that they qualify for refugee status, then they should be given such protection under the Act. Yet, it is clear from 2000 onwards that it was extraordinarily difficult for Zimbabweans to file successful refugee claims in South Africa. Successful claim rates by Zimbabweans in South Africa (as a proportion of claims lodged) are easily the lowest in the world (Table 10). If Zimbabwe is deemed not to be a refugee-generating country by the government, then who were Home Affairs officials to contradict them by granting refugee status to individual Zimbabweans?

	2006	2007	2008	2009
Australia	-	-	71.1	-
Canada	68	71	75.8	-
South Africa	5	14	-	0.1
UK	11	20	25.2	-
US	43	49	59.4	-

Source: UNHCR

The drop in successful claims from 14% in 2007 to less than 1% in 2009 also reflects the growing number of claims for asylum being made by Zimbabweans. These rose from zero in 2000 to nearly 20,000 in 2006 and

then to almost 150,000 in 2009 (Table 11). The interpretation of these figures is a matter of dispute. For some, they simply reflect the fact that political persecution and harassment in Zimbabwe continued to intensify, forcing more and more people out of the country in search of asylum. The South African government, on the other hand, took the position that these were largely “bogus” claims made by economic migrants wishing to stay in South Africa and not be deported. Under the Act anyone is entitled to lodge an application for asylum and to remain in the country until their case is heard.

Year	No.
2000	0
2001	4
2002	115
2003	2,588
2004	5,789
2005	7,783
2006	18,973
2007	17,667
2008	111,968
2009	149,453

The SAMP third wave survey sheds light on this issue. Just over half (52%) of the migrants were holding asylum or refugee permits (Table 12). The key question is how many had a genuine claim to refugee status and how many were simply using the system to stay in South Africa for other reasons? The refugee determination system itself cannot answer the question since it assumes *a priori* that Zimbabweans are not refugees. What, then, do the migrants themselves say? Asked about their main reason for coming to South Africa, surprisingly few respondents mentioned the search for asylum or indeed a political motivation of any kind. A total of only 4% of the respondents said they needed to seek political asylum in South Africa (Table 13). An additional 3.4% mentioned personal and family safety, 1.7% that there was “more peace” in South Africa and 1.3% that there was “more democracy” in South Africa. In total, this amounts to only 10% of respondents giving any kind of asylum-related reason for coming to South Africa. This would seem to confirm that the asylum system had become a major “tool” for migrants to legitimise and/or extend their stay in the country.

	No.	%
Permanent Resident of South Africa	12	2.5
Asylum/Refugee Permit Holder	251	52.3
Work Permit Holder	93	19.4
Other Official Documentation	43	9.0
No Official Documentation	81	16.9
Total	480	100.0

Far more important than political asylum as a major reason for coming to South Africa were to work or look for work (mentioned by 44%), living conditions in Zimbabwe (18%) and to study (7%) (Table 13). What the answers suggest is a considerable variety of motives for migrating to South Africa, even amongst a group supposedly driven out by the need to survive. Only 17% of the migrants said they had no official documentation, a figure that could well have been around 70% but for the refugee and asylum system.

	No.	%
Look for work	312	33.5
Overall living conditions	170	18.3
Work	94	10.1
School/study	68	7.3
Availability of decent health care	39	4.2
Need to seek political asylum	38	4.1
Join family/friends	34	3.7
Safety of self and family	32	3.4
Availability of decent food	30	3.2
Cost of living	18	1.9
More peace	16	1.7
More freedom/democracy in SA	12	1.3
Availability of decent schools	11	1.2
Opportunities for trade	10	1.1
Availability of decent jobs	9	1.0
A decent place to raise family	9	1.0
Treatment by employers	1	0.1
Availability of decent shopping	3	0.3
Availability of land	2	0.2
Other	17	1.8
Total	930	100.0

Note: More than one answer permitted.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE

Several features stand out with respect to the profile of the “third wave” of migrants from Zimbabwe (Table 14):

- The proportion of female migrants in the third wave was the same as in 2005 (44%) which suggests that the gender balance was stabilising;
- There appear to be more young people in the third wave. The proportion of young Zimbabwean migrants (aged 15-24) rose dramatically from 15% in 2005 to 31% in 2010. The proportion of working age migrants continued to increase as it has since the 1990s;
- Consistent with the younger age profile of the third wave, the proportion of unmarried migrants rose again (from 25% in 1997 to 31% in 2005 to 49% in 2010);
- More of the new migrants are school-leavers (the proportion of those with a primary or secondary education rising from 48% in 2005 to 60% in 2010). Some 35% of the migrants had never had a job in Zimbabwe.

	1997	2005	2010
Gender (%)			
Male	61	56	56
Female	39	44	44
Age (%)			
15–24	26	15	31
25–39	50 (25–44)	56	59
>40	23 (>45)	24	10
Marital Status (%)			
Married	66	58	41
Formerly married*	8	11	10
Unmarried	25	31	49
Household Status (%)			
Household Head	34	28	28
Spouse	26	13	15
Sons/Daughters	20	50	43
Other Family	7	9	12
Other	13	1	2
* Separated/divorced/abandoned/widowed			

- As in the past, the unemployed are a major component of the migration flow. Half of the migrants were unemployed before leaving Zimbabwe, whereas only 18% are unemployed in South Africa (Table 15). Wage employment rose from 45% in Zimbabwe to 62% in South Africa and participation in the informal economy from 8% in Zimbabwe to 20% in South Africa.
- The brain drain from Zimbabwe has continued with 25% of migrants in 2010 having a university education (compared to 23% in 2005) and 17% having had professional occupations in Zimbabwe. A quarter of those who had jobs in Zimbabwe before migrating were professionals (Table 16).

	Prior to Migration (%)	After Migration (%)
Wage Employment	50	62
Informal Sector	8	20
Unemployed	42	18

	% Total Migrants	% Employed Migrants
Professional (lawyer/accountant/teacher/doctor etc)	17.1	26.5
Manual worker	11.8	18.2
Service worker	9.9	15.3
Trader, hawker, vendor	8.1	12.5
Office worker	6.2	9.6
Armed forces/security	4.1	6.4
Farmer	2.5	3.8
Domestic worker	2.1	3.2
Agricultural worker	1.7	2.5
Employer/manager	0.6	1.0
Miner	0.6	1.0
Not employed	12.8	
Not applicable (Student, disabled, etc.)	22.5	

SOCIAL NETWORKS

Although the majority of migrants still move in their individual capacity, it is clear from the survey that migration does not occur in a social vacuum and that social networks (including kin and friendship ties) are playing an increasingly important role. A recent household study in the Zimbabwean city of Gweru showed that migration has become a way of

life for many families, with 84% of the households surveyed indicating that they had at least one household member who had migrated to South Africa.⁵⁴ Our study showed that 51% of the new migrants were preceded to South Africa by immediate family members (Table 17). In addition, 52% had extended family members, 63% had friends and 65% had community members already in South Africa. Only 7% of migrants were preceded by 5 or more immediate family members. This increased to 14% with extended family members and 20% with friends and community members in South Africa.

Social networking not only influences the decision to migrate to South Africa, it also has a cumulative impact on the decisions of later migrants. For example, while 49% of migrants had no immediate family members in South Africa prior to migrating, that had dropped to 26% after they migrated (Table 17).

Again, while only 7% had 5 or more immediate family in South Africa prior to migration, that figure rose to 25% after migration. Similar trends can be observed with reference to extended family members (those with no extended family in South Africa dropping from 48% to 32% before and after migration), friends (37% to 17%) and even community members (35% to 27%).

Table 17: Social Contacts in South Africa Prior To and After Migration

	Prior to Migration			After Migration		
	None	1–4	5+	None	1–4	5+
Immediate family members	49.0	44.4	7.2	25.7	48.4	25.1
Extended family members	48.0	35.1	13.7	32.0	35.5	30.1
Friends	37.3	37.5	20.4	16.7	36.0	42.0
Community members	35.4	33.2	19.7	27.5	28.8	31.8

As many as 46% of the migrants reported that they had immediate family members from Zimbabwe come to live with them after they moved to South Africa (an extremely high figure given that none of these migrants had themselves been in South Africa for more than 5 years). Who are these family members? Nearly a quarter of the migrants (24%) reported that their spouse was with them in South Africa and 26% that they had children with them (Table 18). Very few had parents or grandparents in South Africa, but 19% had brothers and 11% had sisters with them.

Table 18: Number of Family Members Living With Migrant in South Africa			
		No.	%
Spouse	None	371	76.2
	One	116	23.8
	Total	487	100.0
Children	None	360	73.9
	One	75	15.4
	Two	42	8.6
	Three	9	1.8
	Four	1	0.2
	Total	487	100.0
Parents	None	475	97.7
	One	3	0.6
	Two	8	1.6
	Total	486	100.0
Grandparents	None	483	99.4
	One	3	0.6
	Total	486	100.0
Brothers	None	389	80.5
	One	59	12.2
	Two	24	5.0
	Three	7	1.4
	Four	2	0.4
	Five	1	0.2
	Seven	1	0.2
	Total	483	100.0
Sisters	None	429	88.6
	One	36	7.4
	Two	15	3.1
	Three	1	0.2
	Four	3	0.6
	Total	484	100.0
Other relatives	None	455	93.4
	One	12	2.5
	Two	9	1.8
	Three	3	0.6
	Four	3	0.6
	Six	1	0.2
	Eight	1	0.2
	Nine	1	0.2
	Ten	2	0.4
	Total	487	100.0

CIRCULAR MIGRATION

A defining characteristic of migration from Zimbabwe since the 1990s is that the vast majority of migrants engage in circular migration, only spending short periods in South Africa, returning home frequently and showing very little inclination to remain in South Africa for any length of time. In 2005, nearly a third of migrants returned to Zimbabwe at least once a month and 50% of migrants returned at least once every few months. The change since then has been dramatic. Less than 1% of the third wave return once a month and only 9% return once every few months (Table 19). As many as 46% of recent migrants have not been back to Zimbabwe since coming to South Africa. Only 3% said they could not return to Zimbabwe (a figure consistent with the number who said they had come to South Africa to seek asylum) and only 2% said they had no desire to return to Zimbabwe.

	2005 (%)	2010 (%)
At Least Once a Month	31	<1
Once Every Few Months	19	9
Once or Twice a Year	26	28
Other	25	9
Not Returned	0	46
Cannot Return	0	3
Will Never Return	0	2

South Africa is seen by many in the third wave as a longer-term destination rather than a temporary place to earn quick money. As many as 46% of the respondents, for example, said that they wanted to remain in South Africa “for a few years” (Table 20). Another 13% said they wished to remain “indefinitely” and another 8% want to remain “permanently.” In other words, two thirds of the migrants view a long-term stay in South Africa as desirable.

	No.	%
Six months or less	9	8.1
Six months to one year	32	6.5
A few years	227	46.4
Indefinitely	64	13.1
Permanently	41	8.4
Leave immediately	31	6.3
Don't know	54	11.0
Total	489	100.0

JOBS, INCOMES AND REMITTANCES


Far from being the desperate, destitute people conveyed by the images of “survival migration”, the third wave of migrants exhibit as much industry and energy as their predecessors. As noted above, 62% of the migrants are employed and another 20% work in the informal economy. Only 18% were unemployed at the time of the survey and a mere 14% had never had a job in South Africa. However, the third wave of migrants do seem to occupy more menial jobs than their predecessors. In 2005, for example, over 40% of migrants from Zimbabwe were in skilled and professional positions. Only 15% of the third wave are employed in these types of positions (Table 21). Nearly a quarter (24%) are engaged in manual work (compared to only 7% in 2005), 13% are in the service sector (compared to 9.5% in 2005), 8% are in domestic work (compared to 2% in 2005) and 4% are in the security industry (compared to less than 1% in 2005). In addition, many migrants have a second job or source of income, the most common being casual work and informal trading (Table 22).

	2005 (%)	2010 (%)
Employer/manager	9.5	1.0
Professional (inc lawyer, health, teaching)	37.3	14.1
Office worker	5.3	4.1
Manual worker	6.6	23.8
Service worker	9.5	12.6
Domestic worker	2.4	8.4
Student	1.3	2.9
Trader, hawker, vendor	–	14.3
Security	0.7	4.1
Never had a job in South Africa	–	14.1

	No.	%
Casual work	177	32.4
Informal sector trading	58	10.6
Social grant	1	0.2
Rentals	4	0.7
Remittances	10	1.8
Borrowing	74	13.6
None	206	37.7
Other source	16	2.9
Total	546	100.0

The fact that those in the third wave occupy lower jobs than their predecessors impacts on their incomes and their remitting behaviour. Only 11% of the migrants said they have no income at all but a quarter earn less than R2,000 per month (Figure 8). Another 32% earn between R2,000 and R5,000 per month. Only 14% earn more than R10,000 per month and 3% more than R20,000 per month. Given the high cost of living in South Africa, this means that disposable income is tight and that migrants generally do not have a great deal of income to remit home. However, remitting continues, though not with the frequency or in the same amounts as with earlier rounds of migrants.⁵⁵ Nearly a quarter of the migrants (24%) had not remitted any money to Zimbabwe. In 2005, 62% of migrants remitted at least once a month (Figure 9). Amongst the third wave, only 27% remitted this frequently.


Figure 8: Average Monthly Income of Migrants in South Africa



The primary beneficiaries of remittances in Zimbabwe continue to be immediate and extended family members. Only 2% paid remittances into their bank accounts in Zimbabwe for future use and only 1% remitted to community groups or organizations. The vast majority of remittances were sent to Zimbabwe for everyday household expenses. As many as 85% of the remitting migrants remit for food purchase and 58% for other day to day expenses (Table 23). Almost half of the remitting migrants send money to Zimbabwe for medical expenses, school fees and to buy

clothes. Far fewer remit money for investment in agriculture (21%), for savings (11%) or for starting a business (8%). In sum, as in the past, remittances are sent primarily to meet the basic needs of households in Zimbabwe. Very little is invested in sustainable, income-generating activity. Comparing the use of remittances in 2005 and 2010, there is considerable continuity (Table 24). Only food purchase was significantly more important in 2010 (from 65% to 87%). However, food remains extremely expensive in comparison to local incomes and in comparison to South Africa. Hence, it is not surprising to see food still being bought in South Africa and sent back to Zimbabwe by migrants. As many as 79% of migrants said they had sent food to Zimbabwe in the previous year.

Figure 9: Frequency of Remitting to Zimbabwe



	No.	%
R1–R499	15	4.1
R500–R999	33	9.0
R1,000–R1,499	20	5.5
R1,500–R1,999	22	6.0
R2,000–R2,499	47	12.8
R2,500–R4,999	64	17.5
R5,000–R9,999	61	16.7
R10,000–R14,999	31	8.5
R15,000–R19,999	12	3.3
R20,000+	12	3.3
Don't know	30	8.2
Refused	19	5.2
Total	366	100.0

	2005 (%)	2010 (%)
To buy food	67.0	85.2
To meet other household expenses	–	57.9
To pay educational/school fees	48.5	49.2
To pay medical expenses	–	48.1
To buy clothes	49.1	47.5
To pay transportation costs	29.1	30.3
For agricultural inputs/equipment	26.8	21.3
To build, maintain or renovate their dwelling	49.5	19.7
For special events	16.5	16.9
To buy property	–	15.3
To start or run a business	–	11.2
To purchase livestock	–	9.6
For savings	16.2	8.2
Other reason	–	3.3

In terms of how remittances are sent to Zimbabwe, the third wave relies much more on informal mechanisms than their predecessors. The proportion of migrants using formal banking channels dropped from 27% in 2005 to only 11% in 2010 (Table 25). This may be because the third wave has found it more difficult to open bank accounts in South Africa by virtue of their non-resident status in the country. On the other hand, the proportion of migrants taking money themselves also dropped (from 35% in 2005 to only 9% in 2010). This is consistent with the finding that the third wave of migrants visit Zimbabwe less frequently. Instead, these migrants tend to use returning friends and co-workers (up from 11% in 2005 to 27% in 2010) and informal money transfer channels (up from 3% in 2005 to 30% in 2010). Informal channels are dominated by cross-border transport operators known as the *omalayisha*.⁵⁶

	2005	2010
Through a bank	26.9	11.3
Take it themselves	34.6	8.9
With a friend or co-worker	11.0	27.2
Formal money transfer agency/post office	14.5	18.1
Informal money transfer	2.9	30.4
Other means	9.8	4.0

RETURN MIGRATION TO ZIMBABWE

Chetsanga's study of emigrant Zimbabwean professionals in 2003 showed that 62.5% of the respondents expressed a willingness to return to Zimbabwe and settle permanently.⁵⁷ Likewise, Makina and Bloch found in separate studies that exactly two-thirds of Zimbabweans abroad intended to return to settle permanently. Both studies included skilled and unskilled migrants. Skilled professionals might find it easier to integrate into the host country and be less unwilling to resettle even if political and economic conditions were to change. A study of Zimbabwean emigrant doctors, for example, found the likelihood of returning was as low as 29%.⁵⁸ Nearly half of the respondents (48%) did not see themselves ever returning to Zimbabwe to either live or work.

A number of studies have shown that fundamental change in the present economic and political environment is one of the most important pre-conditions for return migration to Zimbabwe.⁵⁹ However, a change in these conditions does not automatically mean that Zimbabweans will move back to the country in large numbers. Even though return can be influenced by the course of events in the country of origin, it also has a lot to do with conditions in the destination country. The majority of migrants in the third wave seem in no hurry to return to Zimbabwe. Only 11% said that they wanted to return as soon as they could and 16% that they wanted to return permanently in the next year (Table 26). As many as 46% said they would only return permanently "in a few years" time. However, only 6% said they would never return permanently to Zimbabwe, while 20% were undecided. Consistent with these findings, 45% of the migrants want to become permanent residents of South Africa (and a quarter to become South African citizens) (Table 27). Again indicating that permanent relocation to South Africa in the long term is not intended, only 13% said they wanted to retire in South Africa and 6% that they wanted to be buried there.

	No.	%
As soon as possible	53	10.9
A few weeks	3	0.6
One month	5	1.0
A few months	24	4.9
Six months	10	2.0
One year	42	8.6
A few years	226	46.3
Never	29	5.9
Don't know	96	19.7
Total	488	100.0

Table 27: Attitudes to Permanent Residence in South Africa			
		No.	%
Want to become a permanent resident of South Africa?	Yes	217	44.9
	No	258	53.4
	Don't know	8	1.7
	Total	483	100.0
Want to become a citizen of South Africa?	Yes	121	25.2
	No	348	72.3
	Don't know	12	2.5
	Total	481	100.0
Want to live in South Africa when you retire?	Yes	61	12.7
	No	399	83.1
	Don't know	20	4.2
	Total	480	100.0
Want to be buried in South Africa?	Yes	28	5.8
	No	434	90.2
	Don't know	19	4.0
	Total	481	100.0

Just because migrants want to remain in South Africa on a long-term basis, it does not mean that they will actually be able to do so as the obstacles to long-term or permanent residence in South Africa are many. Thus, far fewer migrants thought it likely that they would remain in South Africa for as long as they wanted to. For example, 53% felt it was likely or very likely that they would return permanently to Zimbabwe within two years and 62% within five years (Table 28). Only 7% said they were unlikely or very unlikely to return.

Finally, the migrants were asked what changes might prompt them to return permanently to Zimbabwe. The two changes mentioned by most respondents are a change in economic conditions (89%) and improved job opportunities (79%) (Table 29). Improved safety and security were mentioned by 69% and changes in the political system by 67%. In other words, while economic changes are seen as paramount, these are not seen as disconnected from substantive political change. Levels of optimism about either are not high, explaining why so many see their immediate future in South Africa and not Zimbabwe.

		No.	%
Within the next two years?	Very likely	117	25.2
	Likely	128	27.6
	Unlikely	89	19.2
	Very unlikely	77	16.6
	Don't know	53	11.4
	Total	464	100.0
Within the next five years?	Very likely	140	31.5
	Likely	138	31.0
	Unlikely	64	14.4
	Very unlikely	44	9.9
	Don't know	59	13.3
	Total	445	100.0
At some time in the future?	Very likely	216	47.5
	Likely	144	31.6
	Unlikely	19	4.2
	Very unlikely	15	3.3
	Don't know	61	13.4
	Total	455	100.0

		No.	%
Change in the political system	Yes	322	66.9
	No	159	33.1
	Total	481	100.0
Improved job opportunities	Yes	379	79.5
	No	98	20.5
	Total	477	100.0
Change in economic conditions	Yes	427	89.5
	No	50	10.5
	Total	477	100.0
Improved safety and security	Yes	325	69.0
	No	146	31.0
	Total	471	100.0
Other	Yes	64	41.6
	No	90	58.4
	Total	154	100.0

STRATEGIES FOR STAYING

Migrants adopt various strategies to narrow the gap between their desire to remain in South Africa and the likelihood of doing so. The first, and most risky of all, is to live and work in South Africa “under the radar”. Before the temporary suspension of deportations in 2009, this meant constant vigilance, avoidance of places where the police commonly target people for deportation, and having a few hundred Rand in the pocket to pay the bribe demanded by arresting officers. Secondly, some migrants try to legitimise their stay by acquiring legal residence permits. Only 2.5% had managed to acquire permanent residence permits in South Africa, which would be the ultimate goal for someone wishing for an extended stay. The third strategy, discussed above, is to apply for asylum and obtain an asylum seeker permit. Half of the respondents had these permits which enable them to remain in the country until they are accepted or rejected as refugees. Finally, the pressure on the refugee determination system forced the South African government into a new policy direction and to implement an “immigration amnesty” for Zimbabweans in 2010. By the time the chaotic Zimbabwe Dispensation Project ended in mid-2011, a total of 275,000 Zimbabweans had applied for four-year work, study, business or residence permits in South Africa.⁶⁰ Amongst their number were many in the third wave.

CONCLUSION

The dimensions of migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa have been extremely well-documented by researchers. In this paper, we suggest that there is a need to periodize these migration flows in order to understand how and why they have changed over time, not simply in terms of the volume of migration but also the changing drivers of migration and the shifting nature of the migrant stream. Few studies have taken a longitudinal approach to Zimbabwean migration, primarily because most research is of a cross-sectional nature at one point in time. SAMP is in the position of having a large database at its disposal which allows us to compare migration from Zimbabwe at three different points in time: 1997, 2005 and 2010. In this conclusion we reflect on what a longitudinal perspective reveals about migration between the two countries.

Firstly, there is a recent tendency in South African policy circles to speak of movement from Zimbabwe in terms of “mixed migration”. As we argue at the outset, this is a useful concept provided that it is not defined too narrowly. However, although the term may only recently have

entered policy discourse, our study shows that the phenomenon itself is not new and can be traced back to the 1990s when Zimbabweans first began to realise that they could not secure an adequate livelihood within the boundaries of their own country. The migrant stream that emerged was unlike anything that Zimbabwe have experienced before in its diversity and in the degree of participation by a broad range of Zimbabweans.

Secondly, the idea of “mixed migration” popularised by agencies such as the UNHCR is based on the premise that migration from Zimbabwe consists both of refugees and non-refugees but that it is almost impossible to distinguish the two, especially when non-refugees begin to use the refugee protection system to legitimise their stay in South Africa. The massive increase in refugee claimants from Zimbabwe in the last five years (as well as a significant increase from countries such as Malawi) is therefore viewed not as a product of increasing forced migration but of manipulation of the refugee protection system. Although our survey is far from being a representative sample of all Zimbabweans in South Africa, over 50% of respondents were holding asylum or refugee permits but only 4% said they had come to South Africa to escape political persecution. In dealing with this situation, the South African government had two options: to rely on its time-honoured (but unsuccessful and rights abusing) strategy of detention and deportation or to offer an amnesty to Zimbabweans in the country who could trade in their asylum seeker permits for legal residence. The amnesty is the fourth offered since the end of apartheid and there is not a great deal of evidence that any lessons were learned from the previous three.⁶¹ Yet, it has potentially given over 250,000 Zimbabweans the legal foothold in South Africa that they previously lacked.

Thirdly, although migration from Zimbabwe has consistently increased since the mid-1990s, it can be periodized into three “waves” since each period has had distinctive drivers of migration, migration patterns and migrant profiles. The first wave occurred in the 1990s, the second from around 2000 to around 2005 and the third in the years since. In this paper we have focused primarily on changing migrant profiles and behaviours, which the SAMP data provides considerable information about. Shifts in the gender profile of migration over this period have not been that significant but what has changed has been the roles and activities in which migrant women engage. These are now far more complex and diverse than they were in the 1990s when most women migrants were cross-border traders. There are also major changes in the age structure, employment profile and migrant behaviour of first, second and third wave migrants.

Fourthly, there is a common assumption that most recent migration from Zimbabwe has been driven by the need to “survive”. The title of the

recent SAMP set of essays, *Zimbabwe's Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival*, is emblematic of this perspective although that volume argues that it is migration that has allowed people in Zimbabwe to survive. Claims have been made that Zimbabwean migration to South Africa is an example of a more general phenomenon known as "survival migration". As we suggest, the evidence for this argument is largely impressionistic and based on observation of groups of migrants who genuinely are living desperate lives on the margins of South African society. The third wave migrants interviewed for this study cannot be said to be survival migrants in this sense. Though their lives are precarious, they are actively carving out lives and livelihoods and building social networks in a hostile land.

Finally, migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa has usually been portrayed as short-term and circular in nature. Although circular migration is still very common, there is evidence that the third wave have a different take on what they are doing. They remit less frequently, they return home less frequently and they see residence in South Africa as much more than a quick fix. While the possibility of return to Zimbabwe is left very much open and few say they want to remain in South Africa permanently, there is growing evidence that Zimbabweans are increasingly viewing South Africa as a longer-term destination.

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